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 Abstract  
This dissertation examines the global crisis of protection through the lens of the Syrian refugee 
crisis and the particular experiences of refugees’ journeys to Sweden.  
In doing so, the dissertation challenges the dominant narratives that represent refugees either as 
victims who deserve aid in their regions, or as threats when they exert their agency and journey 
towards the global north. In the same vein, the dissertation problematizes the dominant narrative 
of the “European crisis of migration” and proposes that the “unauthorized” arrivals of refugees in 
Europe are reflections of a global crisis of protection, a crisis that develops as a result of a failing 
protection regime and bordering practices against refugees from the global south. These practices 
are based to a large degree on government policies designed to contain refugees in their regions 
and deter them from reaching the states of the global north where they believe they can have 
better access to rights. The dissertation proposes that such practices do not deter desperate 
refugees from arriving in the global north, but rather increase the “human cost” (Spijkerboer, 
2007) of their journeys by reducing the legal and safe pathways and forcing refugees into 
illegality and precarity.  
The dissertation examines the journeys of refugees from Syria towards Sweden. These refugees 
escaped the war in their homeland, only to find themselves trapped between a failing protection 
regime and a global system of border controls. Those who decide to journey towards other 
destinations are transformed from being refugees, who deserve protection, into “irregular 
migrants”, who are criminalized for challenging the regime of borders. Due to such precarity and 
illegality, refugees arrive at their intended destinations with a heavy load of pain, fear, and 
confusion, which influences their sense of identity and belonging and affects their ability to 
integrate into their new localities.  
Informed by the knowledge of refugees and through their stories, the dissertation develops a 
conceptual framework of the refugee journey. It addresses the journey as an act of survival and 
resistance that is messy and complex and involves high degrees of agency but also precarity, 
which entails a transformative impact on a refugee’s role, positionality, and identity. 
The dissertation centralizes refugees as the prime source of knowledge and presents them as real 
individuals with various backgrounds and aspirations. It focuses on people’s own experiences 
and stories which are often left out of policymaking, and absent from high-level discussions 
between government leaders, policymakers, and international organizations including the United 
Nations.   
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Introduction 
 َلِيبَس اَهَْيلِإ اَنْعََطتْسا اَم َاذإ َةاَيَحلا ُّبُِحن ُنْحَنَو 
 َليِخَن َْوأ اَمُهَنَْيب ِجَسَْفَنبْلِل ًةََنْذئِم ُعَفْرَن ِنيْديِهَش َنَْيب ُُصقْرَنَو 
 َلِيبَس اَهْيَلِإ اَنْعََطتْسا اَم َاذِإ َةاَيَحلا ُّبُِحن 
 ً اطْيَخ ِ زَقلا َِةدُود ْنِم ُقِرَْسنَو  َليِح َّرلا َاذَه َجِ يَُسنَو اََنل ًءاَمَس يِنْبَنِل 
 َليِمَج ًاراََهن ِتاَقُرُّطلا ىَلِإ ُنيِمَساَيلا َجُرَْخي ْيَك ِةَقيِدَحلا َباَب َُحتَْفنَو 
 َلِيبَس اَهْيَلِإ اَنْعََطتْسا اَم َاذِإ َةاَيَحلا ُّبُِحن 
 ُّنلا َعيرَس ًاتاَبَن اَنْمَقأ ُثْيَح ُعَرْزَنَو َلِيَتق اَنْمََقأ ُثْيَح ْدصْحَنَو ، ِ  وُم 
 َليِهَص َّرَمَملا ِباُرت َقَْوف ُمُسْرَنَو ،ِديَِعبلا ِديَِعبلا َنَْول ِياَّنلا يِف ُُخفَْننَو 
 ًارَجَح اَنَءاَمَْسأ ُُبتَْكنَو’ َلْيَّللا اََنل ْحِضَْوأ ُقْرَبلا اَهَُّيأ ’ َليَِلق ْحِضَْوأ 
ذِإ َةاَيَحلا ُّبُِحنلِيبَس اَهْيَلِإ اَنْعََطتْسا اَم ا… 
And we love life whenever we can… We dance and throw up a minaret or raise palm trees for 
the violets growing between two martyrs. 
 
We love life whenever we can… We steal a thread from a silk-worm to weave a sky and a fence 
for our journey. 
 
We open the garden gate for the jasmine to walk into the street as a beautiful day. 
 
We love life whenever we can… Wherever we settle we grow fast-growing plants, wherever we 
settle we harvest a murdered man. 
 
We blow into the flute the color of far away, of far away, we draw on the dust in the passage the 
neighing of a horse… And we write our names in the form of stones.  
Lightning, brighten the night for us, brighten the night a little. 
We love life whenever we can. (Mahmoud Darwish) 
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Research Overview 
     It was July 2012 when I heard my mother’s broken voice over the phone, telling me about her 
escape with my father from our house in the Yarmouk neighbourhood of Damascus. My mother, 
who is in her mid-seventies, had been collecting the laundry from the balcony that morning when 
the fighting approached the house and forced her and my eighty-year-old father to leave. I could 
not stop my tears while listening to the details of their frantic rush from one street to another in 
Yarmouk until they found a car that took them to my brother’s house in the west of Damascus. 
My mother ended the phone call weeping, “The house came under fire… We had to run away … 
We had to leave ... We became refugees.”   
As I was born and raised in Yarmouk, where I lived among Palestinian refugees and 
studied in UNRWA schools,1 I have always been surrounded by stories of war, statelessness, 
displacement, and journeys, and yet also by resilience and agency. Through these stories, I learnt 
that refugeehood is an emotional and political state of being as well as a label or legal status. I 
was exposed constantly to the pain of loss and uprootedness in my daily interactions with my 
Palestinian neighbours and friends, and with my own family. 
     I was reminded of my mother’s words of July 2012 and all the stories I had heard over the 
years about uprootedness while I watched the faces of exhausted men, women, and children 
arriving at Lesvos in overcrowded, inflatable boats. The images of these arrivals summarized the 
tears and broken voices of millions of individuals who have been forced to leave their homes in 
search of protection – unable to find it in their own regions. But it was one image – that of Alan 
Kurdi, the three-year-old Syrian boy whose body was found washed up on the Turkish coast in 
                                                          
1 UNRWA is the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Neat East. 
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September 2015, as he and his family  journeyed to Greece seeking asylum - that captured the 
world’s attention, if only temporarily.  
     Despite the tragedies of these people and their need for protection, politicians and far-right 
representatives across Europe perceived the arrivals as constituting a “European crisis of 
migration” that needed to be managed and controlled (BBC, 2015; European Parliament, 2017). 
Some politicians referred to refugees as “others,” who threatened the political, social, and 
cultural identity of Europe. These types of fear-mongers railed against the newcomers and what 
they perceived as the “open door” policies implemented temporarily by German Chancellor 
Angela Merkel during the summer and autumn of 2015. The British National Party, for example, 
accused Chancellor Merkel of committing “a genocide against Europeans” (US News, 2015), 
while British Home Secretary at the time, Theresa May announced her reluctance to assist the 
refugees, whom she considered “the ones who are strong and rich enough to come to Europe” 
(Spiegel Online, 2015). Certain eastern and central European governments explicitly challenged 
the European Union’s (EU) relocation scheme for 160,000 refugees who were in Greece and 
Italy in 2015, a project that was advocated mainly by Germany. The Slovakian prime minister, 
Robert Fico, announced that his country would accept only Christian refugees (New York Times, 
2015), and his Hungarian counterpart, Viktor Orbán, described the arrival of refugees as a 
“rebellion by illegal migrants” (ibid.). The Director of National Intelligence in the United States 
went so far as to term the situation in Europe “a disaster of biblical proportions” (Fox News 
Politics, 2015), questioning the background of refugees arriving from Syria and Iraq and linking 
them to possible future terrorist activities. 
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     Informed by my personal knowledge of refugees’ experiences during war and displacement, 
and inspired by stories I heard from refugees about their journeys in search of protection, in this 
dissertation I challenge this negative type of official narrative and argue rather that the arrivals of 
refugees along Europe’s shores, as well as of the bodies of those who did not survive the 
journey, reflect in fact an underlying, structural crisis. This is a crisis of protection that is caused 
by the failure of the international refugee regime to protect refugees fleeing from war in their 
homelands, forcing them instead to experience sometimes extreme conditions of precarity as 
they seek refuge in other destiantions.  
     In this dissertation, I focus on people’s own experiences and their stories, which are more 
often left out of the policy-making process and largely absent from high-level reports and 
discussions between government leaders, policy makers, and international organizations 
responding to the crisis. I propose that it is critical to examine the crisis of protection by listening 
to and understanding refugees’ stories about their own experiences of fleeing war, encountering 
borders, and undertaking difficult, even tragic journeys in search of protection. By undertaking 
these journeys, refugees have refused to wait passively for borders to open and third-country 
resettlement to provide them with the promised protection from the international refugee system. 
Instead, refugees have made myriad decisions to improve their situation, sometimes making 
dangerous journeys across the Mediterranean and Aegean Seas, thus engaging the world as 
political subjects.  
     By focusing on the journeys of refugees from Syria, this dissertation examines refugees’ 
decisions to undertake such journeys as acts of survival and resistance, thus also resisting the 
dehumanizing conditions of displacement in the neighbouring countries of Lebanon, Jordan, and 
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Turkey and choosing instead to risk their lives by undertaking life-threatening journeys towards 
destinations in northern Europe, where they believe they can find protection and access to rights. 
It is against the background of the failure of the international refugee regime that this dissertation 
explores the journeys of these refugees so that we can grasp the untold impact the global crisis of 
protection has on refugees’ lives and their future trajectories. The chapters of this dissertation 
aim to uncover the actual “human cost” (Spijkerboer, 2007) of the crisis by addressing the 
following questions: 
- Why is this a “crisis of protection” and not a “crisis of migration”? 
- How did this crisis develop despite the existence of the international refugee regime? 
- How does the refugee journey reflect the “human cost” of this crisis, and what are the 
implications for the lives and choices of refugees? What are the conditions of the journey, 
and how do refugees create their own spaces and passages, and at what cost? 
     To answer these questions, I address the failure of the international refugee regime and the 
limitations of official policies of containment and deterrence. I illustrate how deterrence policies, 
imposed by several states of the global north, do not deter refugees but rather eliminate legal 
routes and safe pathways for them towards destinations such as Europe, where they  may seek  
access to the structures of international protection. I reflect on the way refugees challenge these 
deterrence policies by deciding to leave and undertaking their escapes. In other words, I look in 
detail at the global crisis of protection through the lens of the Syrian refugee crisis and the 
individual experiences of refugees from Syria, including Palestinian refugees, in their search of 
protection.  
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Background and Context 
The War in Syria 
     In mid-March 2011, peaceful protests against the regime started in Syria, which escalated 
within months into a devastating war. The protests were inspired by the wave of uprisings in the 
Middle East that began in Tunisia in December 2010 as an expression of the frustration of 
marginalized and oppressed people (Hinnebusch, 2015). Despite the differences that existed 
between socio-economic policies in Syria and those of other countries in the region, such as 
Tunisia and Egypt, in the early 2000s the Syrian government adopted neoliberal economic 
policies. Combined with chronic institutional corruption and severe political oppression, these 
policies exacerbated economic and social inequalities between Syrians. Economic development 
was centralized around the urban centers of Damascus and Aleppo, with little for large rural 
communities. These trends increased demographic pressures on major cities and created poverty 
and marginalization in their outskirts (Azmeh, 2016). When peaceful protests started in some of 
these neglected areas in March 2011, protestors demanded the overthrow of President Bashar 
Alassad and his oppressive regime, which has controlled the country with an iron fist since the 
early seventies, when the current president’s father, Hafez Alassad, took power. The regime 
responded brutally to these protests. Government security forces attacked protesters with batons, 
and later with open gunfire. Thousands were detained and tortured, and dozens were killed, on 
the streets and inside the prisons, during the first few weeks of the protests (Human Rights 
Watch, 2012; International Crisis, 2011).2  
                                                          
2 In addition to the cited resources, this section is based also on my personal observations during my time in 
Damascus and during my work as a senior trade officer at the British embassy there.  
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     Most of the protests in Syria in the spring of 2011 started in areas with Sunni Muslim 
majorities, which added a sectarian dimension to the uprising.3 Protesters initially began their 
activities after Friday prayers at major mosques -- the only spaces where spontaneous public 
gatherings were allowed. The regime used this sectarian element to support its accusation that 
the protestors were extremists who threatened the country’s national security and the safety of 
other minorities, such as Christians and Alawites. These government claims were reinforced by 
slogans and statements issued by some opposition leaders inside and outside the country, which 
targeted mainly Syria’s Alawites, including the president and his family. The sectarian nature of 
the uprising was also exacerbated by the immediate sympathy and support the uprising received 
from several regional states, such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, with close links to 
political Islamist groups (Hinnebusch, 2015). Many Western states announced their support for 
the uprisings in Syria. Foreign diplomats in Damascus, including the French, British, and 
American ambassadors, participated in public activities in support of the protesters, including 
Friday demonstrations and Saturday funeral visitations (Van Dam, 2017).  
     The protests expanded to other Syrian cities and towns, and the regime continued to respond 
brutally.4 In less than six months, peaceful protests turned into armed clashes between the Syrian 
army and armed fighting groups, and the country was dragged into a destructive war (Fisk, 
Cockburn, and Sengupta, 2016). Since then, Syrians have been trapped between a ruthless 
regime struggling for its existence  and a fragmented armed militia, controlled mainly by 
                                                          
3The Assad family are Alawites, members of a sect that branched out from and broke with Shia Islam.  
4 Due to official restrictions on media and lack of independent resources in Syria, it was difficult to document the 
actual numbers of people killed and detained during the first months of the conflict. In its 2012 report on Syria, 
Human Rights Watch admitted such challenges and used (unidentified) local groups’ estimates of deaths, which it 
documented at 3,500 as of 15 November 2011 (https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2012/country-chapters/syria). 
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extremists who are loyal to regional powers. This opposition force includes Islamic State fighters 
(ISIS), Al Nusra Front, affiliated with Al-Qaeda, and some Salafi-Jihadi militias with no clear 
structure or leadership. These groups have often fought with  each other as well as  against the 
regime. Groups such as Hezbollah, from Lebanon, which Iran supports, and the Kurdish militia, 
which aims for autonomy in northeastern Syria and has U.S. backing, are also active in this 
conflict. Countries such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates back 
various armed militias in their battles against the Syrian regime, which receives support from 
Iran and Russia (Perra, 2016). The United States, France, Britain, and a number of other 
countries became engaged in an international coalition against ISIS in Syria and Iraq. These 
interventions turned the Syrian conflict into a complex, vicious war, where multiple and 
opposing agendas have made any political settlement or attempts at de-escalation unattainable to 
date.  
     The war worsened throughout most of the country and turned major towns into rubble. Many 
parts of Syria have been destroyed, and large communities still remain beyond the reach of aid 
and are therefore experiencing acute shortages of basic supplies for survival, including food, 
water, and medicine. Millions of Syrians have found themselves trapped and forced to live under 
precarious conditions and subject to horrific atrocities, human rights violations, and severe forms 
of physical, economic, and political insecurities. As of February 2016, the war had killed in 
excess of half a million people, with more than 117,000 missing and believed to be either 
detained or kidnapped (Human Rights Watch, 2016a).  
     As a result, more than 12.6 million Syrians were forcibly displaced by the end of 2017 – over 
half of the country’s population, which was estimated at 22 million before the war (UNHCR, 
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2018). Of this number, more than 5.6 million became refugees, seeking protection in 
neighbouring countries, including Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt, where large 
numbers have continued to struggle, often under appalling conditions, and frequently without 
even the minimum standards of protection (ibid.). Because of these challenging  circumstances, 
many of them have considered leaving the region for other destinations, primarily in Europe, in 
search of protection. In this dissertation, I examine the experiences of these refugees. I also focus 
on Palestinian refugees from Syria, who are uniquely vulnerable because they are stateless and 
hence excluded from the structures of international protection. 
Palestinian Statelessness and Palestinian Refugees from Syria5 
     About half a million Palestinian refugees who lived in Syria when the conflict started in 2011 
have been affected by the conflict (UNRWA, 2016a). Thousands of them have been forced to 
undertake journeys towards Europe to seek asylum and refuge, as I will discuss in this 
dissertation.  Their statelessness subjects them to special consideration in some European 
countries, such as Sweden – for example, a shorter waiting period (four years, as opposed to the 
normal five) for receiving Swedish citizenship (Swedish Migration Agency, 2018). For many 
Palestinian refugees with whom I spoke, such factors influenced their choice of final destination 
of their journeys. Examining the situation of Palestinian refugees from Syria also can help us 
understand the situation of Syrian refugees in general, because Palestinians from Syria are 
excluded from the refugee regime. During their displacement in Syria’s neighbouring countries, 
                                                          
5 This section is based on my article, “Relived vulnerabilities of Palestinian refugees: Governing through exclusion” 
published in Social and Legal Studies (2018). See Almustafa, M. (2018). Relived vulnerabilities of Palestinian 
refugees: Governing through exclusion. Social and Legal Studies. 27(2): 164-179. 
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they are often treated differently from, or experience more precarious conditions than, Syrians.  
Yet, before discussing their journeys, we should understand why the structures of the refugee 
regime excluded them.             
     The enduring crisis of Palestinian refugeeness, which formally began with partition of their 
homeland in 1947 and the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, exposes starkly the 
limitations of the global refugee regime and its failure to resolve their statelessness. This 
existential crisis illustrates the imposition of political and legal restrictions on a certain group of 
non-European refugees, thereby excluding them from the international refugee regime. This 
conundrum flowed directly from a refugee-resettlement program that sought to end the 
displacement of refugees in Europe after the Second World War ended in 1945. It is because of 
this connection that I examine how Palestinians became stateless, their exclusion from protection 
available to other refugees, and the impact of this exclusion on their lives and trajectories during 
the Syrian conflict.  
     The establishment of Israel in 1948, and the events of 1947 in Palestine, created a new wave 
of statelessness, forcibly displacing more than 750,000 Palestinians.  At the time, this crisis was 
peripheral to the larger concern of resettling millions of European refugees. Arendt (1951: 290) 
addresses the link between resettling Jewish refugees in Palestine and making Palestinians 
stateless: 
After the Second World War it turned out that the Jewish question, which was 
considered the only insoluble one, was indeed solved — namely, by means 
of a colonized and then conquered territory — but this solved neither the 
problem of minorities nor the stateless. On the contrary, like virtually all other 
events of our century, the solution of the Jewish question merely produced a 
new category of refugees, the Arabs, thereby increasing the number of the 
stateless by another 700,000 to 800,000 people. 
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     According to UN data, by the end of 1948, more than 726,000 Palestinians were displaced 
(UN, 2016a), or approximately 70 per cent of the total population. After its official 
establishment, Israel was determined to prevent them from returning to their homes and towns. 
Consequently, those who refused to leave were subject to systematic and institutional policies 
that aimed to erase any sense of a Palestinian nation (Piterberg, 2001). Israel has issued laws that 
dispossessed Palestinians of their land6 and then institutionalized and normalized this situation 
through the ideological and political foundation of a radical denial of Palestinians’ rights (Habib, 
2011). This Israeli institutional rejection of their rights as a nation involved the systematic denial 
of Israeli responsibility towards the creation of Palestinian statelessness (Pappé, 1998) and a 
rejection of any international solutions that recognized them  as refugees deserving of protection 
(Pappé, 2018; Piterberg, 2001). None the less the international community has since recognized 
Palestinians as deserving of humanitarian assistance.  
     Yet the involvement of the United Nations (UN) in the creation of Palestinian statelessness 
has helped prolong this crisis. Palestinian refugees have been subject to a special relief regime 
that cannot invoke refugees’ usual protection by the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) – or UN Refugee Agency -- and lacks the power to repatriate them. UN 
Resolution 194 (III) in 1948 called for a peaceful return of Palestinian refugees to their homes 
and compensation for those who did not want to return (UN, 2016a). The resolution led to 
formation of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (UNCCP) as the first 
                                                          
6 Israel implemented a set of policies and recommendations entitled Retroactive Transfer: A Scheme for the Solution 
of the Arab Question in the State of Israel. These policies provided the basis for Israel’s systematic prevention 
practices. Akram (2011: 3) explains: “Among the measures recommended and implemented were destruction of 
Palestinian Arab population centers, settlement of Jews in Arab towns and villages, and the passage of legislation to 
prevent refugee return. Israel also passed a series of laws defining Palestinians who had been forcibly removed from 
their lands or had fled as ‘absentees’, and their land as ‘absentee properties’ which were then confiscated. 
Subsequent Israeli legislation converted vast amounts of confiscated Palestinian properties for the exclusive benefit 
of Jews, and prohibited restitution of such land to Palestinian Arabs in perpetuity.” 
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step towards a separate regime of humanitarian assistance for Palestinian refugees. The United 
Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) emerged 
in December 1949 “to prevent conditions of starvation and distress … and to further conditions 
of peace and stability” (UNRWA, 2016b). UNRWA was responsible for carrying out direct relief 
and work programs for “Palestine refugees,” including education, health care, relief and social 
services, camp infrastructure and improvement, microfinance, and emergency assistance in Gaza, 
the West Bank, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria (UNRWA, 2016c). Thus UNRWA’s mandate was 
operational and did not offer these refugees any legal status that would entitle them to 
international protection (Khalil, 2009). In other words, UNWRA could offer them humanitarian 
assistance but not legal protection. Its mandate was designed mainly to protect their social and 
economic rights, leaving protection of their physical security, human dignity, and human rights 
to the discretion of their host governments (ibid.). As a result, UNRWA became the sole 
international agency responsible for assisting them, yet there was no reference to any protection 
and no authority to facilitate their “right of return,” as stipulated by UN Resolution 194 (III).  
     The 1951 Convention for the Status of Refugees became the founding document of an 
international regime for refugees but excluded Palestinians, who were subject to the mandate of 
UNRWA (see article 1D of the 1951 Convention). Accordingly, Palestinians were excluded from 
the mandate of the UNHCR as the main international agency responsible for coordinating the 
international protection for refugees, and the main UN agency that can facilitate the solution for 
their statelessness through the implementing of UN Resolution 194 (III). Stateless Palestinians, 
who were not represented during the Convention’s drafting, were left with only UNRWA as the 
only relief agency operating in certain areas of the region but one which also had no protection 
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mandate. Their legal status therefore continues to be subject to the discretion of host states, 
resulting in various forms of politicization, discrimination, and social marginalization.  
     Thus, the exclusion of Palestinian refugees from the 1951 Convention and from the UNHCR 
mandate denied them access to the international refugee regime and its promise of protection and 
offered them no alternative sources of protection. The Convention’s drafters did not distinguish 
between UNWRA’s relief mandate -- mainly providing material assistance -- and the UNHCR’s 
mandate -- protecting the safety, security, and human rights of refugees. Furthermore, Palestinian 
refugees’ exclusion from the Convention and the UNHCR’s aegis left them without any 
systematic route to repatriation under UN Resolution 194 (III). This lack of international support 
reinforces Israel’s persistent rejection of their “right of return” and keeps them stateless. These 
factors have prevented any genuine attempt to end the statelessness and multiple displacements 
that Palestinians have suffered since 1948 (Habib, 2011; Pappé, 1998; Said, 2011).7  
     The impact of Palestinian refugees’ exclusion has re-surfaced through their re-victimization 
during the current Syrian war. Palestinian refugees from Syria have been subject to often-
unbearable displacement and may experience extreme vulnerability in the neighbouring countries 
where they have sought protection (UNRWA, 2014a). Jordan, Lebanon, and Egypt have all 
systematically discriminated against, criminalized, and detained many of them (Human Rights 
Watch, 2014, and 2015). Hundreds were detained there and, in some cases, forcibly deported to 
Syrian war zones, which is a clear breach of the international principles of refugee protection 
(Amnesty International, 2014a; Human Rights Watch, 2014a, 2014b, 2014c, 2013). As a result, 
                                                          
7 I focus on the events of 1948 because they directly affected the current status of Palestinian refugees from Syria 
whose experiences I explore.  
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thousands have been forced to consider resettlement in other destinations, with many favouring 
northern Europe because of special considerations (as in Sweden) as I noted earlier.  
     It is worth noting that on their way to destinations in the global north Palestinian refugees lose 
their unique characteristics as stateless individuals and join other desperate refugees who search 
for protection beyond their regions. They are perceived by the global north as a part of one 
homogeneous group of illegal migrants who challenge the border regime and need to be deterred 
and controlled. This is why in this dissertation, I discuss the new displacement of Palestinian 
refugees from Syria in the region separately as they are subject to particular forms of 
discrimination (chapter three), but I do not distinguish between them and other refugees from 
Syria when I study the details of their actual journeys to Europe (chapter four). 
Theoretical Approaches and Concepts 
     To examine the experiences of refugees from Syria as they search for protection, I employ a 
multidisciplinary approach. My inspiration has come from critical social science theory and 
scholarly debates in political science, sociology, and anthropology that focus on refugees and 
their encounters with bordering practices and failing protection policies (Habib, 2011; Ilcan, 
2013; Johnson, 2014; Khousravi, 2011; Malkki, 1996; Mountz, 2015; Rygiel, 2011; Schuster, 
2011; Squire, 2011; Stierl, 2016). I review scholarly work on the global governance of migration 
and the international refugee regime and on policies and practices that have normalized certain 
groups of refugees’ exclusion from international protection. For example, I explore 
governments’ containment and deterrence policies and analyse how these – as well as offering 
humanitarian assistance to refugees -- aim to keep them far from Europe. This body of 
scholarship explains the emergence of conditions that have led to a global crisis of protection 
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that forces many desperate refugees to make frequently precarious journeys looking for 
protection and acceptance.  
     Inspired by Malkki’s (1995) “ethnography of rejection,” my work brings the stories of 
refugees to the fore and situates them at the center of my analyses. Malkki explains that refugees 
challenge the Foucauldian “national order of things” and the “categorical order” rooted in the 
contemporary power structures of the nation-state. Within such structures, refugees are perceived 
as “anomalies,” “a threat to national securities,” and “an attack on the categorical order of 
nations.” They are classified as “no longer, not yet,” struggling through an imposed status of 
irregularity and “a systematic invisibility” (Malkki, 1995: 7). My work is also informed by 
Edkins’s (2011) argument about the significance of voices. Edkins demonstrates how, in the 
aftermath of the Second World War, displaced persons (‘DPs’) were treated “as bare life – life 
with no political voice – lives to be saved, nothing more” (2011: 195). This order was challenged 
“when people at DP camps made their voices heard” (ibid.). Building on Malkki’s and Edkins’s 
theses, I argue that refugees’ stories are significant because they challenge their invisibility in 
official narratives and I present their stories as alternative sources of knowledge about their own 
predicaments.  
     In her work on borders and asylum, Heather Johnson (2014) proposes engaging with 
unauthorized voices and making them heard. Inspired by her arguments, I position refugees from 
Syria as the prime source of knowledge about their own journeys and about the crisis of 
protection more generally. By doing so I hope to challenge policy formation based on 
representations of refugees that assume their “abstract nakedness” (Malkki 1995: 12), rather than 
seeing them as real people with diverse backgrounds, experiences, and aspirations.  I harness 
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here the principles of standpoint theory, as Sandra Harding (1993: 63) explains: “Marginal lives 
ground knowledge for standpoint approaches.” Marginalized people’s experiences, she maintains 
(1993: 54), offer “a source of objectivity-maximizing questions” for research and scholarship. 
Harding confirms that answers for such questions exist in policies and control practices against 
these people: 
The activities of those at the bottom of such social hierarchies can provide 
starting points for thought -- for everyone’s research and scholarship -- from 
which humans’ relations with each other and the natural world can become 
visible. This is because the experience and lives of marginalized peoples, as 
they understand them, provide particularly significant problems to be 
explained or research agendas. These experiences and lives have been 
devalued or ignored as a source of objectivity-maximizing questions -- the 
answers to which are not necessarily to be found in those experiences or lives 
but elsewhere in the beliefs and activities of people at the center who make 
policies and engage in social practices that shape marginal lives.  
     This explanation relates to my work, which centralizes refugees as the prime source of 
knowledge about the crisis of protection, a knowledge which official narratives often ignore. By 
using refugees’ own stories, I reveal how policies and practices of governing them affect their 
lives and decisions. In so doing, I aim to encourage scholars, policy makers, and the public to 
adopt more humane and inclusive frameworks of protection and acceptance of refugees.  
     Emphasizing this ‘positionality’ of refugees also challenges the dominant “methodological 
Europeanism,” which places Europe at the centre of migration analysis and sees it as “the 
blueprint for migration epistemology” (Garelli and Tazzioli, 2013: 247). This positionality is also 
informed by scholarly debates that aim to challenge and correct the state-centric perspective of 
mainstream migration scholarship, which focuses on states’ perspectives on governing categories 
of people, numbers, flows, and policies. I refer here to Jasmin Habib’s (2018: 187) call for 
shifting our engagement with old nationalist political frameworks: 
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Given the dangers as we already know them, debates and actions about 
migration should no longer be made on grounds that assume the legitimacy 
of nation-state arrangements. That is, nationalist arrangements must not be 
taken as the parameters for those debates. If anything new is to come in 
response to the new old fascist nationalist political ecologies, it is that 
the very bases on which we can meaningfully resist and engage must shift. 
     By using refugees’ stories, I hope also to challenge the dominant narratives about refugees, 
which portray them either as victims, or as criminals, when they exert their agency through their 
“unauthorized” crossing of borders. Both types of narrative serve to support containment and 
deterrence policies that many states in the global north impose against refugees from the south.           
By victimizing refugees, states aim to contain them in their regions and provide them with 
humanitarian aid from a distance, but subject those who dare to cross borders to deterrence and 
border control. Centralizing refugees’ stories as the prime source of knowledge about the journey 
and the crisis of protection undermines both ‘victim’ and ‘criminal’ narratives by providing 
alternative account about refugees’ experiences, decisions, and aspirations. The stories present 
them as real people who act politically while they experience often extreme precarity. This 
approach relies on several theoretical concepts and terms – refugees, agency, precarity, crisis, 
borders, and journey -- that I now outline.   
     Refugees: According to the UNHCR (2017: 56), the term “refugees” refers to “individuals 
recognized under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, its 1967 Protocol, the 
1969 Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of 
Refugee Problems in Africa, those recognized in accordance with the UNHCR Statute, 
individuals granted complementary forms of protection, and those enjoying temporary 
protection. The refugee population also includes people in refugee-like situations.” Unlike the 
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category “refugee,”  “asylum seekers” refers to “individuals who have sought international 
protection and whose claims for refugee status have not yet been determined” (ibid.).  
     In this dissertation, I choose to use the term “refugee” in a broader sense, in effect to cover 
both categories. I focus on individuals’ need for protection rather than on their legal status and 
therefore use “refugee” for individuals needing protection, including both asylum seekers and 
officially recognized refugees. Both categories are subject to the same containment and 
deterrence policies and may experience similarly precarious conditions during their journeys in 
search of a protection unavailable in their home regions.  
     My work here draws on scholarly debates about the political implications of categorization. 
For example, in their work on crises and who should ‘count,’ Allen and Anderson (2018) refer to 
the impact of a politics of categorization and discuss how labels such as  “migrants,” “refugees,” 
and “asylum seekers” create the binary of visibility and non-visibility and are used by states as 
tools to govern people’s mobility. In the same vein, I use “protection” to refer to what Hathaway 
describes as “sufficient protection” -- “conditions of independence and dignity which enable 
refugees themselves to decide how they wish to cope with their predicaments” (2007: 364). This 
notion of protection underscores the elements of independence, dignity, and decision making that 
the stories I heard have shown to be refugees’ central aspirations during their search for 
protection.  
     Agency: As refugees’ stories show, the decision to undertake what may become dangerous 
journeys requires enormous agency. These stories provide a different picture of refugees than 
those from media and policy makers, which sometimes depict either victims or criminals. 
Instead, their own stories tend to portray individuals hoping  for better lives and therefore 
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challenging  conditions of war and displacement and willing to undertake journey beyond their 
regions and, usually, against their will in search of  rights and protection. These acts reflect a 
high degree of resistance, which exemplifies refugees’ agency.  
     This understanding of “agency,” which is political per se, speaks to Johnson’s (2011: 29) 
definition: “the capacity to be political: to contest and demand participation in the practices that 
shape a life and the meaning-making discourses that shape a world.” In this sense, it means the 
ability to refuse and resist. Yet, because their journeys may be precarious, severe restrictions 
affect refugees’ ability to decide and act.  Mainwaring (2016) examines the dynamics between 
this particular notion of migrants’ and refugees’ agency and border controls. She refers to 
overrepresentations of agency in the literature of migration, exemplified through complex acts in 
moments of vulnerability and ambivalence. This point may illuminate refugees’ decisions and 
actions during their journeys, which can often seem irrational and confused. Thus, we must not 
overromanticize refugees’ agency and need to separate it from the notions of free choice and 
intentionality. This is crucial because of the political implications of representing refugees as 
political figures with a high degree of agency.        
     This approach may provoke hostile responses against refugees by the receiving states, which 
may treat them as undeserving of protection. This reaction may be a volte-face from policy 
discourses that victimize refugees and render them powerless, unable to decide or act, who 
ideally remain in their regions, subject to humanitarian aid. Those refugees who challenge border 
controls and search for protection and better lives elsewhere, perhaps in Europe, then become 
“illegal migrants” to criminalize and deter. Scheel and Squire (2014) discuss the problematic 
representation in policy discourse of forced migrants as “illegal,” which may lead to their 
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criminalization and deterrence when they act. Additionally, overemphasizing refugees’ agency 
often undermines their often-precarious conditions and the emotional toll of the journeys and the 
heavy load of scars many carry even after resettlement. Vicky Squire (2017) presents a 
framework of “acts, interventions, effects” in her work on unauthorized journeys, avoiding the 
notion of intentionality and addressing instead the political actions of creating new and 
unexpected spaces.  
     Precarity: As I noted above, while it is vital to examine the agency of refugees during their 
search for protection, we must also acknowledge the precarious conditions under which they may 
live and seek to exert their agency. The literature traditionally used the term “precarity” to refer 
to labour insecurity and the socioeconomic status that results from insecurity and unpredictability 
in the workplace (Papadopoulos, 2016; Paret and Gleeson, 2016; Wall, Campbell, and Janbek, 
2015). More recently scholarly usage has expanded to cover other vulnerabilities in the lives of 
marginalized groups. For Banki (2013), as an example, exploitation related to the lack of 
security, and for Butler (2009: 25), “the politically induced condition in which certain 
populations suffer from failing social and economic networks … becoming differentially 
exposed to injury, violence, and death.” Scholars have also used it  to refer to extreme  “social 
vulnerability” during war, as with  Khosravi (2017: 5) on  life in Iran, where he sees it as “a 
broad range of social vulnerabilities that Iranians are struggling with: from insecure work 
conditions and physical insecurity to hopelessness, purposelessness, alienation, and 
disconnectedness from a sense of social community.”  
     This notion of precarity describes a state of social and political marginalization and refers to 
the uncertainty and unpredictability that may affect people during wartime. It effectively 
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characterizes the insecurity, uncertainty, and unpredictability that continue to urge people from 
Syria to flee the war -- the emotional, socio-economic, and political insecurities of war. It 
involves the risk of losing property, jobs, and loved ones, even one’s own life. Displacement in 
neighbouring countries brings other forms of marginalization and social exclusion. In this sense, 
precarity stands for an everyday, existential state of vulnerability and temporariness with little or 
no access to social rights of protection, education, health care, and employment. Such 
circumstances may engender pervasive uncertainty and unpredictability. For example, Baban, 
Ilcan, and Rygiel (2016: 5) examine the precarious legal status of Syrian refugees in Turkey and 
illustrate how it can affect various aspects of their lives. They refer to precarity as: 
involving a lack of security and instability in how people experience their 
lives in diverse fields, such as citizenship, employment, housing, education, 
health, mobility, social protection, and social rights …, and in how such 
experience can marginalize or displace them or unite them for collective 
action. 
This notion of precarity helps explain the acute helplessness some people experience in wartime  
Syria and during displacement in the region, with few choices and little  ability to act.  
     Crisis:  Some European governments have spoken of “crisis” -- chaos or disorder – vis-à-vis 
the unauthorized arrival of large numbers of refugees. Critical migration scholars have 
challenged this usage by addressing its imbedded elements of governance and control (De 
Genova, 2016; De Genova and Tazzioli, 2015). Writing about  the “crisis” in Europe, De Genova 
and Tazzioli (2015) find  the term implies  “emergency politics” and “control”:  “What is 
commonly called the ‘migration crisis’ or, the ‘refugee crisis,’ actually reflects the frantic 
attempt by the EU and European nation-states to control, contain, and govern people’s 
(‘unauthorized’) transnational and inter-continental movement” (2015: 20). 
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     I apply the term to the human suffering of many refugees and the conditions that have forced 
many of them into illegality and vulnerability in search of protection.  I thus reframe the “crisis 
of migration” in Europe as a “crisis of protection” rooted in the intrinsic paradoxes of the 
international refugee regime, which fails to protect refugees from the global south. I argue that 
the crisis exists in the global south, where millions of refugees are governed through deprivation 
as they are contained with insufficient protection and no access to their rights as refugees or as 
persons. They are subject to what Liz Feket (2009: 29) describes as “a system of warehousing 
the displaced in large camps in their region of origin until a conflict has been resolved to the 
satisfaction of western powers.”  
     Within such conditions, refugees who seek their rights, in effect, must leave their regions for 
the global north. But, since that route is blocked, they see no safe or legal pathways to their 
intended destinations. To avoid confrontations with control, many risk their lives through often-
precarious journeys that may sometimes end in death at the global frontiers. While Europe is the 
focus of this dissertation, the crisis occurs elsewhere and is visible most acutely in the bodies of 
those who have not survived the journey across borders, for example, between the United States 
and Mexico or in the sinking of boats between Indonesia and Australia. In Europe, however, the 
crisis can be traced through the thousands of bodies of victims of perilous journeys across the 
Mediterranean and Aegean Seas and washed up along the shores of Turkey, Greece, and Italy or 
inside sunken boats near Lampedusa.  
     This crisis continues even for many survivors, transformed into illegal migrants who 
challenge the structures of control presented by borders and yet need to be ‘securitized.’ Many 
experience illegality and rejection at the borders and also on arrival at their final destinations due 
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to the shrinking asylum spaces and states’ reluctance to honour their international commitments 
to protect refugees. It is because of such suffering and tragedies that I reframe this refugee crisis 
as a crisis of protection instead.  
    Borders: During their search for protection, refugees may cross multiple borders and be 
subject to various forms of border practices. In this sense, borders represent sites where the crisis 
of protection is manifest through deterrence and illegalization. Refugees’ stories show how their 
interactions with borders affect their decisions about their routes, means of transport, even final 
destinations. This study, informed by refugees’ experiences, treats borders not as static, territorial 
demarcations, but as excluding and including practices and performances that also produce 
reactions and resistance. In other words, borders are not merely sites of inclusion and exclusion 
but are rather spaces of life, resistance, and political actions. In this sense, borders embody 
“complex social relations” or “complex social institutions, which are marked by tensions 
between the practices of border reinforcement and border crossing” (Mezzadra, 2015: 9). The 
dynamics of borders and border crossing are relevant to refugees’ experiences during their 
journeys. It is borders and their encounters with border control that may turn refugees into 
“illegal” figures that are deterred and criminalized. Loyd and Mountz (2014: 23) understand 
borders as “paradigmatic symbols and material manifestations of the efforts of nation-states to 
regulate and deter irregular migrants and asylum seekers.” Processes of border enforcement often 
criminalize and dehumanize refugees, make them more vulnerable, and exclude them from and 
deny them their basic human rights of access to food, water, and free mobility. Their stories 
show that they often resist such conditions and exert high degrees of agency and resilience. This 
is also true for refugees in the Occupied Territories, as Habib shows in her studies of Palestinian 
communities in Israel/Palestine (2007, 2011).   
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     This reconceptualization of borders acknowledges refugees’ engagement in new forms of 
political power “that cross the walls of borders and detention centers consistently [and] expose 
the limits of state sovereignty” (Loyd and Mountz, 2014: 37). In this sense, refugees become 
political (Johnson, 2013) through actions such as hunger strikes, burning tents inside detention 
centers, and protesting in front of media cameras at closed borders, as I show in the coming 
chapters. Such political acts transform borders and camps into “sites of intervention” (Johnson, 
2014: 15) and spaces of “contested politics of mobility” (Squire, 2011), where politics emerges 
as controlling structures that engage with vulnerable individuals, who continue to claim 
substantial  agency while searching for protection.   
     Journey: It is through these interwoven notions of agency, precarity, and (reconceptualised) 
borders that I study the actual details of refugees’ journeys as a reflection of the global crisis of 
protection. By positioning refugees as the prime source of knowledge, I explore their suffering as 
they search for protection, and, in doing so, I aim to contribute to migration and refugee studies 
by bringing into the scholarship knowledge about refugees’ daily experiences during their 
journeys. This is invaluable because accounts of the journeys provide first-hand knowledge that 
demonstrates how bordering practices can produce illegality and make refugees more vulnerable 
in their search for protection. Situating refugees at the centre of analysis reveals the impact of 
policies aiming to govern their movement and showcases the inadequacy of protection over their 
lives and identities. By focusing on refugees and their perceptions of border control and 
protection, my work aims to challenge the dominant state-centric narrative in mainstream 
migration studies and to contribute to the developing literature on refugees as real people. 
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     Despite  the recent and growing body of scholarship on refugee journeys (Briden and 
Mainwaring, 2016; Crawley et al., 2018; Gill, Caletrioa, and Mason, 2011; Hassan and 
Biorklund, 2016; Kaytaz, 2016; Khousravi, 2011; Squire et al., 2017), migration and refugee 
studies still do not cover them adequately. Scholars tend to concentrate on the causes and 
consequences of refugee movement rather than on the process in between, which is the journey, 
and on refugees’ experiences in the process. This neglect short-changes our understanding of the 
emotional and transformative processes of the journey and hides the real “human cost” of the 
crisis of protection. Refugees’ journeys change their lives, reflect the crisis of protection, and 
influence refugees’ lives in their new destinations – all dimensions to explore.  
     To address this lacuna, I examine the journey through refugees’ stories and their own words. I 
take the discussion deeper to reflect on the emotional toll of the journey, where detention spaces, 
smuggling practices, borders, and fences travel with refugees, occupy their memories, and 
transform their identities. Thus, I develop a conceptual framework that examines three 
significant and yet underappreciated aspects of this complex and transformative experience, 
addressing the “refugee journey” as:  
1) an act of resistance and survival that demonstrates the vulnerability, but also the agency, of 
refugees on the move 
2)  a messy, complex, and non-linear passage that encompasses extreme elements of precarity  
3)  an emotional and transformative process that can reshape refugees’ positionality and 
identities 
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Methodology 
     My research uses several methods deriving principally from ethnographic work and builds on 
the stories of refugees who have made the journey from Syria to Sweden. It also includes site 
visits and observations, policy critique, and a literature review of scholarly debates and literature 
on the global governance of migration and the international refugee regime using critical 
migration and refugee studies scholarship, as I noted earlier. 
     My policy critique is informed by types of ‘grey’ literature that are “produced on all levels of 
government, academics, business and industry in print and electronic formats, but which is not 
controlled by commercial publishers" (New York Academy of Medicine, 2016). For  this 
dissertation, I examine  policy documents, government reports, and related publications  by 
international organizations (e.g., IOM, OCHA, UNHCR, and UNRWA), human rights 
organizations, including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and Watch the Med, and  
reports from  various regional and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) active 
in refugee assistance and humanitarian activities.  
     By examining such policy documents critically, I uncover the political rationalities and the 
emergence of the crisis of protection through the lens of the Syrian crisis of refugees. This 
literature assists me in grasping some of the circumstances surrounding refugees’ decisions to 
leave and to journey towards Europe. For example, I have analysed the international and national 
responses to the Syrian refugee crisis through UNHCR reports, including its regional plans for 
resettling Syrian refugees and providing them with humanitarian relief since 2011. The 
documents examine states’ responses to the UNHCR’s multiple pledges for resettlement and 
illustrate the funding gap in humanitarian allocations received from states in response to the 
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Syrian refugee crisis. The reports have also shown me how protection policies have shifted to 
containing and immobilizing refugees. For example, I have analysed border control practices by 
regional and other states in reaction to the Syrian conflict since March 2011 and demonstrated 
how they are designed to contain refugees and have thus rendered them more precarious and 
vulnerable.  
Ethnographic Methodology 
     My research also benefited from my position as a research assistant for a project funded by  
the  Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (of Canada) (SSHRC) on Syrian refugees 
in Turkey. In the summer of 2015, I travelled to Turkey and conducted interviews with some 
Syrian and Palestinian refugees in Istanbul, Gaziantep, and Kilis for the project. The visit enabled 
me to observe the actual conditions of displacement of these refugees, which drove many of them 
to push on towards Europe. My work for the project also included conducting interviews with 
three refugees from Syria who travelled through Turkey. Two of these individuals (Khaled and 
Ammar), whom I interviewed via Skype, ended up in Germany after travelling through the 
Balkans in the summer of 2015. I interviewed the third person (Arad) in Kitchener, Ontario, in 
Canada, while he and his family were being officially resettled as government-assisted refugees 
after a journey of displacement in Turkey.8 
                                                          
8 The SSHRC-funded project, “Humanitarian Aid, Citizenship Politics, and the Governance of Syrian Refugees in 
Turkey,” involves the following faculty members: Dr. Feyzi Baban, associate professor at Trent University, Dr. 
Suzan Ilcan, professor at the University of Waterloo, and Dr. Kim Rygiel, associate professor at Wilfrid Laurier 
University. The stories of these three journeys appear in “Resisting Precarity and Precarious Resistances: Claiming 
Rights to Belong, Stay, and Leave,” which I co-wrote for The Precarious Lives of Syrians: Living under Temporary 
Protection in Turkey (Montreal and London: McGill-Queen’s University Press, under review). 
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     Rather than using refugees’ stories as one of several qualitative research methods to collect 
data on refugees’ experiences, I position these stories as the main source of knowledge about 
refugees’ journeys and the crisis of protection. In learning from, and basing my work on, their 
own stories, my methodology is inspired by narrative inquiry principles in documenting and 
further analyzing the actual experiences of the journey. Calddinin and Rosiek (2007: 50) argue 
that narrative inquiry “values the stories of people as the ultimate insight as to how people live in 
the world.” It is a mode of knowledge that helps us understand not only the stories but also how 
and why participants construct them according to their status or identity (Gubrium and Holstein, 
2009). It is “the study of experience as story, [and] first and foremost a way of thinking about 
experience. Narrative inquiry as a methodology entails a view of the phenomenon. To use 
narrative inquiry methodology is to adopt a particular narrative view of experience as phenomena 
under study” (Connelly and Clandinin, 2006: 477). I use the terms “narrative” and “story”  
interchangeably in this dissertation, applying “narrative” generally  to a structural and technical 
form of speaking about refugees’ experiences, and  “story”  more casually and individually. 
     In my research, I follow an ethnographic method with a participant observation approach that 
is mainly informed by stories of refugees from Syria when they encounter bordering practices and 
failing protection structures. Alpa Shah (2017: 51) captures the essence of this approach:  
“Participant observation centers a long-term intimate engagement with a group of people that 
were once strangers to us in order to know and experience the world through their perspectives 
and actions in as holistic a way as possible.” My research expands from open-ended qualitative 
interviews to an ethnographic study that builds initially on my personal knowledge as a member 
of the community and engages intimately with its experiences and actions. I lived in this 
community for most of my life and was separated from it only because of the war in 2011. 
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      Julie Peteet (2005: X) writes about  the anthropologist’s role when studying people, such as 
refugees, in emergency situations: “Our task is also to analyze not just how violence and suffering 
of refugees are enacted, experienced, narrated, and coped with, but also the historicity and the 
structural conditions, local, regional, and global, that underpin their displacement.” She claims 
that anthropologists should “humanize those otherwise marginalized and demonized” and address 
their agency. “Working with populations at risk or in a state of emergency heightens the 
anthropological imperative to forge beyond the constitution of the refugee by a traumatic history 
to explore refugee agency” (ibid.). This understanding of the anthropologist’s role speaks to my 
work as I examine how refugees exert their agency when navigating war, displacement, and often-
precarious journeys in search of protection. My work also addresses the failure of the 
international refugee regime to protect refugees from Syria; the effect of containment and 
deterrence on their lives, their decisions about travel, and their choices of means and routes; and 
the way in which such policies transform them into illegal subjects, even criminals.  
     My work  finds inspiration as well in  the methods of autoethnography, where  Elizabeth 
Dauphinee (2010)  calls for a new way to produce  knowledge via  unheard,  unathorized voices:  
“An academic voice that allows for certain elements of autoethnography has the potential to re-
centre our attention on the individual lives and deaths of people whose names we would otherwise 
not know” (2010: 806).  I bring my personal insights on the refugees’ journey, much like those  in 
Khosravi’s (2011) Illegal Traveler -- “an ethnography of borders.”  This scholar  examines the 
politics of borders and the human experiences of them  through his own journey and those  of 
other “undocumanted,” “illegal”  travellers.  For Khosravi,  “auto-ethnography links the world of 
the author with the world of others. It bridges the gap between the anthropologist’s reality and the 
reality of others” (2011: 5).  I bring to my research my insights and experiences of exile and 
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reconceptualization of home and identity. My understanding of identity owes much to Arturo 
Escobar’s (2008: 203) representation of identity as a dynamic and fluid concept: 
Identities are constructed through everyday practices at many levels. From 
the realm of daily tasks and activities, which create micro worlds, to the 
construction of more stable, albeit always changing, figured worlds, identity 
construction operates through an active engagement with the world. There is 
a constant tracking between identity, local contentious practices, and 
historical struggles that confer upon identity construction a dynamic 
character. 
     I reflect particularly on my own journey and experience as a mother of two stateless 
Palestinian children and as a migrant to Canada, who then became a refugee from Syria and a 
citizen of Canada, both at the same time. In June 2011, I arrived in Canada as a Syrian migrant, 
married to a stateless Palestinian refugee, along with our two children. During my exile, I 
experienced the pain of loss and uprootedness, when returning home became impossible because 
of the war in Syria. I have often felt as if I were a refugee while I was struggling through my new 
life in Canada. Despite my new citizenship, I have often experienced “homelessness,” where 
“achievements … are permanently undermined by the loss of something left behind forever” 
(Said, 2000: 173) -- my house and my lifelong community. My house in Yarmouk was first looted 
by army soldiers and was later turned into a base for the opposition militia. When the Syrian army 
launched its military operation in Yarmouk in April 2018, I lost my house and my belongings as 
most of the district turned into rubble.  
     During the same period, I maintained close connections with my extended family, friends, 
neighbours, and community members who experienced similar forms of pain. To do so, I used 
phone calls and social media, including facebook, Messenger, Skype, and Whats App. I stayed in 
close contact with hundreds of friends and acquaintances from Yarmouk who were forced to 
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depart in 2012 and ended up journeying to various destinations in search of protection. My 
personal experience and the extensive knowledge from these links  facilitate  an ethnographic 
approach which provides an important body of scholarship that is missing in refugee studies. By 
reflecting on my own journeys and the knowledge I gained in seeking protection for  my family 
and me, I am able to position myself in a more connected fashion to those I interviewed than are 
many researchers. 
Research in Sweden 
     I conducted my interviews in Sweden during the summer of 2016. I visited the country three 
times; in June, July, and August 2016 where I conducted 45 interviews with 60 Syrians and 
Palestinians who made the journey from Syria to Sweden between 2012 and early 2016. My 
interviews took place in Hässleholm, Laxå, Malmö, Stockholm, and Uppsala. Most of these (40) 
were individual interviews but five interviews consisted of more than one individual, two of 
which were with husband and wife couples and three with larger families with five people 
including children who came in and out of the room and  while not directly interviewed, at times 
interjected their thoughts as well.  
     I used an open-ended interview technique with opening lead questions about the journey and 
the experiences of escape, displacement, and the actual journey to Sweden; What was the 
situation in your area in Syria? How was your life in Lebanon (Egypt, Jordan, or Turkey)? Why 
did you travel through Egypt (Turkey or Libya)? Can you tell me about the conditions of the 
actual journey? The questions offered my interviewees the freedom and the authority to tell their 
stories in their own way. They were able to choose their moments of departure, discuss their 
decision-making process, and provide details about their negotiations and encounters with various 
32 
 
actors during their journey including their family and community members, smugglers, border 
controls, and other refugees.   
     It is worth noting that the Appendix includes 20 interviews which are featured as the principal 
stories in this dissertation. The stories are featured because they are stories that contain the most 
complexity. They are also chosen because they are representative for capturing stories common to 
most people with whom I spoke. In making decisions about which stories to share, I have selected 
those that I believe to be most representative of many others’ experiences I heard about regarding 
the journey from Syria to Sweden. These stories demonstrate the messy, unpredictable, and often-
disastrous nature of refugees’ journeys while also exposing their commonalities.  
     I benefited from my extensive personal network within the Palestinian and Syrian communities 
in Sweden. I was able to interview people from my community in addition to other individuals 
and families to whom relatives and friends introduced me. That is, I was able to apply a snowball 
method, as some families willingly invited their friends to their houses for them to meet with me 
and to share the details of their journeys as well.  
     Politically, Sweden presents a powerful example of shrinking asylum spaces in the global 
north as well as the wide gap between the numbers of resettled refugees and in-country grants of 
asylum, all while the state shifted protection from permanent to temporary. Sweden is also an 
interesting case because of the special consideration (noted above) it offers to Palestinian refugees 
from Syria because of  their statelessness. Additionally, Sweden was the first European country to 
grant asylum and permanent residence to Syrian refugees. In September 2013, Swedish Migration 
Minister Tobias Billstroem called on European countries to assist Syrian refugees. Then 
Swedish Migration Agency spokeswoman Annie Hoernblad declared: “All Syrian asylum 
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seekers who apply for asylum in Sweden will get it” (DW, 2013; SBS, 2013). She explained that 
the “vast majority of Syrian nationals, who today have provisional status, would apply for 
permanent status” (ibid.). “No other conflict on earth today,” she added, “is as terrible as the 
long and bloody conflict in Syria. That should make many politicians, inside and outside the 
EU, think about our responsibilities” (ibid.).  
     Word of these developments reached desperate refugees trapped in either the war in Syria or 
in displacement in neighbouring countries. Many  perceived them as an open-door invitation to 
Sweden.  Although the Swedish and other European governments did not facilitate their 
movement, some refugees decided to risk their lives to reach Sweden for asylum and permanent 
residency.  
     The minister was also addressing his fellow Swedes perhaps more than people in distant 
Syria. Paulin de los Reyes from Stockholm University observed: 
He [the minister] was talking to the people in Sweden, making them think 
that they have humanitarian government; we are a humanitarian country; we 
show solidarity. But in his imagination, the “others” are so other and this 
speech is not dedicated to those people, because those people are so different 
that in his imagination they will not react … they are not his target. (De los 
Reyes, 2016)  
     In 2015, Sweden received approximately 160,000 asylum seekers, a third of them from Syria, 
and accepted between 90 and 100 per cent of them (AIDA, 2016). With a total population of 9.6 
million, Sweden took in more asylum seekers per capita than any other European state (ibid.). 
During the same period, Sweden undertook to resettle 2,700 Syrians per year (up from 1,900) in 
response to the UNHCR’s calls for resettlement and humanitarian admission of Syrian refugees 
(European Resettlement Network, 2016).  During the same period of 2015, some 50,000 people 
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from Syria entered the country “illegally” as asylum seekers. Nevertheless, Sweden was the first 
European state to grant Syrians permanent protection (AIDA, 2013), thereby entitling them to 
permanent residency as well as residency permits for immediate family members. However, as of 
November 2015, the government tightened its regulations for protection and recognition of 
asylum applications in favour of EU minimum standards of protection, as set out in the EU 
Temporary Protection Directive of 2001 (Orchard and Miller, 2014). That document defines 
temporary protection as: 
a procedure of exceptional character to provide, in the event of a mass influx 
or imminent mass influx of displaced persons from third countries who are 
unable to return to their country of origin, immediate and temporary 
protection to such persons, in particular if there is also a risk that the asylum 
system will be unable to process this influx without adverse effects for its 
efficient operation, in the interests of the persons concerned and other persons 
requesting protection. (EC, 2017) 
     These new measures aimed to deter asylum seekers from choosing Sweden as their final 
destination, as  Prime Minister Stefan Löfven made clear: “We are adapting Swedish legislation 
temporarily so that more people choose to seek asylum in other countries ... We need respite” 
(The Guardian, 2015b). As a result, a new Swedish Aliens Act (20 July 2016) stated that 
individuals granted asylum will receive temporary residency, varying with their status. Persons 
with refugee status will receive a residency of three years, and those with subsidiary protection, 
thirteen months. The law also limits family reunification to refugees or people given subsidiary 
protection before 24 November 2015. Later recipients may apply for family reunification if the 
case is exceptional (Swedish Migration Agency, 2016). The new law was a response to far-right 
demands and was criticized by various civil society organizations for undermining the rights of 
asylum seekers. The law seemed to hinder the integration of refugees and asylum seekers, as it 
targeted mainly the right of refugees to be joined by their family members (Folkkampnj for 
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Asyllratt, 2016). Further, the changes in protection standards were to be accompanied by  
deportation of larger numbers of rejected asylum seekers – some 80,000, the state announced in 
January 2016 (The Guardian, 2016) -- while it offered other asylum seekers  cash payments to 
return voluntarily to their countries (The Independent, 2016).  
Ethical Sensitivities and Reflections  
     In order to be ethically sensitive when conducting my research, I avoided interviewing 
refugees still on the move, due to their extreme vulnerabilities and hardships. I decided instead to 
interview refugees who had reached Sweden and achieved a sense of safety and a degree of 
settlement. I conducted my interviews in the summer of 2016, and all my interviewees had arrived 
in Sweden between 2012 and early 2016. Many were already permanent residents, while some 
were still waiting for the results of their asylum applications.  
     I also explained to my interviewees that their participation in my research was voluntary and 
that they could withdraw from the research at any time prior to, during, or after the interview. I 
offered to stop the interviews at any moment if they felt uncomfortable. Although recalling the 
details of their journeys and previous experiences of displacement and wartime caused some of 
them to feel vulnerable and emotional, none of them asked me to stop the interview or asked to 
withdraw from the research. On the contrary, I was amazed by their willingness to talk about their 
experiences and to share the details of their journeys. There were occasions where families 
gathered to tell me their stories. This was particularly the case in Hässleholm (near Malmö) and in 
Laxå (near Örebro) -- two small towns that host some families from Syria. I felt that people 
wanted their stories about the journey to be heard and understood. They appreciated the fact that 
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someone from their own community was doing this research and trying to present them as real 
individuals with aspirations for better lives.   
     Most of my interviews took between three and four hours, but some more than six. Some 
lasted longer than six hours, and a number of people were willing to meet with me more than once 
to continue sharing their stories. As I mentioned above, most of the interviews took place at 
interviewees’ houses, where I was able to meet and interact with many family members at the 
same time. Even though I did not intend to interview children (and never interviewed them 
directly) because they are especially vulnerable, some joined the storytelling after their parents 
invited them to participate and told their part or shared their insights about certain stages of the 
journey.  
     Some men preferred to talk to me individually and shared tense, emotional moments of their 
journeys with me, including stories about detention, humiliating experiences, torture, pain of 
separation, and loss of loved ones. Many wept as they recalled these moments, and some admitted 
to me that they had never before shared these feelings, even with their partners. Refugees 
normally do not speak about such sentiments with foreign researchers, but they chose to do so  
with me probably because I am a Syrian researcher married to a Palestinian refugee, have 
undertaken such a journey, and have been through  similar experiences. Most of my interviewees 
treated me as an insider, in ethnic terms, and also as a person who could feel their pain and who 
shared the same sentiments of loss and helplessness, but also determination and hope. My unique 
situation facilitated my access to the interviewees and created a friendly research environment 
(Morosanu, 2015). This positionality also allowed me to overcome various ethical challenges 
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often facing this type of ethnographic research, including power dynamics vis-à-vis interviewees, 
trust building, and cultural sensitivity (Johnson, 2011; Puvimanasinghe et al., 2014).  
     My fluency in Arabic permitted me to conduct all the interviews in Arabic without the need for 
interpretation, which reduced one type of cultural barrier frequent in such research and enhanced 
mutual trust. I was able to audio-record my interviews after first obtaining interviewees’ 
permission.  
     I transcribed their interviews verbatim and used pseudonyms throughout my work to protect 
their identity and confidentiality. I then analysed the narratives thematically, identifying 
differences and commonalities with regard to wartime experiences and displacement in the 
region, which I discuss below in chapter three. I also identified details about chosen routes and 
encounters with smugglers and bordering practices during the actual journeys – see chapter four. I 
focused on indications of particular sentiments during the journey – elements that affected 
refugees’ emotional and physical conditions while on the move and after arrival at their 
destinations. I was also able to identify expressions and indications that reflected the 
transformation of refugees’ roles, positionality, and identity. I discuss these emotional and 
transformative elements of the journey in chapter five.  
     In fact, due to the messy and complex nature of refugees’ journeys, I faced difficulties in 
defining certain moments of departures and arrivals. It was also a challenge trying to study the 
journeys through a chronological framework (departure, actual movement, arrival). Most of the 
journeys developed as a series of departures and included several loops of mobility and 
immobility. Thus, in chapter four, on the conditions of the journey towards Europe, I followed the 
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storylines of refugees’ journeys and held my reflections until chapter’s end. I thereby avoided 
breaking the flow of the stories and allowed refugees’ voices a central place in my analysis.  
     My position as a researcher did not save me from emotional stress during and after my 
interviews and also when I revisited those stories as I transcribed and analyzed them. I was 
subject to various emotional moments during my research, as I shared similar feelings of pain, 
loss, and grievance that most of my interviewees experienced. This was exacerbated by my 
position as an insider and was particularly intense when I interviewed members of my own 
family, who told me about moments of fear, humiliation, and pain during their journeys. It was 
also emotionally challenging for me whenever I involved my own experience and personal 
insights. However, despite the emotional toll of taking an autoethnographic approach, rather than 
reflecting on these experiences from the outside looking in, such moments allowed me to engage 
deeply with all of the individuals whom I met and with the stories they told.   
Overview of Chapters 
     Chapter One – The Global Crisis of Protection and the International Refugee Regime:  In 
this chapter I challenge the dominant narrative that frames the “unauthorized” arrival of one 
million refugees on the shores of Europe in 2015 as a “crisis of migration.” I propose rather that 
the arrivals reflect a global crisis of protection, which emerged as a result to bordering practices 
and policies that restrict protection for refugees from the global south in order to protect the order 
of the global north. I further address the global conditions of mistrust and rejection that govern 
and control refugees. I show how refugees from the South may be victimized, represented as 
nameless and powerless masses of people, who suffer in their distant camps, yet are often 
demonized with their arrival in the global north.  
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     To capture the nuance of this crisis of protection within the international refugee regime, I 
discuss the regime’s intrinsic paradoxes and focus on its state- and Euro-centric orientations to 
show how it was established mainly to deal with post-1945 refugees in Europe while protecting 
the international state system. I examine the performance of the regime’s normative principles 
under the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol and the regime’s institutional structures, 
especially the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).  
     I show that the practices and strategies against refugees from the global south do not deter 
them from arriving in the global north in search of protection. Rather they increase the “human 
cost” of the journey by reducing legal and safe routes and rendering refugees illegal and 
precarious.  
     Chapter Two – Conceptualizing the Refugee Journey: This chapter examines the concept 
of the refugee journey as a reflection of the crisis of protection and a result of containment and 
deterrence practices of governments in the global north vis-à-vis refugees from the global south. I 
discuss refugee journeys as part of the “human cost” of the crisis of protection, where refugees 
may experience illegality as cogs in a global system of border controls, based largely on policies 
designed to immobilize them.  This process may transform individuals from refugees who deserve 
protection into “irregular migrants,” who may be criminalized for challenging borders and border 
controls. By reviewing critical migration and refugee studies scholarship, and learning from  
refugees’ personal stories, I develop a conceptual framework of the journey as an act of survival 
and resistance that can become  messy,  complex, and very precarious and  transforms  refugees’ 
roles, positionalities, and identities. I discuss these three significant, yet underappreciated, 
elements of the journey in the following chapters.  
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      Chapter Three -- Stories of Escape and Survival: Refugees’ stories of escape and 
displacement relate to the first aspect of the journey, which I depict as an act of survival and 
resistance. I examine their experiences of insecurity and fear during wartime and their subsequent 
displacement, where they are often subject to social marginalization and exclusion, with limited 
access to rights. I show how many refugees, who may be socially marginalized, have no other 
choice than to continue to other destinations in Europe in the hopes of finding protection and 
acceptance.  
     Drawing on refugees’ stories of escape from the homeland, I discuss insecurity, fear of 
detention or conscription, and loss of income as the main reasons for their fleeing their homes to 
seek safety in neighbouring countries. Refugees’ stories of displacement in Lebanon, Jordan, and 
Turkey provide a comparative perspective of their social marginalization and limited access to 
rights in these countries. I examine the case of Palestinian refugees from Syria whose 
statelessness traps them in particular peril and exclusion.  
     Chapter Four -- The Non-linear, Messy, Complex Journey to Europe:  In this chapter, I 
investigate the conditions of the actual journey towards Europe. I discuss the unpredictability and 
messiness of refugees’ journeys as they experience various forms of violence and precarity. 
These elements present the second aspect of my conceptual framework of the refugee journey as 
it develops through multiple loops of non-linear movements that are often chaotic and 
unexpected. I show how refugees may exercise high degrees of agency, which comes at a high 
price because their journeys are so precarious. Through my discussion I aim to answer the 
following questions: a) How did refugees from Syria decide who should go and who should 
stay? b) How did they choose certain routes and pathways? c) How did they travel from Syria? 
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What types of transportation did they use? And how did they negotiate border crossings with a 
variety of border actors such as smugglers, coast guards, and other actors while on the move? 
     Chapter Five -- The Emotional Toll of Refugee Journey: In this chapter, I take the 
discussion to another level and focus on the journey’s emotional toll and its transformative impact 
on refugees’ roles, positionalities, and identities. I argue that many refugees who survive the 
precarious journey arrive at their new localities with a heavy burden of scars and painful, even 
tragic memories that affect their perceptions of themselves, their family, and their lives. The 
transformations they undergo en route affect their ability to integrate within their new ‘homes.’ 
Here I also look at mothers and their intense emotional experiences. I explore the transformation 
of refugee identities through the experiences of Palestinian refugees from Yarmouk in Syria, who, 
as we saw above, relive the trauma of their statelessness through their new displacement from 
Syria. Their journeys in search of protection result in penetrating cases of identity affirmation as 
refugees with multiple losses.  
     Conclusion: In the conclusion, I review recent developments in the crisis of protection. While 
the world’s attention shifts away from refugees’ predicament, we witness individuals facing ever-
harsher deterrence that increases their exposure to inhumane conditions at border crossings. I 
propose that these conditions necessitate our focusing on refugees’ stories and knowledge about 
the crisis and the journey. It is by examining their words and their real-world experiences that we 
can help create a more inclusive and humane protection framework. Building on this argument, I 
discuss future research that will expand on ideas developed in this dissertation to examine 
unanswered questions about refugees’ experiences and perspectives in their new localities.  
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Featuring  
Ammar: A Syrian tourist guide from Damascus. He escaped to Lebanon in 2013 after multiple 
detentions. He travelled to Thailand and then to Turkey, where he crossed to Greece and 
travelled through the Balkan route to Germany in the summer of 2015. He lives in Hanover, 
Germany. 
Arad: A Syrian Kurdish man from Aleppo. He left Aleppo in 2012 with his wife and two sons. 
They lived in Istanbul, Turkey until they were resettled as a government-assisted refugee in 
Canada in 2014. They live in Kitchener, ON, Canada. 
Fares: A textile merchant from Hama. He was detained in 2012 and then travelled to Egypt with 
his wife and two-year-old son. He then moved to Libya and lived there until 2014. He and his 
family undertook a journey from Libya to Sweden through the Libyan route. He lives in 
Stockholm, Sweden. 
Hania: A Palestinian mother who travelled from Damascus with her six children to join her 
husband in Sweden. She travelled through the Balkan route in 2015. She lives in Laxå, Sweden. 
Issam and Qamar: A Palestinian couple who travelled with their five children from Damascus 
to Egypt and undertook a journey to Sweden through the Egyptian route in 2013. They live in 
Stockholm, Sweden. 
Karam and Jenna: A Palestinian couple from Homs. They travelled with their three children 
from Homs to Turkey and crossed to Greece in 2014. They had to send two of their children with 
smugglers to Italy on their way to Sweden. They live in Hässleholm, Sweden.  
Khaled: A Palestinian refugee from Daraa, Syria. He departed Syria in 2012 and lived in 
Amman, Jordan for two years. He left his wife and two sons in Amman and travelled back to 
Syria, crossed to Turkey, and undertook a journey with his sister and her family through the 
Balkan route in the summer of 2015. He lives in Berlin, Germany.  
Mahmoud: A Palestinian refugee from Homs. He travelled with his two sons to Sweden through 
the Egyptian route in 2014. His oldest son had to stay in Germany and Mahmoud, and the rest of 
his family live in Hässleholm, Sweden.  
Rahma: A Palestinian mother from Homs. In 2015, she travelled with her three-year-old son to 
Turkey to join her family in Sweden. She lost her son during the crossing to Greece. She lives in 
Hässleholm, Sweden.  
Rana: A Palestinian mother from Yarmouk near Damascus. She travelled with her husband and 
two sons to Irbil, North Iraq and then undertook a journey with one son and her mother to 
Turkey and crossed to Greece in 2014. She had to send her son with smugglers to Copenhagen, 
Denmark. She had several failed attempts at Athens airports before her departure to Sweden. She 
lives with her son in Katrineholm, Sweden.  
Rasha: A Syrian widow from Damascus. She undertook a journey with her three children to 
Sweden in 2015 through the Balkan route. She lives in Laxå, Sweden.  
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Rawan: a Palestinian refugee from Syria. He used to work as an engineer with the largest 
petroleum company in Syria. Rawan crossed into Turkey, found a way to travel to Malaysia in 
order to be smuggled into Germany from where he was finally able to continue his journey to 
Sweden. He lives in Uppsala, Sweden.  
Safieh: A Palestinian refugee from Yarmouk. She and her husband undertook a journey through 
Turkey to Greece where they flow to Oslo, Norway. They live in Ramnes, Norway. 
Salam: A Syrian teacher from Lattakia. He travelled to Turkey in 2013. He crossed to Greece 
and flew to Sweden from Athens airport in 2016. He lives in Avesta, Sweden. 
Wassim and family: A Palestinian refugee from Damascus. He moved to Egypt in 2013 with his 
wife, Rajaa and two sons, Rami and Shadi. Rami travelled to Sweden through the Egyptian 
route. Shadi travelled to Turkey and reached Sweden after a long journey through the Balkan 
route. Wassim and his wife Rajaa travelled to Turkey and flew from Greece to Sweden 
separately. They live in Stockholm, Sweden. 
Yamen: A Palestinian refugee from Homs. Travelled to Sweden with his four-year-old daughter 
via Libyan route. He lives in Hässleholm, Sweden.  
Youssef: A Palestinian refugee from Damascus. He lost many relatives in the war and was 
detained for a number of months. He travelled to Europe via the Libyan route. He lives with his 
family in Hässleholm, Sweden.  
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Map of Syria: (https://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/syria-map.htm)  
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Map of Sweden (https://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/sweden-map.htm)  
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Chapter One: A Global Crisis of Protection and the International Refugee Regime  
 
Introduction 
     In 2015, an unprecedented number of people around the world were suffering displacement 
because of war and persecution. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) – in effect, the United Nations Refugee Agency -- recorded a total of 65.3 million 
displaced individuals, of whom 21.3 million were refugees --  its highest number since its 
founding in 1949 in the aftermath of the Second World War (UNHCR, 2016). In response, 
however, only 107,000 refugees received official resettlement. This number is far fewer than the 
3.2 million who applied for asylum globally (ibid.), a situation former United Nations secretary-
general Ban Ki Moon called “a crisis of solidarity” (ibid.). More than half of these refugees were 
from three countries: 4.9 million from Syria, 2.7 million from Afghanistan, and 1.1 million from 
Somalia (ibid.). Other conflicts also produced internally displaced people, refugees, and asylum 
seekers, again in record numbers. The large-scale displacement because of the conflict in Yemen, 
for example, has seen almost 3 million people internally displaced or seeking protection in 
neighboring countries (ibid.). The majority of these refugees are staying in developing regions, 
including sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East, where Turkey, Iran, and Lebanon host 
millions of refugees (ibid.).  
     Despite these overwhelming statistics, global media focused on the so-called migration crisis 
in Europe, as more than one million asylum seekers arrived by sea during the summer of 2015 
(UNHCR, 2015). Every day that summer, 4,000-10,000 refugees reached the continent (BBC, 
2015; The Guardian, 2015). Almost 4,000 of them went missing, believed to have drowned at 
sea (UNHCR, 2015). Bodies of little children, such as Alan Kurdi, were found washed up along 
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the shores of Turkey and Greece. Thousands of refugees who survived the sea trip found 
themselves trapped in the overcrowded, often-appalling reception facilities in Greece or stranded 
and detained at heavily militarized razor-wire fences along the borders of the western Balkan 
route through Macedonia, Serbia, and Hungary. This sobering reality led many commentators to 
invoke a “refugee and migrant crisis” (BBC, 2015; European Parliament, 2017; The Guardian, 
2015), a crisis described variously as “existential” (US News, 2015), “biblical” (Fox News 
Politics, 2015), and completely “political” (Human Rights Watch, 2016).   
     In this dissertation, I challenge this dominant narrative and argue instead that this is a “crisis 
of protection” revealed through the refugees’ suffering and tragedies during their search for 
protection. What is shocking is not the number of asylum seekers reaching Europe, but rather the 
precarious conditions that have denied them protection in their home regions. This lack of 
protection forces them to undertake risky, sometimes life-threatening journeys to Europe hoping 
for protection and access to their rights as refugees.  In a sharply divided world, globalization 
acts as “a system of inclusion and exclusion of specific areas and groups, which maintains and 
exacerbates inequality” (Castles, 2003: 16). Within these asymmetrical power dynamics and 
inequalities, countries in the global north decontextualize refugee crises in the global south by 
evading their own historical roles in  creating the political and economic crises there, instead 
blaming the people there for their own hardships (Chimini, 1998; Ferguson, 2006). In the same 
vein, the global northern states are reluctant to honour their commitment towards refugees from 
the global south and design and practise containment and deterrence policies to exclude them. 
Yet many refugees, who escape wars and conflicts in their home countries and cannot find 
protection in their regions, challenge such practices and journey northwards, seeking protection 
and acceptance.  
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     In this chapter, I provide a policy context to governing refugees in general and for the Syrian 
refugee crisis in particular. I present states’ perspectives on the crisis of protection, which I then 
reconsider through refugees’ own experiences and stories in later chapters of this dissertation. 
Yet, to capture the nuance of the crisis, in this chapter, I examine the historical development of 
the international refugee regime to identify its limitations, which have allowed the recent global 
crisis of protection. I argue that this crisis is produced by the reluctance of many countries in the 
global north as they refuse to honour their commitments to the international refugee regime and 
to protect refugees. This reluctance is especially clear in their policies of containing and 
deterring refugees from the global south and restricting space of asylum and protection for 
refugees who reach the global north. I examine these practices and show how these governments 
have altered the norms and practices of protection to contain refugees from the global south and 
deter them from reaching the global north and claiming refuge and access to their rights as 
refugees. I discuss how these practices affect the lives of refugees who do not find sufficient 
protection in their regions and are forced to search for protection in other destinations while 
often enduring extreme precarity. I start the chapter, however, by examining the global crisis of 
protection and its development.  
A Global Crisis of Protection 
     The harrowing images of refugees in Europe during 2015 illustrate the extent of what has 
become a litany of human suffering, even tragedy. This nightmare, however, reflects a larger 
crisis of protection. Understanding this crisis to be about protection focuses attention on the 
countries in the global north that are reluctant to honour their international commitments towards 
refugees, as affirmed in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 
Protocol. Instead of protecting refugees, many governments in North America, Europe, and 
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Australasia have recently reduced their assistance to and support for refugees from the global 
south by creating various frameworks of governance and control that aim mainly to contain them 
in their own regions and to keep them away from the global north. Those refugees finding 
inadequate protection in their home regions, are forced to look for protection elsewhere. Yet to 
do so they usually have to challenge daunting border practices, where they may become subject 
to illegality and sometimes be left to die, as a result of government actions to stop them. 
     The current practices of refugee protection reveal how international systems, as reflected in 
the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol – whatever their limitations -- have given way to 
alternative practices, such as externalization of borders, containment, and deterrence. This in turn 
has resulted in the current protection crisis for millions of refugees around the world. Powerful 
states, in particular, have reduced their obligations towards refugees to a bare minimum, 
reshaping the norms and practices of protection to serve the perceived national priorities of 
security and selective migration, in addition to – in some countries – a move towards more social 
and cultural homogeneity.  U.S. President Donald Trump’s executive order of 27 January 2017 
offers a telling example of how powerful states can withdraw from their international obligations 
towards refugees. Titled “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United 
States” (The White House, January 2017), the order denied entry to citizens from seven Muslim-
majority countries: Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. The order suspended 
admittance of refugees for 120 days while banning all refugee from Syria. Despite domestic 
opposition and international criticism of the document, a follow-up, on 6 March 2017, reinforced 
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the previous order but excluded Iraqi nationals from the travel ban (The White House, March 
2017).9  
     Such actions resonated across the globe, as far-right governments suggested similar policies. 
For example, Viktor Orbán’s government in Hungary rejected the European Union’s (EU) plan 
to relocate refugees within Europe in 2015 according to a quota scheme. It also erected walls 
along its border with Serbia to stop refugees and decided to detain all asylum seekers during the 
lengthy processing of asylum applications. Orbán described migration as “a Trojan horse for 
terrorism” (The Guardian, 2017). These official policies stem from extreme nationalism and 
anti-immigrant sentiments that problematize refugees and perceive them as “anomalies,” “a 
threat to national security,” and “an attack on the categorical order of nations” (Malkki, 1995: 7). 
In other words, they present patterns of “securitization of nationalism” (Sparek, 2006) against 
“others” (i.e., groups of migrants and refugees from certain regions), by rendering them a 
security threat and therefore attempting to deter and exclude them.  
    The concerns raised here arise because many states are limiting their commitments towards 
refugees despite their adherence to an international convention guaranteeing refugee protection. 
By so doing, they are undermining the international protection regime, which depends on states’ 
willingness to honour those commitments. Dennis McNamara, director of the Division of 
International Protection at the UNHCR, insists: “The essential institutions of refugee protection – 
including the Conventions and the UN structures -- are ultimately only as strong as States allow. 
State responsibility is at the heart of this problem” (McNamara, 1997). By their neglect, such 
                                                          
9  Executive Order 13780 was reviewed in September 2017, and the list of countries subject to entry restrictions was 
modified. The new list includes Chad, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Syria, Venezuela, and Yemen (The White House, 
September 2017).  
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states are creating a global crisis of protection that seriously harms millions of refugees. The 
current Syrian refugee crisis, widely referred to as one of the world’s most disastrous 
humanitarian emergencies and the largest forced displacement since the Second World War 
(UNHCR, 2014a), reveals starkly this global crisis of protection. With all its complexities and 
implications, it acutely reflects the effects of global policies of containment and reduction of 
protection. It graphically illustrates the failure of the international refugee regime to protect the 
millions of refugees who have escaped the brutal Syrian war and have found themselves trapped 
in the inhumane circumstances of displacement.  
Syrian Refugees and the Global Crisis of Protection 
     The conditions of the Syrian war (see the Introduction) have forcibly displaced more than 
12.6 million Syrians, about 5.6 million of whom became refugees (UNHCR, 2018). They are 
displaced in neighbouring countries, including Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt, where 
many struggle to live, often in shocking conditions, without even minimum protection (ibid.).  
     The official international response to the Syrian refugee crisis has seen chronic shortages in 
aid funding and very limited resettlement. Allocations for humanitarian aid in Syria for 2018 
were $5.6 billion (U.S.) short of what was needed (UNHCR, 2018). For 2016, the UNHCR had 
estimated humanitarian needs for Syrian refugees at $4.5 billion but received only $2.8 billion, 
for a funding gap of 62 per cent (ibid.). In 2017, the requirements stood at $4.6 billion, against 
only $2.4 billion coming in (ibid.). Consequently, in June 2017, the agency announced a series of 
aid cuts. It had to halt monthly cash assistance for 60,000 Syrian refugee families in Lebanon and 
Jordan, along with winter assistance for 209,000 families. It also cancelled 192,000 health 
consultations for Syrian refugees in both countries (Relief web, 2017). These chronic funding 
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gaps reflect the global “crisis of solidarity” (UN, 2016) and “responsibility shifting” vis-à-vis the 
international community’s collective duty to protect refugees. As a result, Syrian displaced 
persons, victims of a brutal war in their homeland, often experience dire conditions of 
displacement either internally or in neighbouring countries where infrastructures are already 
weak and resources are strained (Mercy Corps, 2016).  
     This “crisis of solidarity” (UN, 2016) and “responsibility shifting” have expanded to affect 
even the handful of international efforts at resettling Syrian refugees. The UNHCR has pleaded 
many times for assistance with resettlement and humanitarian aid, but by the end of April 2017 
fewer than 260,000 Syrian refugees had been offered resettlement (UNHCR, 2017). This total 
equaled about half of the 10 percent of the Syrian refugee population, a population  perceived by 
the UNHCR to be the most vulnerable group in need of resettlement by the end of 2018 (ibid.). 
As well, since the conflict began, many countries of the global north have tightened their border 
controls and imposed a “non-entrée” regime against people from Syria. This regime, which I 
discuss in the next section, betokens “a commitment to ensuring that refugees shall not be 
allowed to arrive” (Hathaway and Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2015: 241). Generally speaking, it 
controls refugees’ mobility and to prevent them from reaching the global north, where they 
might seek asylum and protection. It distances them spatially and isolates them in Syria and 
neighbouring countries, without adequate protection and legal or safe routes to other destinations 
such as Europe. Yet, rather than reducing the actual numbers of refugees, these restrictions have 
eliminated safe and legal routes for them. As a result, many pursue more dangerous routes 
towards other destinations, where they believe they can find protection and refuge. Thus, about 
one million Syrian nationals applied for asylum in the EU between 2011 and June 2017 
(UNHCR, 2017), creating an alleged “European crisis of migration” (Bundy, 2016: 51). 
53 
 
However, as I explained earlier it is not so much their numbers as their precarious conditions of 
travel that make this crisis unique. I examine those journeys below in chapters two, three, and 
four, and five, where I focus on individual refugees’ perspectives and draw on their own stories 
in order to reveal the impact of the global crisis of protection on their lives. The reminder of this 
chapter examines, first, historical development of the international refugee regime, to understand 
how its limitations  have allowed the current, massive crisis, and, second, governance today: how  
states today  limit their international obligations towards refugees and circumvent them by 
strategies of containment and deterrence, leading to such a widespread crisis of protection.  
Governing Refugees Historically and Today 
The historical development of the international refugee regime 
     The contemporary refugee regime emerged in the aftermath of the First World War when the 
map of Europe was redrawn and the populations of old empires were reorganized (Gatrell, 2013). 
After the war, Russians fleeing the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 were looked upon as the main 
contributors to a ‘refugee crisis’ in Europe (Bundy, 2016). Armenian and Greek refugees 
escaping the Ottoman Empire formed another ‘refugee crisis’ that attracted the attention of the 
League of Nations, which sought solutions through the Minorities Protection Treaties. Hannah 
Arendt (1951: 275) argues that these treaties were designed to preserve the new European 
politics of nationalization and the state-system order:  
The Minority Treaties said in plain language what until then had been only 
implied in the working system of nation-state, namely that only nationals 
could be citizens, only people of the same national origin could enjoy the full 
protection of legal institutions, that persons of different nationality needed 
some law of exception until or unless they were completely assimilated and 
divorced from their origin. 
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     Through this hypothesis, Arendt links the new states and the production of stateless 
individuals. She explains that individuals who left their countries of origin to seek refuge 
elsewhere became “stateless” and lost their rights as citizens. Their ‘refugeeness’ made them 
“foreign” and “exceptional.” The League of Nations appointed a High Commissioner for 
Refugees (Fridtjof Nansen), which issued travel documents such as the “Nansen passport” to 
facilitate refugees’ mobility, but the provision of refugee aid was mostly voluntary and ad hoc,  
with no effective institutional framework (Gatrell, 2013).  
During and after the Second World War, the numbers of refugees displaced across 
Europe increased dramatically. Jews fled the German atrocities, and Italian and Spanish citizens 
escaped the Fascist regimes in their respective countries (Bundy, 2016). By mid-1945, there were 
more than 40 million displaced individuals, in addition to 13 million ethnic Germans expelled 
from the Soviet Union and other central and eastern European countries (UNHCR, 2000). In 
response, many European states sought to control their movements by introducing restrictive 
procedures such as nationality screening and eligibility checks (Lui, 2004). The institutional 
structures of today’s refugee regime began to emerge. The United Nations Relief and 
Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) had been established in 1943 and managed refugee 
camps and resettled millions of refugees within Europe (Bundy, 2016). UNRRA was then 
replaced by the International Refugee Organization (IRO) in April 1946. The IRO facilitated 
asylum applications and large-scale mobility of European refugees, including groups of Soviet 
citizens and Greeks who fled their countries before the Second World War, in addition to the 
thousands of Jewish refugees who were transported from Europe to Palestine under the British 
mandate there (Marrus, 1985). The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
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was set up in 1949, and the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees was adopted in 1951, 
codifying international obligations towards refugees. 
     These origins of the world’s refugee regime reveal its Eurocentric nature. It emerged to help 
European states manage the large numbers of postwar refugees (Barnett, 2002), which, according 
to Lui (2004), challenged the new order of the European state system. The system, she shows, is 
state-centric and helped forge the modern state system and national citizenship. Her thesis 
suggests that its creation was as much about preserving the international system of nation-states 
as about assisting refugees (ibid.).  
     This Eurocentric focus of the regime resulted in the neglect of millions of refugees elsewhere 
who were dramatically affected by the war and other regional conflicts, including China, India, 
and Pakistan. According to the UNHCR, “It was the movements of people across the European 
continent, which had been so devastated by war, that most concerned the Allied powers” 
(UNHCR, 2000:13).  
     Marrus (1985) proposes that the 1951 Convention’s narrow definition (in article 1) of 
“refugee” reflects European influence vis-à-vis the concept of protection. It related to individual 
reasons for fearing persecution and focused on the cause of flight (Kushner and Knox, 1999). It 
related only to people from Europe who became refugees as a result of the Second World War 
(Johnson, 2011). Consequently, article 1 defined a refugee as a person who: 
 as a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to a well- 
founded fear of being persecuted on account of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the 
country of their nationality, and is unable to or, owing to such fear, is unwilling 
to avail him/herself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a 
nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a 
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result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to 
it. (UN, 1951: 152) 
     Article 1 thus clearly presents political instability as a legitimate cause for flight but ignores 
economic reasons. The Convention’s 1967 Protocol removed the earlier document’s time and 
geographical limitations.10 The Cartagena Declaration on Refugees (1984) of the Organization of 
American States (OAS) expanded the legal definition of refugee in the 1951 Convention and its 
1967 Protocol to include “persons who have fled their country because their lives, safety or 
freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, 
massive violations of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public 
order” (UNHCR, 1984: 36). Yet, according to refugee-law scholar Audrey Macklin (1996: 119), 
the definition still excluded massive groups: “Simply through adopting this legal definition, 
millions of women (and men) are already eliminated, not because the impetus for their flight was 
gender-specific, but because war, starvation, and environmental disasters ‘don’t count’ for 
purposes of the legal definition.” The Organization of African Unity’s (OAU) Refugee 
Convention (1969) described a refugee as: 
Every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign 
domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the 
whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place 
of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his 
country of origin or nationality. (UNHCR, 1974: 3) 
     The additional definitions by the OAS and the OAU addressed issues such as “external 
aggression, occupation, (and) foreign domination” as well as referring to “persons who have fled 
                                                          
10  Article I of the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1967) states that “the term, ‘refugee’ shall, except as 
regards the application of paragraph 3 of this article, mean any person within the definition of article I of the 
Convention as if the words ‘As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and …’ and the words ‘… a result 
of such events’, in article I A (2) were omitted” (UNHCR, 2010: 46). The same article also states that ‘The present 
Protocol shall be applied by the States Parties hereto without any geographic limitation” (ibid.). 
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their country because their lives, safety or freedom have been threatened by generalized 
violence” (ibid.). Consequently, and despite the universal application of the 1967 Protocol, the 
limitations arising from the 1951 Convention have facilitated the continuing exclusion of 
millions of refugees from the global south from the international protection regime.  
     The case of Palestinian refugees, which I discussed above, presents a powerful example of 
how the original design of international protection failed them. Since the formation of Israel in 
May 1948 eased the pressure of refugees in Europe, the statelessness it created for another 
people received short shrift. The latter’s exclusion from the international refugee regime 
illustrates manipulation of  protection policies  to serve  powerful states’ interests and leave  
certain groups of refugees to suffer through, as it turned out, a series of displacements and 
vulnerabilities. The establishment of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine 
Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) in 1949 appeared to offer a solution but  provided these 
refugees little legal protection or access to social rights. Their historical exclusion helps explain 
the failure of international protection for millions of refugees who have no access to permanent 
protection or social rights because of the circumstances of their displacement, which I will 
discuss in the chapters that follow.   
     The three solutions sought by the regime -- repatriation, return to country of origin, or 
resettlement and integration in a third country -- were also Eurocentric by definition, tailored to  
align with the political and economic interests of European states (Chimni, 2004). They were 
designed to “re-order” refugees (Lui, 2004) and govern migration as part of a state-centric 
regime. They seek to return refugees to their former subjectivity as “citizens” of a state, 
reflecting sovereign political, demographic, and economic priorities that relate to protection not 
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of refugees but of international state system (ibid.). Chimni (2004) explains how, after 1945, 
Western states did not favour repatriation of refugees due to Cold War politics and to the 
economic needs of reconstructing Europe. UNRRA, for example, helped repatriate refugees, but 
the United States opposed its work of repatriating Soviet refugees to the Soviet Union. As the 
major donor, the United States could refuse to renew the organization’s mandate (UNHCR, 
2000). As a result, UNRRA was replaced in this effort by the International Refugee Organization 
(IRO), founded in 1946, which mostly resettled refugees rather than repatriating them. During its 
mandate, which lasted until 1952, the IRO facilitated repatriation of 73,000 people and helped 
resettle one million (ibid.). The IRO gave way in 1952 to the UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR), set up in 1949 under the control of the UN General Assembly (UNHCR, 
2000). The UNHCR was created to act as the main international agency to protect refugees and 
seek permanent solutions for their displacement (ibid.). Yet it operated under extreme restrictions 
and limitations, due to “the desire of the United States and its Western allies to create an 
international refugee agency that would neither pose any threat to the national sovereignty of the 
Western powers nor impose any new financial obligations on them” (UNHCR, 2000: 19).  
     Since its establishment, the UNHCR has been subject to “non-humanitarian” factors including 
the economic needs in Europe in the aftermath of the Second World War, as outlined above, in 
addition to the politics of the Cold War. The United States, for example, refused to contribute 
funding to the organization due to the UNHCR’s activities behind the “Iron Curtin”, which 
dramatically affected the organization’s ability to achieve its mandate (UNHCR, 2000). Yet, the 
two significant moments in the UNHCR’s history, as identified by the organization itself, were in 
fact rooted in the politics of the Cold War. The first “defining moment” was the involvement of 
the UNHCR in the crisis of Hungarian refugees in 1956 (ibid.) and the second was the UNHCR’s 
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initial operation outside Europe when the organization assisted Chinese refugees in Hong Kong 
in 1957. In both cases, people were escaping communist governments and assisting them enabled 
the organization to secure more support from the United States (ibid.).  
     These “non-humanitarian” factors continue to influence the UNHCR’s performance and the 
international refugee regime. The UNHCR received a start-up, temporary three-year mandate in 
1949. Its founders sought mainly to resolve the postwar European refugee crisis. The mandate 
was renewed every three years until 2003, when the UN  recognized that  this periodic renewal 
was unnecessary and made its mandate  permanent (UNHCR, 2014a). Its decades of uncertainty 
clearly contradicted its assigned goal of finding permanent solutions for refugees, particularly 
when refugees no longer were temporarily “out of place” and their displacement had become a 
structural feature of the international state system.  
     Also limiting the UNHCR’s effectiveness are its lack of financial autonomy and its lack of 
political impartiality. It receives a small administrative budget from the UN General Assembly 
and depends mainly on voluntary, often-unpredictable contributions from donor states. As well, 
the top ten donors contribute up to 75 per cent of its budget (Milner, 2008). Consequently, the 
UNHCR’s endeavors to assist refugees have always been subject to economic, political, and 
cultural factors and the need to accommodate the interests of major donors, most of them from 
the global north (Betts, 2013).  
     This section has addressed the deficiencies in the regime as a universal system of protection 
and humanitarian assistance for refugees.  Migration and refugee scholars debate the roots and 
causes of those deficiencies. Hathaway (2016), for example, confirms that refugees are 
experiencing less protection at the global level. He explains that the 1951 Convention astutely  
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“gives priority to allowing refugees to make their own decisions about how best to respond to 
their predicament” (Hathaway, 2007:364),  But, he points out, many states’ performances and 
practices  vis-à-vis international norms of protection relate  directly to their desire  to reduced 
their commitments to protect refugees -- hence the global crisis of protection. Hathaway argues 
that states’ deterrence and containment of refugees are the main source of the current crisis. He 
thus opposes attempts to “renegotiate” the 1951 Convention and calls for better strategies to 
“operationalize that treaty in a way that works dependably, and fairly” (Hathaway, 2016: 99).  
     Against Hathaway’s argument, critical refugee and migration scholars note that a number of 
intrinsic limitations impede the regime’s performance and have engendered the global crisis of 
protection (Lui, 2004; Scheel and Squire, 2014; De Genova et al., 2015). For example, De 
Genova et al. (2015: 71) see the regime as “highly political,” “partitioning,” and “authoritarian.” 
First, according to De Genova, its political nature flows from the 1951 Convention’s definition 
of “refugee,” which he finds state-centric and territorial, since the right to claim refuge requires 
crossing a state border. Second, the regime creates an either/or partition through its 
determination of status, which either grants or denies refugee status. Third, it is “authoritarian,” 
since it requires individuals to behave according to a set of disciplinary norms and to follow 
governance rules in their camps and displacement zones in order to receive protection as 
refugees. For example, long processes of determination may finally reject refugees’ applications 
and deny them protection. The “well-behaved” refugees are expected to return voluntarily to 
their countries when they are asked (ibid.). Further, in the camps, refugees must obey the regime 
and are subject to programs of assistance and aid allocated according to donors’ priorities, 
regardless of refugees’ actual needs and aspirations.  
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Governing Refugees Today 
     The refugee literature extensively addresses the role  of sovereign states’ interests in shaping  
protection of refugees and has  linked it to the limits the regime enforces, which lead to  
exclusion of millions of refugees from the structures of international protection (Betts, 2011; 
Gamlen and March, 2011; Lui. 2004). For example, Lui (2004) explains how in a world  
articulated around the order of nation-states and citizenship, the  regime acts as a model of 
“policing the non-citizens” (ibid.), where refugees are “anomalies” vis-à-vis  the state-citizen 
order and need  governing so they no longer subvert  the international order and its pillars of the 
nation-state and the territoriality of citizenship (ibid.). Theoretically, international human rights 
and refugee law guarantee refugees access to universal human rights. Yet it is almost impossible 
for them to realize these rights when they are not members within a state. In fact, refugees, who 
leave their countries because their state is unable or unwilling to protect them, lose their 
privileges as citizens and enter a status of “rightlessness.” This notion of “rightlessness” brings 
to the fore Arendt’s argument about rights – that they can be protected only within the structure 
of a nation-state, which is the only political community that can guarantee its citizens’ rights and 
well-being (Arendt, 1951). As a result, the right of asylum, as an international concept, is 
actually subject to the politics of nation-states (ibid.). This state-centric notion of rights grounds 
a system that subjects refugees to states’ sovereign decision to deny them entry to the state-
citizen framework. Thus the sovereign structures protecting the rights of a state’s citizens 
simultaneously exclude refugees and deprive them of their “right to have rights” (ibid.). They do 
so by making refugees “non-citizens” with no access to political membership and therefore to 
rights.  
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     According to Hathaway (2007: 353), the presence of refugees outside their own state brings 
them within “the unconditional protective competence of the international community.” Yet, I 
maintain, some states of the global north, despite their international obligations, are trying to 
evade this “unconditional protective competence” by containing refugees in their home regions 
and by deterring those who would search for protection elsewhere. This unwillingness derives 
substantially from  their  perception of refugees as a burden (Hathaway, 2007) --  “uninvited 
migrants” who cross a state’s borders irregularly but whom, by  the 1951  Convention, they 
should  protect rather than subject to discrimination, penalization, or refoulement (UNHCR, 
2010: 3). According to the Convention, states should protect refugees so as to guarantee their 
rights, including access to education, work, health care, legal services, and all necessary 
documents, such as travel papers to facilitate mobility (UNHCR, 2010: 3). In reality, however, 
they perceive refuges as “irregular migrants” who challenge states’ abilities to decide who may 
cross their borders and harness social welfare and citizenship rights.  
     It is this unauthorized movement that concerns states (Johnson, 2011):  refugees challenge a 
“state’s sovereignty and authority over migration” (Hathaway, 2007). They undermine states’ 
bordering practices, which are, as Schuster and Solomos (2002) describe, “Selective by nature.” 
These  notions -- of governing migration selectively  and  of refugees as  threatening this ability -
- lead  some states of the global north to treat them  as  “unwanted” people  to contain and keep  
in their  own, home region.  Many states tend to govern migration in a way that protects domestic 
markets, national security, and sovereignty, social cohesion, and, in some countries, even cultural 
homogeneity (Casetles and Loughna, 2004). They may see refugees as a threat and potential 
burden.   
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     An  official narrative against refugees and irregular migrants may result in what Koser (2010) 
calls “protection gaps,” leaving  millions of irregular migrants and refugees  without protection 
and  vulnerable  to human rights abuses and exploitation. Koser (2010) relates these gaps to the 
absence of a global authority on migration, and Castles (2003), to embedded elements of 
globalization. Refugee protection policies thus reflect asymmetrical structures of power between 
wealthier countries in the global north and those in the poorer global south. In this sense, 
governance of global migration, including of refugees, is a complex set of norms, structures, and 
actors, which facilitates this global process of inclusion and exclusion of people through control, 
division, and policing. This understanding of migration governance speaks to Walter’s definition 
of migration policy as “a form of dispersed police that is exercised over the world’s population, 
ordering, dividing, distributing but also connecting populations and territories” (Walter, 2015: 
13).  Thus refugees who journey  in search of protection become subject to discriminatory 
structures of governance and in effect “an issue of international relations” (Lui, 2004: 121), 
where norms of “burden shifting,” or “refugee exporting,” prevail. States may invoke or create 
mechanisms to minimize their obligations towards refugees and neglect “the unconditional 
protective competence of the international community” (Hathaway, 2007: 352). They may 
categorize refugees as “irregular migrants” to manage and control, even marginalize, criminalize, 
and/or fully exclude them (Hyndman and Mountz, 2008).   
     Since the 1960s, many countries in the global north have increasingly restricted and excluded 
refugees, particularly in response to decolonization struggles and conflicts in the south after the 
1960s. Refugees from Africa and Asia were fleeing war zones but did not serve the ideological 
and political contestations of the Cold War. As a result, many European states saw refugees not 
as victims of a larger ideological struggle but as social and cultural threats and an economic 
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“burden.” The terminology of “genuine” refugees and “bogus” asylum seekers surfaced 
increasingly in the public discourse of refugee protection. As Bloch and Schuster (2002: 399) 
argue, “The ‘morally untouchable category of political refugee’ has been deconstructed and 
replaced with the figure of exploitive and criminal ‘bogus’ asylum seeker.” Refugees were 
perceived as opportunistic migrants who move to the global north to improve their living 
conditions, attracted by generous welfare schemes (ibid.).  
     Restrictive policies often went hand in hand with a shift in the public perception of refugees. 
Some people may regard refugees as simply victims in need of charity or humanitarian assistance 
rather than as human beings who have demonstrated political agency in challenging and fleeing 
war and other forms of oppression and persecution (Johnson, 2011). As Johnson proposes, this 
reframing of what it means to be a refugee reflects a shift in  perception from that of “a heroic 
male, fleeing for his politic beliefs,” to that  of a passive group  easy to govern, ideally away 
from the global north (ibid.). Such depoliticization transforms refugees from political figures 
who have “found (their) ways of mastering an uncertain future” (Arendt, 1943: 111) to 
individuals whose lives are “desperately simple, and empty. No homes, no work, no decision to 
take today” (Johnson, 2011: 1029, quoting Soguk, 1999: 9). This new representation means that 
the public, media, and policy often imagine them as powerless masses of women and children 
who deserve aid and humanitarian assistance. It is critical to note, however, that this aid is 
expected to occur yet in their home regions (Johnson, 2011). Such images of refugees are 
employed in the global north to engage public support for humanitarian aid to the global south 
(ibid.). Johnson (2011) explains how this political act of representation shapes refugee policies 
and stems from the perception of refugees from the global south as the “other,” who presents a 
potential threat to the state-order of the global north.  Johnson refers to Chimni’s (1998) notion 
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of a “myth of difference,” whereby refugees lose their individualistic features in a constructed 
mass of powerless and nameless people, essentially different from European refugees. States of 
the global north, Chimni (1998: 351) maintains, may use this “myth of difference” to 
decontextualize refugee crises in general. This reframing of the narrative ignores historical 
backgrounds and conditions of instability and inequality, which are the main causes of refugee 
movement. These conditions, which Chimni relates to the “geopolitical spread of capitalism and 
the politics of imperialism” (ibid.), underlay refugee crises initiated by the two world wars and 
the anti-colonial struggles in the global south. Yet some states in the global north tend to 
decontextualize and belittle the refugee crises arising from the global south. They may present 
such conflicts as emerging from local political or social concerns, largely ignoring the power 
dynamics of political and cultural subordination, in addition to the economic inequalities 
imposed on the global south by the global north (ibid.). Further, the “myth of difference” 
normalizes their rejection and deterrence vis-à-vis refugees from the global south.  
     This mistrust -- a “crisis of authenticity”   (Johnson, 2011) -- means that refugees from the 
global south must prove themselves “genuine” refugees, who suffer from persecution. Refugees 
are increasingly less welcomed in parts of the global north and may be subject to restrictive 
measures designed primarily to reject them and return them to their regions of origin -- they 
become “undesirables” subject to institutionalized exclusion and distancing (Agier, 2011). This 
systemic rejection has helped engender a public “culture of fear” and increasing xenophobia 
against them (Hyndman and Mountz, 2008), especially since the “war on terror” and the events 
of ‘9/11’ (in New York, 11 September 2001).  The more recent  overall securitization of societies 
in the global north has subjected  refugees from the global south to new forms of restrictive 
governing policies, which often lead to  extreme vulnerabilities and exclusion for them (Bigo, 
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2002). After 9/11, notions of asylum and protection moved gradually from the purview of 
international law to frameworks of national security – a sea change. Hyndman and Mountz 
(2008: 253) perceive “a shift from a paradigm of refugee protection to prioritizing the protection 
of national security interests.” They note that the existing legal norms of protection for asylum 
seekers and refugees have been limited significantly, whereas rejection and violence prevail and 
have been normalized. Hyndman and Mountz (2004: 254) explain:  
The threat of migrant invasion is underwritten by securitization; a 
governmentality based on mistrust and fear of the uninvited other. The 
mobilization of fear to securitize asylum serves a politically powerful 
resource for states that need legitimate grounds for extraordinary measures, 
such as exclusion from their territories by potentially legitimate legal 
subjects, namely asylum seekers.  
A Shift of Emphasis  
     Global northern states have been re-prioritizing the three solutions for refugees -- repatriation, 
return to country of origin, or resettlement and integration in a third country -- with a shift of 
emphasis from resettlement towards repatriation (Chimni, 2004), regardless of the poor, even 
inhumane  conditions in refugee camps and hosting communities in the global south. The 
UNHCR has been influenced particularly by global northern states’ strategies of containing 
refugees in their own regions (through camps, for example) (Chimni, 1998).  
     In recent years, UNHCR operations have favoured mass repatriation over resettlement. 
Resettlement clearly relies on states’ willingness to provide space for refugees, which 
governments can easily reduce by letting in fewer refugees. In response, the UNHCR 
rationalized its operations as “emergency or crisis relief” (Hayden, 2009: 258) -- humanitarian 
aid in crisis zones and homeland protection. States can appear to uphold their international 
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commitments while reducing them in practice, by containing and deterring refugees through 
“non-entrée” regimes (Gammeltoft-Hansen and Hathaway, 2015). These authors see a 
“schizophrenic approach,” where such governments avoid their obligations towards refugees but 
uphold the global regime. Some have even convinced states in the global south to take in more 
refugees as part of their own international commitments, thereby containing refugees within the 
region (ibid.). Further, a number of states have found ways to control refugees’ movements in 
order to keep refugees away from the global north. Restrictive policies include: containing 
refugees in their home regions through humanitarian assistance, applying protection in refugees’ 
regions of origin, using “non-entrée” regimes to keep asylum seekers out of the global north, and 
deterring refugees by enforcing physical borders.   
Containment through humanitarian assistance 
     Policies designed to contain refugees in their regions of origin rely on humanitarian relief and 
homeland-oriented solutions (Crips, 2001). Humanitarianism here shifts from traditional caring 
for refugees’ welfare to governing policies and practices to control refugees in the first place.  
Hyndman (2000: 3) describes an “increasingly well-funded and politicized process of balancing 
the needs of refugees and other displaced persons against the interests of states.” This 
combination of care and control crystallizes through a set of social and cultural relations (Ilcan, 
2013). At the international level, humanitarianism serves to control certain groups of the world’s 
population and keep them out of the global north (Agier, 2011). It thus safeguards the global 
north’s perception of the world order by erecting barriers that close off the northern world to 
outsiders. Agier (2011) suggests that, the more globalized our world becomes, the more walls we 
see around us. In this sense, refugees from the global south are not forgotten but instead subject 
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to a global mobility regime designed principally to maintain the nation-states of the global north. 
This governing process excludes and spatially distances the “undesirables,” who await their 
fates, however dire, in their camps, far from the global north (ibid.).  
     Many countries in the global north are normalizing such containment of refugees by 
supporting international humanitarian assistance in regions of origin rather than resettlement as a 
way to protect refugees. For example, the UNHCR is increasingly offering humanitarian aid to 
refugees in their home regions with less involvement in resettlement activities. The UN’s   
allocations for that purpose, however, illustrate a massive gap. In January 2017, the global 
requirement was $22.5 billion (U.S.) needed by 93.5 million people in 33 crisis-affected 
countries, whereas UN appeals for aid generated only $77.2 million, for a shortfall of $22.4 
billion (OCHA, 2017) – a minimal commitment, showing how unsustainable are the containment 
strategies implemented by the global north.  
Protection practices at refugees’ regions of origin 
     A second way for  governments in the global north to control refugees’  movement  is by re-
prioritizing the first two of the three “durable solutions” of the protection regime --  repatriation 
to the home country, integration in the host country, and resettlement in a third country. Johnson 
(2011) argues that this change emerged because of the preponderance of refugees coming from 
the global south.  UNHCR records for 2015 show 21.3 million refugees globally, most of them 
hosted in the global south, and 107,100 people resettled worldwide (UNHCR, 2016).  
     Furthermore, global northern states are creating new norms for protection to contain refugees, 
as in the “right to remain” approach, which encourages them to stay in their areas under UNHCR 
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supervision. Yet, according to Hathaway (2001), this practice actually does little to protect 
people in “imminent danger.” Thus the “right to remain is in essence not a right of refugees at 
all, but is the right of governments to avoid confrontation with the needs of refugees” (ibid. 43). 
Hathaway refers to other such practices, including “safe havens” in the Bosnian war, “no-fly 
zones” for the Kurds in northern Iraq, and the situation at the Kibeho refugee camp in Rwanda 
(ibid.). The horrifying events and lack of protection in such zones exemplify how these norms do 
not protect refugees but rather serve the political agendas of powerful states, which aim primarily 
to govern refugees and control their mobility in their own, home regions.  
Non-entrée regimes and externalization of borders 
     States are also working to circumvent their international obligations by creating “non-entrée” 
regimes. Territorially oriented systems of national asylum require refugees to cross a state’s 
borders in order to claim asylum there (Migration Policy Institute, 2015). Thus, to cut back on 
their obligations while sustaining the global refugee regime, some states in the global north 
attempt “non-entrée” regimes, which Hathaway and Gammeltoft-Hansen see as “ensuring that 
refugees shall not be allowed to arrive” (2015: 241). This system limits refugees’ access to 
protection by controlling their mobility and excluding them from the global north (Johnson, 
2011). Its conventional form uses legal and administrative strategies such as restrictive visa 
regulations and sanctions on carriers. Its restrictions on mobility include externalization of 
border controls and linking trade and development agreements to migration control, which 
effectively outsources and shifts the refugee burden. For Hathaway and Gammeltoft-Hansen 
(2015),  “non-entrée” regimes deter would-be refugees in their countries of origin, which act as 
gatekeepers in exchange for trade and development assistance: “With poorer states of origin and 
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transit often willing for economic, political, and other reasons to serve as the gatekeepers to the 
developed world, wealthier countries believe that they can insulate themselves from liability for 
refugee deterrence by having such action take place under the sovereign authority of another 
country” (2015: 249).  Such policies spatially distance refugees from the global north, where 
they may believe they can have better access to protection and rights.  
     In another element of the regime, externalization of borders, states outsource border control to 
a third party or stretch its operations beyond national boundaries (Casas et al., 2010). Hyndman 
and Mountz (2008) see this as a “geography of exclusion” or “respatialization of asylum,” which 
shifts protection from the “legal” to the “political” domain of governance (ibid.), so as to deter 
asylum seekers. Some global northern states are immorally offering “cash for containment,” 
whereby, according to Chimni (2004: 68), they “pay for the care of refugees in exchange for 
being refugee free states.” The most notorious instance perhaps is Australia’s “Pacific Solution,” 
in effect since the 1990s (Hyndman and Mountz, 2008), however, in 2001, Prime Minister John 
Howard announced publicly, during his re-election campaign, that he would not allow asylum 
seekers to reach Australia’s shores (Mountz, 2011). Following the election, Canberra instructed  
the Australian navy to intercept vessels in territorial  waters and transfer  asylum seekers to 
offshore detention centers it had set up in the Christmas Island, on Papua New Guinea’s Manus 
Island, and in Nauru  (Parliament of Australia, 2012). It signed agreements with Fiji, Nauru, and 
New Zealand for them to accept asylum seekers under the aegis of the International Organization 
for Migration (IOM) (ibid.). Since asylum seekers could not enter the Australian mainland, they 
could not apply for asylum. Although the “Pacific Solution” ended officially in 2008, the 
outsourcing of detention facilities on Pacific islands continued, and new agreements arose for 
such places on Nauru and Manus Island (Parliament of Australia, 2012).  
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     Readmission and safe-third-country agreements between states in Europe and the global south 
also  externalize and outsource border controls, using a third country to deter and detain refugees 
and irregular migrants (Hyndman and Mountz, 2008; Rygiel, 2011). Since the Tampere 
European Council Summit in October 1999 and the EU-African Summit in Lisbon in 2007, the 
EU has worked closely with governments in the global south, mainly in north and west Africa, 
on migration control and policing through strategic partnerships and neighbourhood policies that 
link migration control to aid, trade, and development (Casas et al., 2010). The Global Approach 
to Migration (GAM), for instance, which the EU  initiated  in 2005, links migration to other 
sectors of international relations and development by  extending border controls into a third 
country –  a neighbour  or a non-neighbour country of the EU (ibid.). Within that framework, the 
EU controls border policy and immigration by cooperating with other states, which manage 
regional protection and refugee movements (ibid.). Hence the GAM framework keeps refugees 
away from the global north, with a third country protecting them that may not have signed the 
1951 Convention to guarantee it is ‘safe.’   
     Through the ‘EU-Turkey deal,’ signed 18 March 2016, the EU shifts protection to a third 
party (Turkey) and keeps out refugees. Starting 20 March 2016, Greece (an EU member) would 
return illegal migrants from Turkey without assessing their claims. By the deal’s “one-to-one 
initiative,” for every Syrian whom Turkey readmitted from Greece, the EU would resettle 
another Syrian from Turkey (European Council, 2006). Turkey agreed to enhance  security  “to 
prevent new sea or land routes for illegal migration opening from Turkey to the EU” (ibid.), 
while the EU would  liberalize visa restrictions for Turkish citizens and  disburse €3 billion for 
the Facility for Refugees in Turkey (ibid.). Various human rights and civil society organizations 
argued that all parties to the deal were seeking to evade responsibility for refugees (Rygiel, 
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Baban, and Ilcan, 2016). Some criticized it particularly for “undermining the right to asylum” 
and jeopardizing the rights of refugees detained in Greece with limited access to asylum (DRC, 
2016). On the deal’s first anniversary, Amnesty International announced: “The EU-Turkey deal 
has been a disaster for the thousands who have been left stranded in a dangerous, desperate and 
seemingly endless limbo” (Amnesty International, 2017). This status includes detainees on the 
Greek islands and Syrians returned to Turkey, where more than 2.7 million Syrian refugees live, 
many of them with insufficient protection and limited access to  education, health care, and 
employment (Human Rights Watch, 2016; Rygiel, Baban, and Ilcan, 2016).  
     In February 2017, the European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) reported a French 
and German proposal for “a crisis-resistant Common European Asylum System (CEAS) to face 
any potential new ‘migration crises’.” The policy note cites the EU-Turkey deal as a “blueprint 
for future European asylum policy,” as Europe seeks to cooperate with its neighbours to protect 
its external borders. The note also proposes:  “All those entering the EU would be removed to 
non-EU countries willing to host them, and kept there in conditions which minimally guarantee 
their survival and non-removal to unsafe countries” (ECRE, 2017).  
Enforcing physical borders    
     Despite all their attempts at containment, governments in the global north have been unable to 
prevent refugees from arriving at their borders, seeking asylum and rights. In response, some 
securitize their borders with walls and fences to physically keep out “irregular migrants,” 
including refugees. In  Europe, even though the Schengen agreement (1985) lifted most internal 
borders, some states have  reinforced  their external borders and harmonized the legal 
frameworks of border control and asylum standards (Vaughan-Williams, 2015),  securitizing  
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migration to transform  borders and further limit access to asylum and to  protection (2015: 20). 
This process spread globally after 9/11 and the multiple bombings in European capitals, 
especially in Madrid (2004) and London (2005). However, it was the political unrest in the 
Middle East after 2010, which led masses of individuals to escape the violence for protection in 
Europe. By the end of 2012, Greek authorities completed a four-meter-tall fence, equipped with 
thermal cameras, at the land border with Turkey, along the Evros River -- the “shortest, and 
safest route for migrants and refugees” (World Post, 2015). In 2015, Bulgaria constructed a fifty-
mile-long razor-wire fence, fifteen feet tall and five feet wide and equipped with infra-red 
motion-sensitive cameras and monitored with armed guards, to seal its borders with Turkey and 
block ‘illegal’ crossings (Mail Online, 2015). The UNHCR spokesman in Bulgaria  explained 
that “the fence is there to keep people out but it means asylum seekers undertake more perilous 
journeys and pay higher rates to smugglers” (ibid.).  
     In response to the massive arrivals of refugees in Europe in 2015, European territories 
constructed additional walls and fences, stranding thousands of refugees at militarized and 
heavily securitized borders inside Europe. In November 2015, Macedonian soldiers erected a 
metal fence at the border with Greece (The Guardian, 2015). In September and October 2015, 
Hungary had sealed its southern borders with Serbia and Croatia (CNBC, 2015). In August 2016, 
Prime Minister Viktor Orbán announced an additional fence at Hungary’s border with Serbia “to 
keep out major new waves of migrants” (Reuters, 2016). The European Border and Coast Guard 
Agency, Frontex, was formed in 2004 to manage operational cooperation at Europe’s external 
borders, but it focuses on prevention and deterrence. Critics have often accused it of abusing 
migrants and refugees (Human Rights Watch, 2011, 2015, 2016).  
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     Europe’s practices of containment and deterrence keep refugees in their home regions and 
control them by “burden-shifting.” The official narrative about “unauthorised” arrivals in Europe 
during the summer of 2015, which I discussed above, illustrates this approach. Accounts often 
presented refugees as “others” who threatened Europe’s political, social, and cultural identity and 
reframed their unexpected arrival as a “European crisis of migration.” 
Shrinking Spaces of Asylum  
     I explained above how governments develop practices to control the movement of refugees in 
order to deter them from entering the global north. They may tailor humanitarian aid, offer 
protection in home regions, and set up “non-entrée” regimes. Nevertheless, such procedures do 
not stop desperate refugees from seeking protection and new opportunities for better lives, but 
rather limit safe pathways for them and significantly increase the “human cost” (Spijkerboer, 
2007) of border crossing. As a result, refugees may undertake precarious journeys through often-
treacherous routes that can lead to their illegalization and criminalization. Refugees continue to 
risk crossing the Aegean and Mediterranean (Tazzioli, 2015). If they survive, they must then cross 
through several countries in southern and central Europe, where they will encounter heavily 
securitized borders and inhumane detention. This journey transforms them from refugees, 
deserving of protection, to illegal migrants, supposedly needing control (Schuster, 2011). Arrival 
in the global north does not guarantee them access to rights and protection. Macklin (2005) refers 
to refugees’ “discursive” disappearance in the West: states reduce their international duties to 
protect refugees while “doing everything possible to repel the spontaneous arrival of migrants 
likely to seek asylum” (2005: 367). Governments are increasingly reducing standards of 
protection and asylum so as to discourage asylum seekers. Such practices create legal limbo for 
asylum seekers and limit their access to social rights. Liza Schuster (2011) outlines some of the 
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mechanisms European governments use to restrict asylum seeking. According to Schuster, the 
Dublin Regulation (Dublin III, 2013), which governs assessment of asylum applications and 
involves EU member states and the EURODAC database (which stores fingerprints of asylum 
applicants), aims to “reduce the number of those able to apply for asylum to an absolute 
minimum” (2011: 401). The Swedish case, which I discussed above, presents a stark example of 
shrinking asylum spaces in the global north, which is in effect turning refugees who travel to 
Europe irregularly into asylum seekers, subject to national domestic asylum rules. As Hathaway 
(2001: 43) explains, “Under the current international regime, refugees who arrive in an asylum 
state are solely the legal responsibility of that state. As such, the distribution of state responsibility 
towards refugees is based primarily upon accidents of geography and the relative ability of states 
to control their borders.” It was the unauthorized mass arrivals in 2015 that some officials 
perceived as a crisis but actually reflected a global breakdown of protection because the global 
north shirked its international commitments. 
Conclusion  
     Some European officials’ perceptions in 2015 reflect how the arrival of more than one million 
people caught states in the global north offguard, as they had anticipated that refugees would 
remain in camps and hosting communities in the global south. The situation has in fact proved 
that refugees continue to challenge global frameworks of migration governance and decide to 
claim international protection as refugees and as humans in the global north. They do this despite 
the daunting combination of containment practices and “non-entrée” regimes that have sought to 
deter asylum claims. Such challenges have upset the global order and created what some officials 
term “the migration and refugee crisis in Europe.”  Reece Jones (2016: 180) concludes: “By 
refusing to abide by wall, map, property line, border, identity document, or legal regime, mobile 
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people upset the state’s schemes of exclusion, control, and violence. They do this simply by 
moving.”  
     In this chapter I have shown that the arrivals of refugees in Europe in 2015 reflect a global 
crisis of protection emerging because the international regime for protecting refugees seems not 
to be working. Further, I have illustrated how states in the global north have altered the norms of 
protection to serve their own priorities and reduce their international duties towards refugees and 
to that end have reshaped the protection regime to contain and deter refugees. The UNHCR’s 
increasing focus on aid and relief, its  re-prioritization of durable solutions for refugees, with less 
emphasis on resettlement, and its insufficient  humanitarian aid and minimal quotas of resettled 
refugees all reflect the global crisis of protection through the structures of the international regime 
for protecting refugees.  
     In this chapter, I have critically examined the regime’s historical development and its 
performance in order to explore the roots and relations of the more recent global crisis of 
protection. I showed the links between the crisis and the regime’s intrinsic deficiencies, present at 
its creation. Set up to resettle European refugees after the Second World War, it has continued to 
operate substantially according to the interests and preferences of the global north. I also showed 
protection norms and structures shifting frequently in tandem with the politics of the global north, 
even though most refugees since the 1960s have come from the global south. These historical 
developments help explain  the “crisis of solidarity” in responses to the Syrian refugee crisis and 
some European officials’ construction of the arrival of more than one million “unauthorized” 
individuals in 2015 as a “crisis of migration.” These unexpected arrivals disturbed the sense of 
order by contesting states’ ability to govern refugees. They exposed the failure of the global 
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refugee regime and revealed not a “crisis of migration” but rather a crisis of protection, as some 
European countries failed to honour their international commitments and refused to assist 
refugees.  
     The regime’s inability to respond was painfully visible. According to its own standards, it was 
supposed to contain refugees in their own regions and govern them remotely through 
humanitarian operations -- which, not incidentally, proved woefully inadequate. Yet these 
refugees dared to confront the norms of containment and deterrence. They managed, despite all 
odds, to reach the global north to claim protection. In so doing, they posed an unexpected 
challenge for those states and forced them to reconsider and reframe their policies of protection 
and asylum, as Sweden did. By their unauthorized movement, they exposed the regime’s intrinsic 
paradox:  refugees, who deserve protection, face states’ sovereign decision to (not) allow them in. 
In fact,  such government decisions force  refugees  to risk their lives and  travel in unauthorized 
ways and through challenging, sometimes-inhumane conditions in order to seek asylum and claim 
their right of protection as refugees, and that exercise of political agency  transforms their 
positionalities and identities, as we see in the following chapters, about  refugees’ journeys in 
search of protection.  
     As well, this chapter has considered the system of protection through the eyes of government 
leaders and policy makers and of migration and refugee scholars. Later chapters add further 
complexities by showing what this system looks like from the ground, as I hear from those people 
actually affected by it. I use their stories to challenge the official narrative of refugees as 
powerless victims or as a threat. Their accounts provide alternative knowledge of the crisis, as 
people whose lives have been affected by the failing regime of protection and the bordering 
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practices of states. Examining the concept of the refugee journey draws our attention towards the 
actual lived experiences of refugees, as they move in search of the type of protection sorely 
lacking in the system. As I discussed above, examining refugees’ stories on the journey shifts our 
focus from policy discussions to the narrative of people who are often ignored by international 
policy makers. I challenge this neglect by positioning refugees as the prime source of knowledge 
for my work about the journey and the crisis in general. Their stories of their journeys will reveal 
the impact of war, lack of protection, and deterrence against refugees during their search for 
safety and acceptance. Their words illustrate the “human cost” of the crisis of protection.  
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Chapter Two: Conceptualizing the Refugee Journey 
 
Introduction  
     In chapter one, I challenged the dominant narrative favored by countries in the global north 
about “the European migration crisis.” I showed that advocates have reconstituted the structures 
of international protection to contain and deter refugees in their own regions so they will not 
threaten the international state order. I explored the shifts policies and practices for international 
protection in an increasingly divided world, which often subverts protection to put people “back 
in place” in the global south, with or without protection. I showed how some countries in the 
global north are backing away from their international duties towards refugees and block their 
access to Europe. In the resulting “global crisis of protection,” failing protection, containment, 
and deterrence lead to immense suffering, sometimes tragedy, when refugees from the global 
south, including Syria, dwell in poor, even horrific conditions. When their lives become 
unbearable, refugees may undertake “unauthorized” journeys, which only make them more 
vulnerable. It is this notion of “crisis” that I seek to discuss in the following chapters, as I explore 
the experiences of desperate refugees who see no option but to journey towards asylum and 
rights.  
     As I discussed above, examining refugees’ experiences during their search offers us 
alternative, real-life knowledge from people who have lived through the failing regime of 
protection and the bordering practices of states. This new, rich, primary source challenges the 
official narrative, which usually omits or misrepresents refugees. Instead, I bring their voices to 
the fore and present them as real individuals. This approach situates refugees as the prime source 
of knowledge about their journeys and experiences en route. Their first-hand accounts enrich the 
scholarship of migration and refugee studies by adding their insights and perspectives, and, as I 
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noted above, they show how bordering practices create illegality and increase the “human cost“ 
(Spijkerboer, 2007) of crossing.  
     As I suggested above, a refugee journey that starts as a simple response to the horrors of war 
and persecution, or as a survival move in a search for protection, may evolve into a complex act 
of resistance, even of political agency, which involves various transformations of identity and 
positionality. By deciding to leave their home regions for the global north, refugees exercise 
agency and reject the sometimes-precarious status and often-dehumanizing conditions of camps 
and host communities. Though vulnerable, they practise a “right to escape” (Mezzadra, 2015), 
refusing marginalization and aiming to reach other, more accepting destinations.  
     In this chapter and those that follow, I examine the conditions of these journeys to reveal the 
“human cost” of the global crisis of protection. These journeys reveal how a global system of 
border controls traps refugees, largely through government policies designed to immobilize 
them. Those who survive are trapped again in their new localities in the global north, where 
protection is usually temporary and opportunities for starting new lives are shrinking. This 
process transforms refugees who deserve protection into “irregular migrants,” sometimes 
criminals, challenging the state’s sovereignty at its borders.  
     Critical migration and refugee studies have increasingly embraced the journey with new 
attention to the journeyers’ perspectives. In this dissertation, I examine these journeys by using 
refugees’ own stories. Building on their accounts, and learning from various migration 
literatures, I develop a conceptual framework of the journey and study it as a precarious, 
complex, and messy act of survival and resistance that entails multidimensional transformations 
of refugees’ identities and positionalities in their new localities. In this chapter, I discuss this 
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concept of the journey focusing on the three elements:  survival, messiness, and transformation.  
In the following chapters I explore in turn each of these aspects, weaving in the actual 
experiences of refugees from Syria. In chapter three, I study the journey as an act of survival and 
examine refugees’ vulnerability during war and displacement in neighbouring region of Syria, a 
situation that pushes some to leave. Chapter four deals with the refugees’ messy, complex, non-
linear journey, facets emerging as refugees recount the conditions of their movement towards 
Europe. Chapter five discusses the emotional and transformative dimensions of the journey.  
     In the next section, I explore how the concept of the journey has developed in the literature of 
migration, especially in critical migration and refugee studies and in mobilities scholarship. 
Through this review, together with my knowledge from experience and field research, I 
articulate my own understanding of the concept of refugee journey and its three significant, yet 
undertheorized dimensions: survival, messiness, transformation.  
Conceptualizing the Journey 
     The migration literature has usually treated  the journey as a linear and planned move from 
one point to another, or as a temporary passage from country of origin to that  of destination 
(Brigden and Mainwaring, 2016; Collyer, 2007). Yet migrants frequently undertake fraught, 
multiple-stop journeys in several countries. Various concepts and literatures have attempted to 
better capture this non-linear experience. For example, much migration literature speaks of 
“transit migration” (Collyer, Düvell, and de Hass, 2012) -- migrants and refugees who aim to 
reach certain destinations but make a series of stops and detours en route. The term implies 
temporary transitions or even brief interruptions to an otherwise-smooth journey. Düvell, 
however, recognizes that restrictive policies of control affect migrants’ routes and actions: “It is 
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the destination countries’ policies that contribute to the emergence and construction of transit 
migration” (2012: 422). Hence, he sees transit migration more critically as “a strategic response 
to the constantly changing control regime and part of the complex interaction between migrants’ 
autonomy and states sovereignty” (ibid.). So too, de Hass stresses border control as a major 
cause of “illegal” mobility and notes the “vicious circle of more restrictions – more illegality – 
more restriction” that absorbs migrants (2008: 16). Yet, writing about African migrants’ journeys 
to Europe, he refers to their high sense of agency and determination on the move, criticizing the 
stereotypical image of “African misery” as the root causes of this migration (ibid.).  
     Some critics feel that “transit migration” aims to fix or stabilize the actions of migration, 
which are fluid and unpredictable by nature (Collyer, Düvell, and de Hass, 2012). Düvell (2012), 
for example, refers to its politicized, policy-driven, and Euro-centric orientations, as it serves 
migration control and externalization of borders against migrants and refugees on the move. 
Düvell (2012) calls for careful analysis of in-migration as complex and changeable categories 
and patterns of migration, which include transit migration, “These kinds of dynamic migrations 
can be subsumed under the umbrella typology of in-migration of which transit migration would 
be a sub-category” (424). Such a call allows for play of various dynamics and patterns of 
migration that capture complex and unpredictable migration acts, including refugees’ journeys 
towards protection.  
     Like Düvell and de Hass, Collyer (2007: 668) also opposes a linear logic for the journey, 
emphasizing the “places in-between origin and destination.” He also replaces “transit migration” 
with “fragmented migration” (2010), to better reflect current reality. He grants that border 
controls and mobility restrictions initiate and prolong these forms of migration, but notes roles of 
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social networks, advanced technologies, and modern communications. Collyer and de Hass 
(2012)  argue for  “fragmented journeys” to reflect migration’s  fluid nature, with often-
indeterminate starting and ending points  and  people’s status  transformed while on the move. 
This argument supports my drawing on refugees’ stories of moving when I analyse the journey, 
as it reflect its messy, non-linear, and transformative nature, characteristics which eliminate 
some of the problems in terms such as “transit migration.”  
     Just like transit migration, mobilities studies has wrestled with the complexity and 
unpredictability of mobility and human movement, which can help explain refugees’ journeys. 
For example, it complexifies the study of movement and migration by incorporating the more 
nuanced experiences of potential movement and stillness. Mimi Sheller (2011: 6) explains:  
“Mobilities research in its broadest sense concerns not only physical movement but also potential 
movement, blocked movement, immobilization, and forms of dwelling and place-making.” This 
understanding captures the refugee journey, with its moments of emotional and physical 
departure, phases of stillness, and loops of movement, often unintended, as I illustrate in the 
following chapters when I discuss refugees’ stories. Other mobilities scholars, such as Tim 
Cresswell, address the complex and diverse nature of mobility and examine the impact of 
individuals’ identities and status on the politics of mobility, which he defines as “the ways in 
which mobilities are both productive of such social relations and produced by them” (Cresswell, 
2010: 21). Cresswell treats mobility as a resource that is “differentially distributed” and subject 
to different politics of representation. He proposes: “The representation of movement can 
certainly impact the experience of its practice” (2010: 22). In other words, one act of movement 
may hold different representations when different groups of individuals of varying identities and 
status practise it. This argument speaks to refugees’ experiences at borders and explains how 
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officials may present their movement as “illegal” and “unauthorized,” because they are 
“unauthorized,” but treat the same act of border crossing as regular and welcome for compliant 
individuals. Cresswell further demonstrates how choice is crucial in the discourse of mobility, 
yet he realizes the interactions between will and enforcement:  “Mobility, as practices [,] brings 
together the internal world of will and habit … and the external world of expectation and 
compulsion” (2010: 20). In this sense, mobilities scholarship helps us move beyond the journey’s 
details (who went where and when) and allows us to incorporate the subject’s experiences and 
expectations. It particularly helps us theorize the concept of refugee journey, as it explores 
aspects of this complex form of mobility and its interrelated politics of physical movement, 
representations, and practices.  
     Yet the traditional mobilities paradigm often associates movement or the ability to move with 
notions of progress and freedom. Cresswell (2006) criticizes the romanticization of mobility and 
its association with positive notions of freedom:  “The romanticization of the nomad, for 
instance, is infected with the discourse of Orientalism. It is also the outcome, historically, of 
deep-rooted ideas about mobility as a progressive force, as a form of relative freedom, as a break 
from earlier, more confused, spaces and times” (Cresswell, 2006: 56-7, cited by Gill et al., 2011).  
According to Gill, Caletrio, and Mason (2011: 302), viewing movement positively reflects a 
“partial geographical concern.” This tendency may exclude the movement of millions of forcibly 
displaced people in the developing world, as well as the mobility of asylum seekers and refugees 
who long for stillness and stability but have to go on complex and uncertain journeys. Gill, 
Caletrio, and Mason (2011) recognize uncertainty and insecurity in the movement of forcibly 
displaced populations and emphasize those groups’ reluctance vis-à-vis “an undesirable 
necessity” (2011: 304).  
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     Mimi Sheller (2018) calls for a new way of thinking about mobilities, power relations, and 
different mobility capabilities that disconnects mobility from freedom and permits a more 
inclusive paradigm: “Mobility justice is an overarching concept for thinking about how power 
and inequality inform the governance and control of movement, shaping the patterns of unequal 
mobility and immobility in the circulation of people, resources, and information” (2018: 30). 
Sheller proposes: “A more robust and comprehensive theory of mobility justice can help us 
address the combined ‘crises’ of climate change, sustainable urban transitions, resource depletion 
and global migrations. These ‘crises’ are part of a common phenomenon, which shares its origins 
with other uneven mobilities that impact everyday life” (ibid.). Understanding the impact of 
asymmetrical power relations and inequalities on the patterns of mobilities and immobility can 
help us fathom refugees’ complex decisions and actions on their journeys. Such complexities 
have also received analysis from critical migration scholars such as Brigden and Mainwaring 
(2016), who look at migrants and refugees’ clandestine journeys and their encounters with 
structures of control at borders. They worry that the literature tends to neglect migrant journeys. 
Indeed, many scholars focus on migration policies and practices before and after arrival, 
downplaying the crucial phase in between.  
     In recent years, it is journalists who have explored the refugees’ journey most extensively, 
with many travelling alongside them after awareness skyrocketed in 2015. Examples include: 
Wolfgang Bauer’s Crossing the Sea: With Syrians on the Exodus to Europe (2016), Charlotte 
McDonald-Gibson’s Cast Away: Stories of Survival from Europe’s Refugee Crisis (2016), and 
Patrick Kingsley’s The New Odyssey: The Story of Europe’s Refugee Crisis (2016). All of these 
works draw attention to the lives of people and the difficulty of their journeys.  Migration and 
refugee scholars should examine refugees’ journeys and experiences as complex social and 
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political acts. Brigden and Mainwaring (2016: 247) explain, “The journey is not simply a space 
in between arrival and departure, a temporary moment of mobility between more ‘normal’ static 
existences, but a social process that shapes migrants and societies alike.” I discuss this notion of 
the journey and how it shapes refugees’ positionality and sense of identity in chapter five.  
     With this understanding, Brigden and Mainwaring (2016) look at the journey not as a linear 
process but as a multifaceted series of non-linear movements, with many moments of 
“im/mobility.” “Migration journeys are rarely a linear passage, traveled from point of origin 
directly to destination. Rather, migrants make these journeys in broken, unplanned stages; a 
failed stage may give rise to another unexpected leg of the journey” (2016: 415). Thus journeys 
incorporate various typologies of movements and stillness that start before they begin and 
continue after they arrive. Through this viewpoint, I shed light on refugees’ experiences. In 
chapter three I show how for most of my interviewees, the journey begins before their physical 
departure. In chapter four, about the conditions of actual journeys, many refugees ended up in 
unintended destinations.  
     Like Brigden and Mainwaring, Alexandria Innes depicts the journey as much more than a 
linear pathway of travel from one place to another. Looking at asylum seekers in Greece, Innes 
(2016) finds that refugees, when not moving forward, may well be immobile. However, such 
moments of “stillness” may allow for the vital acts of “negotiation” and “navigating” (ibid.). 
Like Brigden and Mainwaring, who describe the journey as a “social process” (2016: 247), Innes 
(2016: 266) uses “state of being” to reflect on the journey’s complexity, which stretches from a 
temporary passage, or a direct crossing, to a transforming “political act” that shapes the lives and 
trajectories of migrants and refugees.  
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A Conceptual Framework of the Refugee Journey 
     In what follows, I build on the work of these critical migration scholars and others, and focus 
on refugees’ journeys from Syria to Sweden. I use the concept of the journey to reflect on their 
individual experiences, facing war, lack of immediate protection, and – because of the failure of 
the international refugee regime -- insufficient protection through their passage and resettlement 
elsewhere. Some of them cross borders illegally, becoming “illegal migrants,” who then begin 
more precarious journeys that in many cases, resulted in human tragedies (Striel, 2016). En 
route, most refugees experience anxiety, fear, even violence in a series of intense, sometimes-
traumatic experiences. Yet, despite being highly vulnerable, many display true resilience and 
agency. Their journey transforms their identities and prospects for life in their new localities. 
Thus, learning from refugees’ own stories, I develop a three-part concept that reveals the journey 
to be variously: 
 - an act of resistance and survival  
 - a messy, complex, and non-linear passage 
 - an emotional and transformative process 
     This dissertation applies the insights I noted above. My use of the term “journey” here, while 
I think critically about refugee mobility, develops from my method, which draws on refugees’ 
stories and their experiences during their journeys. I call as well on the knowledge I acquired 
during my fieldwork, where I conducted 45 interviewed with 60 refugees from Syria who made 
the journey to Sweden. Their stories and words have helped me to develop this conceptual 
framework of the journey and explore its three aspects.  
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The Journey as an Act of Survival and Resistance  
We were surrounded by death. It was everywhere. We escaped death back 
home to find death in Libya. Death is around us. The way ahead might bring 
death or life. We did not know. We were not sure. We were not sure of 
anything, except of the death that was around us. (Fares, Stockholm, Sweden, 
July 2016) 
     As Fares, who journeyed to Sweden via Libya, indicates starkly, the journey can become an 
act of survival, in which refugees attempt to protect themselves and their loved ones through a 
series of traumatic events. After the intensifying war in Syria undid social networks in their 
home communities, and finding insufficient protection in neighbouring countries, refugees may 
conclude that the journey is the only route to rights and protection. As I noted above, 
governments seeking to contain and deter them transform the journey into an experience of 
illegality and precarity. Examining the journeys is a way to analyse the impact of the crisis of 
protection on refugees and to engage with their stories. This study challenges refugees’  
“structural and systematic invisibility” (Malkki, 1995) and provides a counter-narrative to 
migration studies that, as scholars have noted, have often presented refugees as powerless, 
speechless victims (Malkki, 1996). Further, this account of personal experience challenges the 
state-centric view of refugees as a burden or a threat (Hyndman and Mountz, 2008). Refugees 
are rather political subjects whom circumstances force them to challenge sovereign borders to 
claim their rights. They are able, as Johnson (2014: 19) suggests, “to contest and demand 
participation in the practices that shape a life and the meaning-making discourses that shape the 
world.” We can understand their journey as “taking politics through which refugees assert their 
own capacity to decide their own life conditions” (Johnson 2014: 181).  
     Yet, while interviewing refugees, I noticed that agency and resistance became most visible 
while they recounted acts of survival that they did not intend or understand as political, which 
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downplays any intentional agency on their part. In most such cases, refugees did not aim to defy 
state sovereignty by crossing a border illegally. They were looking for safety and acceptance and 
the rights that such border controls denied them. In fact, most did not want to leave their homes 
and communities in the first place. The conditions of war forced them to do so and when 
neighbouring regions failed to offer support, they set out on their fraught journeys in search of 
protection. In addition to fearing a perilous journey and lacking adequate finances, many 
expressed shame and humiliation about having to travel illegally and about the stigma of 
becoming refugees in need of protection. They found uprootedness extremely hard to accept, and 
possible illegality even harder. For Palestinians, leaving Syria meant another painful episode of 
statelessness that further distanced them from their homeland, Palestine.  
     Yet extreme conditions left these refugees from Syria with no other choice. Thus we must 
examine their agency and political acts separate from the notions of choice and intentionality. 
Some migration scholarship tends to overemphasize refugees’ agency, which may well 
romanticize their choice to leave. This view may depict refugees as deliberately challenging 
states’ sovereignty by crossing borders, and observers may thereby seek to justify harsher 
treatment of them. In reality, almost all refugees seek principally and ultimately protection and 
safety. As well, overplaying their agency may undermine the dynamics of control and its painful 
impact on their lives. Their stories show that they decide about their journeys in a precarious and 
restrictive atmosphere, which constrains them and further problematizes the notion of their 
agency.   
     Vicky Squire’s (2017) framework of “acts, interventions, effects” seems very apposite here. It 
opposes the political simplifications of the binary “agency – structure” vis-à-vis refugees’ actions 
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and positionality and offers new ways to analyse the politics of their “unauthorized” journeys 
and their ability to act and resist while on the move. Squire adapts Foucauldian structure of 
power and resistance to focus on “action” rather than on the actors and their uncertain intentions. 
Building on Isin’s (2008) definition of political action, she explores how certain activities disturb 
“established scripts and subjectivities” and create unexpected “political subjects” (Squire, 2017: 
265). The model reflects on the transformative nature of refugees’ “unauthorized” journey when 
they create new trajectories and spaces while they struggle for survival. Particularly useful, it 
addresses their agency while also examining the lack of protection that forced them to leave. It 
avoids the actors’ intentions and strategic orientations and gives space to examine the actions of 
people who did not intend to act politically. Even so, they managed to create new and 
unexpected spaces and trajectories through their journeys while interacting with control 
structures. Refugees become political through their acts of resistance and survival, which stance 
develops within a highly precarious atmosphere, as revealed by Fares. 
     I examine the survival and resistance dimensions of the journey in chapter three through 
refugees’ stories of escape and displacement. Their experiences of escape unpack the key 
motives that force refugees to leave their hometowns in search for protection. These motives 
include insecurity and violence, fear of detention, fear of conscription, and loss of income. 
Through their stories of displacement, I examine the lack of sufficient protection that refugees 
suffer from in their camps and host communities in the neighbouring countries of Syria and how 
these conditions force them to consider journeying towards destinations beyond their region. The 
journeys are, however, conducted in disastrous circumstances, which turn them into messy, 
complex and non-linear passages as I discuss in the next section. 
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The Journey as a Messy, Complex, Non-linear Passage  
I could not evaluate my decisions at the time. For example, the 
smugglers I chose were too bad but I did not know that at the 
beginning. No one can judge me since I was too desperate. I was 
totally trapped. (Yamen, Hässleholm, Sweden, June 2016) 
     Yamen’s degree of confusion reveals another theme that emerged in the stories refugees 
shared with me. The journey’s complex and unpredictable events occur in the midst of 
challenging conditions that escalate when refugees encounter structures of control. The journey 
is rarely linear, but rather messy, with moments of “im/mobility” and “resistance/surrender.”  
“Messy” best captures the journey’s true nature. Since this dissertation presents the personal, and 
harrowing, stories of individuals, I wanted some of its language to reflect the emotional intensity 
of their experiences.  
     I grasped the journey’s complexity when I tried to identify its specific starting and ending 
points for each refugee. I could not readily delineate clear stages of departure, physical 
movement, and arrival. Many refugees went through multiple moments of departure and 
disconnection that were emotional rather than physical. After leaving their hometowns, most 
faced multiple borders, often failing to cross and waiting long periods. Many became stranded at 
points of their journey for weeks, months, even years -- detained, subjected to new border 
controls, or having to wait for additional finances from families or friends. They experienced in 
effect “a trajectory of wandering” (Khosravi 2011: 51). 
    Three striking examples illustrate this nightmare. Ammar is a Syrian refugee who was a 
successful tour guide in Damascus. He speaks Arabic, English, German, and Persian. Fearing 
further detention, he fled Syria in search of protection abroad. After 2011, several security 
departments had detained him for participating in peaceful protests, later releasing him on bail. 
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However, in March 2013, through connections, he learned that Syria’s notorious military 
security was still looking for him, so he crossed illegally into Lebanon. He was unable to access 
the facilities of the UNHCR there so lacked protection. He then journeyed to Thailand to apply 
for UNHCR resettlement there, a process that would take years and with no guarantees of 
success. He found life in Thailand hard and when his residency status there expired, he again had 
to leave. He considered an “illegal” journey to Germany to seek asylum.  However, his finances 
were limited, and, even after borrowing money from family and friends, he could not afford 
smugglers’ services so set out on his own. This “do-it-yourself” process took him through 
Turkey, Greece, and the Balkan route (accessible at the time), to Germany, where he now lives. 
Rawan, a Palestinian refugee from Syria, experienced similar circular mobility. He crossed into 
Turkey, found a way to Malaysia, was smuggled from there into Germany, and pushed on to 
Sweden. Shadi, a Palestinian refugee, was 17 when he spent more than nine months moving 
between countries on his way to Sweden. Egypt detained him when he tried to leave illegally 
with family. As a Palestinian refugee, he risked deportation to Syria, but he was released after his 
family paid a huge bribe to a mediator. He then travelled to Turkey with help from his father’s 
business connections there. He crossed then by boat to Greece, which detained him for months 
for trying to leave illegally with a smuggler. After his release, he continued north on the Balkan 
route, but Macedonia detained him for a few weeks. He crossed into Hungary and then into 
Germany with the aid of relatives in Europe. He arrived in Sweden in February 2014; nine 
months after he left Egypt and two years after departing Syria. Egypt, Greece, and Macedonia 
had detained him, and his journey cost more than €40,000. I explore the conditions of journeys 
such as those of Ammar, and Shadi in the following chapters.  
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    Arrival at the intended destination does not end the journey for many refugees, who may have 
to seek asylum and wait months for residency permits. Sweden, with its Aliens Act of 20 July 
2016, has lengthened the process for arrivals after November 2015. As I noted in the introduction 
of this dissertation, the Swedish law states that asylum will mean temporary residence -- three 
years for persons with refugee status, and thirteen months for those with subsidiary protection. 
The law also limits family reunification to people who became refugees or received   subsidiary 
protection before 24 November 2015. Later recipients may now apply for family reunification 
only in exceptional cases (Swedish Migration Agency, 2016). Thus refugees who left their 
families behind now have limited hope for reunification. For them, the journey has not ended, 
even at their intended destination and with asylum.  
     Family reunification takes a long time and is exhausting even for those who arrived before the 
law came into effect. Rana, a Palestinian refugee from Syria, reached Sweden in November 2014 
following a journey of four months, after being stranded in Greece and sending her younger son 
with a smuggling network to Sweden before her. She had already left her eldest son and her 
husband in Irbil, Northern Iraq, as they could not afford the cost of traveling as a family. When I 
met Rana in Stockholm in July 2016, she was learning Swedish, applying her skills working in 
the aviation industry, and waiting for family reunification – her journey continues.  
    The examples I considered suggest refugees’ multiple departures, unpredictable conditions, 
loops of im/mobility, and unmarked arrivals. Such intense experiences, as in Yamen’s words, 
reveal the journey as a messy, complex, non-linear passage.  Exploring these elements assists us 
with understanding the impact that the containment and deterrence policies imposed by countries 
in the global north have on refugees from the south, especially where there is a lack of sufficient 
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protection in refugees’ regions of origin.  I study these elements of the journey in chapter four 
through refugees’ experiences during their actual movement to Europe via the three popular 
routes where they are subjected to extreme violence and precarity.   
The Journey as an Emotional and Transformative Process  
I lost my country to save my family … I lost my family and saved myself 
… I lost myself … (Mourad, Canada, 2018) 
     Experiences of uprootedness affect people’s lives and shape their perceptions about their 
identities and their lives. Refugees’ journeys, complex and messy, stand as “highly intensive” 
(Benezer, 2002) or “life-changing events” (Benezer and Zetter 2014). As I outlined above, the 
journey may expand from a temporary moment of movement to a process of transformation that 
reshapes the person’s state of being and perception of home and belonging. My research has 
uncovered the complexity and fluid notions of refugees’ positionalities and identities both during 
their journeys and in their new localities. Their stories present the journey as an intense 
emotional experience, involving separation pain, loss, guilt, and shame. Their physical and 
psychological challenges affect their mobility and their perceptions of life in general. Many 
refugees live with fear of detention and of losing their own life or that of a loved one. They may 
experience humiliating treatment by smugglers, disastrous conditions at gathering points, sea 
crossings in unworthy boats, and passage through the wilderness in the dark of night. Yet most 
are still able to celebrate moments of joy, excitement, and accomplishment.  
    The intensity of these emotional experiences is overwhelming and unforgettable for them. I 
heard stories of frustrated men who were humiliated during their detention or unable to protect 
themselves and their families from violence or physical danger during encounters with smugglers 
or while crossing borders. I met mothers who lost their babies at sea, or who had to send their 
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children ahead with smugglers. Some told me about the shame they internalized when they had 
to teach their children to lie about their identities in order to pass through airport controls. I 
explore these stories in the following chapters – notable elements of refugees’ journeys that 
profoundly affect their perceptions of self and life.  
    Additionally, the often-messy and -unpredictable journey may transform refugees’ 
positionalities and roles within their families and communities. As illustrated in the quote above, 
refugees who could not protect their families from the horrors of war or from the devastating 
conditions of their journey may feel they have lost their most important role as protectors. 
Arrival at their destination turns refugees into asylum seekers with limited ability to work. They 
may become dependent on social services and stop being providers, which affect their familial 
and community relations. I examine these major changes in chapter five.  
    Their journeys alter refugees from war victims to political subjects whom authorities may 
brand “illegal migrants.” At their destinations, they become asylum seekers and protected 
persons, perhaps eventually permanent residents, even citizens with rights and responsibilities. 
Thus a series of complex moments of transformation take them from one status to another. This 
differs from the legal definition of a refugee, as I discussed in chapter one: 
individuals recognized under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, the 1969 Organization of African Unity 
(OAU) Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in 
Africa, those recognized in accordance with the UNHCR status, individuals 
granted complementary forms of protection, and those enjoying temporary 
protection. (UNHCR, 2010: 3) 
    Their stories show that being a refugee transcends legal status to become an emotional state of 
being (Khosravi, 2011). In fact, most of my interviewees were not officially recognized as 
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refugees, despite their need of protection. Lack of sufficient protection had pushed them to 
consider journeys despite their uncertainty and vulnerability, though also great aspirations and 
determination. They decided to claim their rights as humans and seek protection elsewhere as 
refugees, changing in the process from passive victims to vulnerable political figures creating 
their own spaces and trajectories (Scheel and Squire, 2014). Thus, as I explained above, I use 
“refugee” for any individual in need of protection, regardless of legal status. Edward Said 
(2000), my inspiration here, distinguishes between the limited international political concepts of 
“refugee” and the emotional notion of the lonely and isolated “exile.” Said sees exiles as 
uprooted and existing in the “territory of not-belonging.” This emotional status renders identity, 
belonging, and home fluid and changeable.  
     The journey of displacement and search for protection reshape a refugee’s perception of home 
and exile. The case of Palestinian refugees from Syria, particularly from Yarmouk, in Damascus, 
which I explore in the following chapters, exemplifies how multiple displacements during war 
and the journey towards Europe reshape these refugees’ ideas about identity, home, and loss. 
Palestinian refugees’ families have long experience with journey and exile. Much of the writing 
on Palestinians and exile deals with reconstruction of identity in the refugee journey and exile.  
Said acknowledges the dialectical relationship between exile, borders, self-awareness, and 
national identity for Palestinians, addressing (1986) its uniqueness  as it has been reproduced 
repeatedly since 1948,  through the wars of 1948, 1967, and 1982. Their current suffering in the 
midst of the Syrian war is exacerbated by their exclusion from international protection, as I 
discussed in chapter one, and by neighbouring countries’ discrimination and rejection against 
them. I discuss these policies in greater detail in the next chapter.  
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     The case of Yarmouk reflects the new sense of loss since Palestinian refugees were forced to 
leave that community in December 2012 and have been prevented from returning to it again. 
This new displacement has affected their sense of identity. They reaffirm their identity as 
Palestinian refugees from Yarmouk rather than as Palestinian refugees from Damascus or Syria. 
They attempt thereby to reassert that they belong to Yarmouk -- their home, according to the 
diasporic notion of multiple-home identity in exile (Chimni, 2004), and which they have lost like 
their first diasporic home, Palestine. A young Palestinian refugee, now a resident of the 
Netherlands, summarized this experience on his facebook page after the bombing of Yarmouk in 
April 2018: “This is the smoke of my burning tent. This is my father and grandfather’s tent. I am 
now a stateless refugee with no tent (facebook, 20 April 2018). Said (1986) refers to this 
reconceptualization of identity as a communal affirmation of collective identity.  
     Syrian refugees do not share the same type of reconceptualization of communal identity as 
Palestinians. To add to Syrians’ vulnerability, the current and complex conflict in their country, 
often perceived as a civil war, has sharply divided them. While the nature of the conflict is 
beyond the scope of this dissertation, it has, like most civil wars, destroyed any common sense of 
identity among the people of Syria. In the midst of such strife, people suffer personal grief and 
loss, while divisions between them add more pain and vulnerability to their experience in exile. I 
examine the emotional toll and transformative impacts of the journey in chapter five where I 
discuss in detail the set of sentiments that refugees suffer from during their search for protection. 
Their stories reveal the heavy load of scars and traumatic memories they carry with them during 
their journeys which influence their ability of settlement in their new localities.  
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Conclusion  
     Referring to critical migration and mobilities literatures and to my own knowledge from 
refugees’ stories, in this chapter I have explored the concept of journey as a consequence and a 
reflection of the global crisis of protection. Lacking protection in their home region, refugees 
decide to seek protection in the global north, thereby challenging government policies of 
containment and deterrence.  
     Hearing refugees’ own stories, I developed a conceptual framework of the journey that 
highlights three crucial dimensions. First, the journey is an act of survival against precarious 
conditions and lack of protection. Refugees, who suffer from insecurities and violence during 
war, escape their hometowns and seek refuge in neighbouring counties. Yet, when during 
displacement, they do not find “conditions of independence and dignity which enable refugees 
themselves to decide how they wish to cope with their predicaments” (Hathaway, 2007: 364), 
they decide to journey elsewhere to gain their rights as refugees and as humans. Examining the 
journey as an act of survival and resistance is significant as it shifts the focus of analysis towards 
refugees’ agency and their ability to act unexpectedly despite the disastrous circumstances of war 
and displacement. The stories show that, by deciding to leave, many refugees resist their own 
desire to stay home or closer to home. In the case of Palestinian refugees, resisting having to 
leave is, in itself, also an act of agency as it is also a way for Palestinians to assert their unique 
political claim as stateless refugees.  This approach also demonstrates how, through their 
survival attempts, refugees are subject to illegality and imposed invisibility which in many cases 
results in restricting their agency. Thus, this understanding of the journey challenges the 
perception of refugees as powerless victims, presenting them instead as people with agency and 
the ability to act unexpectedly. Yet, the approach avoids the misperception and 
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overrepresentation of refugees’ agency in romanticized ways because it simultaneously 
recognises the conditions of control and marginalization imposed on refugees during their 
journeys.  
     Second, the journey turns out to be frequently non-linear, messy, and precarious. The notion 
of agency is also useful in this context. I illustrated how problematic ideas of choice and 
intention may be, particularly when making decisions to leave under such harrowing situations. 
These conditions suggest that refugees’ journeys are often a series of complex loops of non-
linear, unpredictable, uncontrollable movements. Yet these same experiences can transform these 
highly vulnerable refugees from powerless victims into political actors, who are able to create 
new spaces and trajectories for themselves and their families. In this sense, examining the 
journey as a messy and complex process can challenge states’ narratives that often render 
refugees as powerless victims or as criminals when they challenge the bordering practices. It also 
challenges states’ claims about their ability of controlling “unauthorized” migration, including 
the movement of refugees. It problematizes the way that states often reject “unwanted” migrants, 
including refugees, by securitizing their borders and the way that this response to the refugee 
crisis has become normalized within the international community.  This approach to refugee 
journeys demonstrates how state practices fail to deter desperate individuals, pushing them 
instead to travel through dangerous routes, which transform their journeys into messy and 
complex passages that in many cases end tragically. 
     Finally, the third key dimension of conceptualizing the journey is as a highly emotional, and 
transformative act that often reshapes refugees’ understandings of identity, self, home, and 
belonging. Examining these feelings and transformations reveals the human cost refugees pay for 
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their acts of resistance. These feelings are the price of challenging policies of containment and 
deterrence, which mainly aim to keep refugees in their regions without sufficient protection. In 
other words, these feelings demonstrate at the human level the emotional toll of the global crisis 
of protection and how it invades the intimate space of refugees’ bodies and minds. In this sense, 
understanding the journey as a transformative emotional experience enhances our understanding 
of refugees’ predicament and challenges the dominant perception of them as faceless and 
voiceless people. By focusing on the emotional toll of the journey, we are more able to 
understand and treat refugees as humans. In fact, bringing the emotions to the discussion 
challenges the absence and marginalization of emotions and feelings in social research, in 
general and in refugee studies, in particular. Conceptualizing the  refugee journey in this way 
thus expands the idea of a journey from away from simply physical movement from one land 
point to another to include the intense emotional experience that influence the lives of refugees 
in their new localities. My unique positionality, as I explained above, helped me to grasp the 
reality of this change. In my field research, many refugees saw me as a member of their own 
community whom they trusted and therefore graciously offered me intimate and personal 
insights about their painful experiences during the war and throughout their respective journeys.  
     In the following chapters, I draw on those individual stories and insights to reflect on the 
impact of war and the absence of protection on the lives and trajectories of individuals. These 
personal stories help us see refugees’ journey as a complex, messy, and life-changing experience 
that involves often-acute precarity but also resists passivity as refugees exercise agency. This 
viewpoint reveals the complex nuances of the global crisis of protection as reflected in the 
human suffering of these refugees in their search for protection. We can then perhaps visualize 
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the refugee journey as both a complex passage from the local to the global and a friction between 
structures of governance and the intimate space of refugees’ bodies.  
    I will examine these elements of the journey as experienced by refugees from Syria who made 
the journey to Sweden. In chapter three, I focus on the conditions of refugees’ journey during 
wartime and in displacement in Syria’s neighbouring countries. I show how Syrian refugees 
receive inadequate access to their rights in Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey. Yet I also describe the 
challenges they raise to as they seek to claim their human and refugee rights. Many reject the 
dire circumstances of displacement by risking dangerous journeys to pursue protection in 
Europe, thereby finding what Hannah Arendt evocatively terms “ways of mastering an uncertain 
future” (1943: 111). Such acts allow refugees to take the lead in establishing new trajectories and 
new lives for themselves. Following Arendt’s observation, the following chapters show the 
agency of refugees who wrestle with the precarity that results from war, displacement, and 
strategies of containment and deterrence to reach destinations where they aim to claim their 
rights and start new lives.   
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Chapter Three: Stories of Escape and Survival  
 
Introduction 
     In chapter two, I examined the refugee journey as a reflection of the global crisis of protection 
and proposed a conceptual framework to study it. I proposed that the journey evolves as an act of 
resistance and survival, which leads to escape and displacement (this chapter). The journey then 
develops as a non-linear, messy, and complex passage (chapter four); and, in the process, may 
well transform the individuals who are undertaking it and impact their identities and roles 
(chapter five). In this chapter, I look at the first dimension of the journey, resistance and survival, 
as refugees decide to leave their homeland (escape) and begin a stay, perhaps temporary, in a 
neigbouring country (displacement). I explore people’s reasons for leaving and the conditions of 
their displacement as they cross borders into neighbouring countries.  
    To understand refugees’ journeys one must examine their choices, as well as their interactions 
with various policies and actors during their escape, their displacement, and their travel towards 
northern Europe. The details of their daily lives during wartime and displacement help explain 
the motives for their journeys. Months or even years before they depart physically for Europe, 
precarious wartime conditions and severe vulnerability in Syria, and displacement into 
neighbouring lands, disconnect them emotionally from their communities. The absence of safe 
and legal routes out leads many to risk their lives with smugglers.  
     The stories refugees told me ground this chapter’s first part, “Stories of Escape.” They seem 
to indicate four key motives for leaving Syria:  insecurity and violence, fear of detention, fear of 
forced military service (conscription), and loss of income. The chapter’s second part – “Stories 
of Displacement” -- analyses their conditions of displacement in each of three neighbouring 
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countries -- Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey. This discussion provides a brief comparative 
perspective of how the conditions for refugees differ between countries. The third part considers 
a distinctive case: the subset of stateless Palestinian refugees from Syria and their particular 
conditions of precarity and rejection during both escape and displacement.   
     The stories in this chapter highlight aspects of resistance. Most of the refugees I interviewed 
first tried to cope with wartime life in their country. Yet, especially after the violence intensified 
and conditions worsened, all the interviewees left the country in search of protection elsewhere. 
These departures were acts of both survival and resistance, as refugees rejected marginalization 
and sought alternatives offering – they hoped -- greater rights and safety. As Johnson (2014: 19) 
explains, refugees “contest and demand participation in the practices that shape a life and the 
meaning-making discourses that shape the world.” And, as I discussed above, and explore here, 
refugees’ agency, despite their vulnerabilities, reflects their ability to act when action is not 
expected or even, perhaps, permissible.  
     The findings in this chapter, and those that follow, emerge from the stories of 60 Syrian and 
Palestinian refugees who journeyed from Syria to Sweden between 2012 and 2015. I met and 
interviewed them in the summer of 2016 in Hässleholm, Laxå, Malmö, Stockholm, and Uppsala 
in Sweden. In addition, in the spring of 2016, I interviewed two refugees in Germany through 
Skype and one Syrian family  the Canadian government resettled in Kitchener, Ontario, after a 
journey of displacement via Turkey.  
Stories of Escape  
     In chapter two, I referred to refugees’ feelings of helplessness in the midst of the Syrian war, 
which limited their choices and their ability to act. Since the crisis began in March 2011, people 
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in Syria, lacking networks of support or protection, have daily faced vulnerability, insecurity, 
and unpredictability as conditions threatened properties, jobs, loved ones, and life itself. As a 
result, more than 5.6 million individuals have left in search of protection and support in 
neighbouring states (UNHCR, 2018). They cite as principal motives insecurity, fear of detention, 
fear of forced military service (conscription), and loss of income.  
Insecurity 
     I personally witnessed the first three months of unrest in Damascus before I left with my 
family for Canada on 4 June 2011. I recall the fear that I shared with my husband as we drove 
through central Damascus one Friday evening. It was the end of March 2011, when weekly 
protests at mosques followed Friday noontime prayers. Security forces often brutally attacked 
protesters. The silence in the empty streets was unnerving in this usually crowded and lively 
capital. There was a moment when I had to ask my children, in the back seat, to lower their heads 
to avoid any bullets that might come from the dark corners of the empty streets. This was the 
moment when I felt that things had changed and Damascus would never be the same.  
    Our concerns about insecurity and violence increased as military operations escalated and 
fighting intensified throughout the country. I spoke later with many individuals from Syria who 
had similar stories to my own of fear. As insecurity deepened, daily activities became harder to 
maintain. Constant bombing, explosions, and kidnappings haunted residents and made them 
afraid of going to work or even sending their children to school. Many families moved several 
times within the same city in order to maintain their jobs. All these stories cited conditions of 
violence and insecurity, fear of detention, and loss of employment and income, which all help 
create economic insecurity and social vulnerability.  
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     These and other types of precarious conditions have forced millions of people to leave their 
communities in search of stability and new opportunities elsewhere. The stories of Rajaa, Rana, 
and Rasha, three women who lived in Damascus, and whom I met in Sweden after their long and 
complex journeys, illustrate the insecurity and violence typical for people in wartime Syria.  
     Rajaa is a well-known Syrian actress. She is married to Wassim, a Palestinian refugee from 
Syria, and they have two sons, Rami and Shadi. Initially, Rajaa did not want to leave Syria, but 
her family insisted she depart with them to Egypt because they were concerned about her mental 
and emotional condition. She explained: 
From the beginning of the crisis, I was terrified by the war, the bombing, the 
burnings, and the sounds. Our area was relatively safe but we were at the 
borders with Daria, which was a hot zone. There was a particular bombing that 
happened near our place, which caused me a kind of nervous breakdown … I 
could not bear the situation anymore. I was terrified. I started using medication. 
I used to hide in the corners of my house whenever I heard something. I even 
stopped sleeping in my bedroom because it had big windows … I continued 
rejecting the idea of leaving but I almost lost it. I was not able to focus on 
anything. I lost my appetite. I was totally paranoid as a result of the bombing. 
(Rajaa, Stockholm, July 2017)  
     Rajaa and her family fled to Egypt in 2012 to start new lives there. Yet after two years in 
Egypt, they chose to journey to Sweden (see the next chapter for details). 
     Like Rajaa’s story, Rana’s reflects these elements of precarity. Rana and her family left their 
home in Yarmouk in December 2012 for a safer part of Damascus. After more months of 
suffering, they felt they had to leave Syria and moved to Irbil, northern Iraq, where her husband 
found a job through some contacts. As I explained above, Rana ultimately headed to Sweden 
with her younger son, leaving her husband and older son behind in Irbil. She described 
conditions in Damascus:  
106 
 
We left Yarmouk camp on 16th December 2012 when the air fighters bombed 
the camp. We rented a house in the suburbs of Damascus where we lived in 
continuous fear and instability. There was a lot of fighting and bombing on 
daily basis on our way to work in addition to suffering at the checkpoints. We 
used to face lots of difficulties in reaching our offices. I used to work at the 
airport, and my husband was an accountant at Benetton Company, near 
Damascus. The checkpoints were very scary, as we were never sure that we 
would be able to pass and reach home. We stayed like this for six months. 
(Rana, Stockholm, July 2016) 
     Such insecurity was common to millions of individuals who have lived through the war in 
Syria, as illustrated acutely in the story of Rasha, a widow from Damascus, whom I met in 
Sweden after her horrible journey there with her three children. Rasha decided to escape with 
them from Damascus after a bombing of the children’s school while they were in class. When 
she got there, she found her daughter totally covered with broken glass. She observed about 
Sweden: 
At least we can sleep peacefully here … I can close my door and go to sleep. I 
do not have to wake up in the middle of the night to rush to the basement 
because of the bombing … We witnessed lots of horrors in Syria …  bombs, 
explosions, kidnaps, chopped heads …  We have seen it all. Whatever we face 
here, at least it is safe. Back in Damascus, I used to say my final goodbyes to 
my parents every time I used to leave the house to go to work because I was not 
sure that I will be back again … Do you remember the explosion of Al Hayat 
hospital, downtown Damascus? I was there. I survived. It was a miracle. (Rasha, 
Laxå, Sweden, July 2016) 
     The stories of Rana, Rajaa, and Rasha illustrate the common insecurity during the war. Their 
stories reveal how Syrians have lived, and still live, in precarious conditions, whether destruction 
of houses and communities or direct targeting of people’s bodies.  
     Many individuals have been subject to direct violence and threats of detention or death. 
Khaled’s story reflects such danger. Khaled is a Palestinian refugee who lived with his wife and 
two sons in Daraa in southwestern Syria. After March 2011, security conditions in the city 
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deteriorated, and Khaled decided to send his family to Jordan to live with his wife’s parents. She   
is a Palestinian refugee from Jordan who held a Jordanian travel document, and their children 
had multiple entry visas. They moved in November 2012, and the youngsters had to renew their 
residency permit every two months. After only six months that was no longer possible because 
Jordan blocked admission of all Palestinian refugees from Syria (as of January 2013; see Al-
Monitor media site, Washington DC, 2014). Without documents the children became illegal 
residents, but their registration with the United Nations Relief and Work Agency for Palestine 
Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) allowed them to stay in school and receive basic medical 
care. But the older son, who was seven, was epileptic, and UNWRA did not cover his daily 
medication, for which the family now had to pay.  
      Khaled had remained in Syria, unwilling to leave his home. He had often heard his parents’ 
stories of displacement from Palestine in 1948 and feared living as a displaced person. However, 
violence in Daraa grew. Members of the Syrian security forces attacked and assaulted him when 
they invaded his house during a check of the area. They then attacked Khaled’s neighbour and 
took him to a detention centre, where he died a few weeks later. Khaled’s parents decided to 
leave, but not without their son. Khaled finally decided to go with his parents to Jordan, but its 
new restrictions kept them out. The family decided to cross illegally, and Khaled chose to travel 
separately. He gave his parents fake identity documents as a Syrian couple with a disabled young 
son (actually a cousin), while he posed as the son of an elderly woman (also a relative). As with 
other refugees, Khaled had experienced severe insecurity and violence and decided to start a 
journey in search of protection and safety.  
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Fear of Detention  
     As was the case with Khaled, many refugees from Syria had to leave their home because they 
fear detention. Youssef, whom I interviewed in Hässleholm, Sweden, had a desperate story of 
detention and lost many relatives during the war. His three brothers and nephew died in prison, 
where Youssef was also detained for two months in 2012. During that period, four of his cousins 
were also killed. All of the men in his family were wanted by the security forces. During 
temporary release, Youssef bribed a security officer to help him obtain a passport so he could 
move to Egypt.  
     The continual threat of detention indicates Syrians’ extremely precarious situation. Like 
Khaled and Youssef, Fares had to leave Syria to avoid a very dangerous detention. Fares is a 
young textile merchant from Hama. He arrived in Sweden with his wife and two-year-old son 
after a long journey through Egypt, Libya, and Italy. I met Fares in Stockholm in July 2016, and 
he spoke with me for more than six hours about his journey. In his opinion, his journey began 
long before he physically left Syria. His wedding day marked the turning point: that day security 
forces killed his best friend. Fares had no interest in politics, but his friend’s death drove him to 
become active in the protests and start helping families in the besieged areas of the city.  
     His actions resulted in his detention in a prison run by one of Syria’s most brutal national 
security services. Fares shared with me the details of the horrible torture that he experienced 
during his detention which deserves attention beyond the scope of this dissertation. His detention 
furthered his emotional departure from his homeland. He internalized the shame of helpless 
humiliation during his detention. His words captured his shame, which undermined his identity 
109 
 
as a man and as a husband, and his later reunion with his wife after his release reflected his 
severe trauma. He wept while he asked me:   
What should I show her? The blisters of my skin, the cigarette burns on my 
legs, on my back, and on other parts of my body? She is too young to 
understand this … How could I describe the humiliation I experienced in 
prison? Would she still see me as the man who could protect her from the 
whole world? Would she still be able to respect me? (Fares, Stockholm, July 
2016) 
     Only a few months after his release, Fares learned that he was still wanted by the security 
forces.  Fear of further imprisonment, and the ever-present risk of death there, pushed him to 
leave the country in less than 24 hours. He had to pay one million Syrian pounds (roughly 
$15,000 U.S.) to bribe a security officer in Hama for details from his security record. Having 
confirmed that he was wanted by security forces, Fares paid more money to obtain passports for 
himself and his family and also to guarantee that security forces would not stop them at the 
airport. Yet, and despite his legitimate fear of further detention, Fares was ashamed of leaving 
Syria in such circumstances. I could sense his deep sorrow and guilt when he told me: “I did not 
have a passport before. I never thought of obtaining a passport. I never thought of leaving Syria. 
Never. I adore Syria. I adore Hama” (ibid.).  
     The entire journey came as a shock for Fares. He had not prepared for it and had no idea 
about its trajectory. He sometimes looks back and is puzzled by the way it unfolded:  “My 
journey has been a complete shock for me. After all this time, I am still confused about its 
events. I have not yet understood how did it happen, how it developed and how I managed 
through it all.” This shock and confusion affirm the atmosphere of violence and precarity 
surrounding the refugee journey. Refugees like Fares act out of fear and need of protection, and, 
despite the substantial agency their departure represents, they act essentially to survive. As I 
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illustrated in chapter two, although refugees may be creating their own trajectories and 
unexpected scripts (Squire, 2017), any observer’s invoking of their agency problematizes their 
choices and intentions within such extreme conditions.  
     As with Fares, Ammar, whom I introduced in chapter two, feared detention and fled to seek 
protection abroad. When I asked Ammar about his detention, he summarized it: 
If you want to document the sufferings of refugees, I would tell you that all 
the risks and the hardships I faced during my journey from Syria to Europe 
which took me through Lebanon, Thailand, Turkey, and the horrible sea 
journey to Greece cannot be compared with the experience of detention in 
Syria, particularly during the first two months. (Ammar, Hanover, Germany, 
April 2016) 
     Ammar summarizes the horrors of detention and the emotional scars it left. The 
experience often launches an early emotional departure, where refugees disconnect from 
their community as they lose control over themselves and their conditions. This acute status 
of precarity affects how refugees see self, home, and life in general. I analyse this 
transformation in chapter five.  
Fear of Military Service and Conscription 
     In addition to insecurity and detention, possible military service pushed many people to leave 
Syria. Many families with young men left to avoid military service, which is mandatory for 
males who are eighteen and older. They needed passports for their sons, who otherwise could be 
stopped and detained at any Syrian army checkpoint. As well, many families living in areas 
controlled by opposition groups left  to prevent their sons being forced into the militias. These 
forces also frequently stopped young men at checkpoints and forced them to fight against the 
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regime. The story of Mahmoud, a Palestinian refugee from Syria, illustrates this fear. Mahmoud 
left his home near Homs with his two sons to keep the older one from military operations.  
In fact, the main reason that forced us to leave was my concern about my oldest 
son who had to choose between joining the Syrian army or the Free Army. 
Both options were totally refused. My younger boys were at school at the time, 
but my fear of seeing my oldest son joining the military operations forced me 
to leave the country as quickly as I could. (Mahmoud, Hässleholm, Sweden, 
June 2016) 
     Salam, a Syrian teacher from Lattakia, also had to leave the country to avoid joining the army 
or the militia: 
People at my age are supposed to get armed and are forced to fight. This was 
the main reason for me to leave. In fact, I am from the coastal area, from 
Lattakia, but I used to work as a teacher in Al Hassakeh, in the east of Syria. 
When the revolution started in 2011, I moved back to Lattakia, and there was 
lots of pressure on me to fight with one side against the other, which I totally 
refused. I did not want to be a part of the war and did not want to participate in 
any fight. This was the main reason that forced me to think about departing, but 
I had no idea where to go. (Salam, Stockholm, July 2016)  
     By refusing to fight and deciding to leave, such young men exercise their “right of 
escape” (Mezzadra 2015), distancing themselves from the horrors of war. They disconnect 
themselves from their realities and attempt to create their own scenarios and trajectories 
(Squire, 2017).  
Loss of Income 
     If the fear of having to fight inspires many departures, so does loss of income. Arad went 
through multiple internal displacements. He lost his shop and thus his income. He is a Kurdish 
Syrian who lived in Aleppo with his wife and two children, seven and ten years old. He repaired 
automobiles and owned his shop, managing a number of workers. In 2012, when the opposition 
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Free Syrian Army (FSA) militia entered the area, it became a target for the regime’s barrel 
bombs. Arad lost his shop and decided to take his family to his village near Afrin, close to the 
Turkish border. They stayed there for nine months, but he could not find a job and had no 
income. He then decided to return to Aleppo. In March 2013 the FSA and the Kurdish militia 
entered Arad’s former neighbourhood, and the regime started bombing again. Arad and his 
family escaped back to the village and stayed with his father for two months. The house had no 
power, no drinking water, and no public services. There were no jobs, Arad still had no income, 
and the schools had closed. Since returning to Aleppo had become impossible, Arad considered 
Turkey. Lacking travel documents, he crossed the border illegally.  
     Arad’s case represents a chronic condition for millions of Syrians. Loss of jobs and income 
has, in fact, affected the whole population. As well as greater insecurity, people in Syria have 
faced a collapsing economy, which forced millions of them to leave in search of protection, 
safety, and support. In 2017, the World Bank estimated that  Syria lost about 538,000 jobs per 
year 2011-15 and had unemployment  of 78 per cent, as more than 9 million Syrians were jobless 
(World Bank, 2017).  
Stories of Displacement 
     In this section, I examine the conditions of displacement that refugees describe in their 
stories. In particular, I look at their fleeing to Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey, so we can compare 
their situations in each of those states. Syria’s neighbours, including Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, 
and Egypt, have put up border controls to keep out Syrian refugees (Human Rights Watch, 
2013). Thus these refugees’ precarious wartime conditions include crossing borders to those 
states, where they may become illegal for that very act. Further, their illegal transit worsens their 
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living conditions as displaced people in those states. They encounter new forms of vulnerability 
and unpredictability by engaging with smugglers and border control.  
     The story of Arad, from Aleppo, and his family shows how this illegality amplifies refugees’ 
vulnerability and affects their displacement conditions. A smuggler guided them from their 
village near Aleppo into Turkey through a Syrian military area that contained land mines. There 
was a dam on the Turkish side near the border crossing, and when Turkish authorities open the 
dam gates the river often becomes too deep and too dangerous to cross. That day the water was 
above Arad’s knee, making the passage quite risky:    
It was very difficult at the borders. We waited for about two hours and were 
then ordered to run without looking back. We had to run through a rocky 
river. I carried a suitcase on one side and my son on the other, running and 
jumping from one rock to another. My kids were too young to keep up the 
pace, and my wife was hardly able to manage her way. It took about half an 
hour to reach the borderline, which was a razor-wired fence with holes in it 
made purposely by smugglers to allow people to cross through to the other 
side. (Arad, Kitchener, Canada, March 2016) 
     The image of the foursome passing through fields with land mines and crossing a treacherous 
river captures the plight of refugees escaping a brutal war, only to cross a border illegally at great 
personal risk. During the interview, Arad’s voice reflected his shame at crossing illegally, and 
his wife wept when she recalled the mud that covered them when they reached Turkey. 
     As with its border with Turkey, Syria’s border in the south with Jordan also made refugees 
more vulnerable. The official border exit was closed, so refugees had to cross illegally through 
unofficial exit points under the supervision of the Syrian opposition militia, which coordinated 
with the Jordanian army, to receive them at the other side of the border. For example, Khaled and 
his parents used an illegal crossing three kilometers from the official exit, amid constant 
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bombing. They waited six hours before trucks arrived to take them to the border. They crossed 
with another 200 people. Once they were on the other side, the Jordanian army took women and 
children in one truck, and men had to walk for about 45 minutes to the first military checkpoint, 
where border authorities inspected their identity documents. Khaled did not have a passport so 
presented civil records of his new, fake identity as a Syrian citizen. He begged the officers to 
allow him in and asked a woman pretending to be his mother to intervene, but she was already 
having trouble remembering her new name. She was not a good actor. His father then intervened 
as a stranger and begged the army officer as well. The official finally accepted Khaled, who told 
us:  
Jordanian authorities sent men with no passports back to Syria. They loaded 
them in what refugees called “expelling buses” and pushed them back through 
the borders … At 5:00 a.m. I started losing hope. We were told by the 
intelligence forces that we will be thrown back to Syria, including my parents, 
the disabled young man, and the old lady. No one was allowed without 
passports. (Khaled, Berlin, April 2016) 
     This encounter is typical of dehumanizing practices at the Jordanian border. Despite needing 
protection, refugees without official travel documents were immediately deported back to Syria’s 
war zones. Refugees like Khaled, whom authorities allowed in, could be deported at any time -- 
an extreme precarity, which makes refugees more vulnerable while displaced in neighbouring 
countries.   
     During their displacement, the majority of refugees from Syria share similar vulnerabilities 
and social marginalization. They do not receive the “sufficient protection” they deserve as 
refugees, “fundamentally oriented to creating conditions of independence and dignity which 
enable refugees themselves to decide how they wish to cope with their predicaments” 
(Hathaway, 2007: 364). As I showed in previous chapters, this definition entails dignity, 
115 
 
independence, and autonomy for refugees, who are “the victims of fundamental social 
disfranchisement and uniquely within the protective ambit of the international community” (ibid. 
350). This notion of protection, enshrined in international human rights standards and the 1951 
Convention on the Status of Refugees, entitles refugees to a set of social and economic rights, 
including the right to stay legally, to work, and to receive education and health care (Human 
Rights Watch, 2016).  
     Yet Syrian refugees fleeing to neighbouring countries lack access to these rights and the 
protection they deserve as refugees. Instead, they are subject to the domestic regulations of each 
country (Akram, 2014), where ad-hoc policies give them precarious legal status and few rights. 
Even worse, Lebanon and Jordan have not signed the 1951 Convention or its 1967 Protocol and 
make no attempt to implement international standards of refugee protection (ibid.).  Egypt, which 
has signed the 1951 Convention and the OAU Convention, places refugees in legal limbo, as its 
domestic regulations do not adhere to the norms of international refugee protection (ibid.).  
      Turkey applies such standards, but only to individuals of European origin, while most asylum 
seekers in Turkey are non-European (Soykan, 2012). It processes asylum applications from the 
latter group in an atmosphere of uncertainty and vulnerability and requires them to leave in the 
long term (ibid.). Its Law on Foreign and International Protection Act (LFIP, 2013) created 
statuses of “temporary protection,” “secondary refugee,” and “secondary protection,” which 
exclude Syrian (and other) refugees from permanent residency (Baban, Ilcan, and Rygiel, 2015). 
The act maintains the geographical distinction European/non-European and offers refugees no 
path to integration or naturalization (Soykan, 2012). Temporary protection has rendered Syrian 
refugees more precarious by making international protection in Turkey or in a third country more 
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unlikely for them. Furthermore, it has reduced their ability to claim international protection if 
they register for temporary protection in Turkey and then go to Europe hoping to settle there 
(Baban, Ilcan, and Rygiel 2016).  
     To summarize, refugees from Syria become extremely vulnerable and precarious during 
wartime and as displaced persons living in neighbouring states. Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey, 
which do not recognize them as refugees and deny them  many social, economic, and political 
rights, present dramatic examples of this precarity through systematic discrimination and 
marginalization. In the midst of such conditions, thousands of families have developed  
“negative coping strategies” (LCRP, 2015) to survive, such as arranging early marriages for 
young girls, withdrawing children from school, putting some  to work, and eating less(ibid.). 
Such strategies exacerbate their social, economic, and emotional vulnerability.  
     In the following three subsections, I examine their new forms of vulnerability and intense 
hopelessness in Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey. Their stories reveal harrowing details of their 
displacement and allow us to compare conditions in each country, which in turn force many to 
continue on towards other destinations, mainly in Europe, where, they believe, better access to 
rights is available.  
Lebanon  
     There are more than 1.5 million refugees from Syria in Lebanon, with only one million of 
them registered by the UNHCR (LCRP, 2015). Lebanon has about 4.5 million people, including 
more than 450,000 Palestinian refugees, so one in every three residents is a refugee (ibid.). While 
the UNHCR recognizes escapees from the Syrian war as refugees worthy of international 
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protection, the Lebanese government does not, referring to them instead as “displaced 
individuals” (ibid.). This precarious legal status (ibid.) limits their access to aid and basic rights, 
such as health care, education, housing, and work. Further, it subjects them to domestic 
regulations concerning residency and mobility. For example, in 2013 Beirut restricted the flow of 
Syrian refugees into the country. Would-be entrants must show a flight or a hotel booking in 
Lebanon or obtain supporting documents from a Lebanese sponsor. Those who plan to stay must 
obtain a residency permit and renew it frequently, with fees too high for most refugees to afford 
(Amnesty International, 2015). As a result, entering the country has become harder, and people 
already there face new forms of discrimination and precarity. In January 2015, the government 
began requiring Syrians to obtain visas to enter Lebanon, making it almost impossible for those 
already there to renew their residency permits (Akesson and Badawi, 2017). Syrian men unable 
to renew their permits could be detained and deported. These regulations make them more 
vulnerable, particularly as authorities reject most renewal applications, further marginalizing 
thousands of families (HRW, 2016b).  As well, thousands of unregistered Syrian children born in 
Lebanon lack documentation proving their identity – some 50,000 of them in 2016; legally they 
do not exist (Reuters, 2016).   
     Syrian refugees, because of their precarious legal status, face rejection, discrimination, and 
harassment in many areas of the country. Denying  their refugee status, Beirut refuses to set up 
official camps for them, forcing most  to live in the most vulnerable areas,  including the Bekaa 
Valley and  Akkar (Akesson et al., 2017), or in unrecognized, makeshift camps such as those  
around Arsal, close to the Syrian border. These places offer deteriorating living conditions and 
extreme insecurity (HRW, 2017). Organizations including Médecins sans frontières (MSF) 
(2013a) and World Vision (2013) have frequently reported on these shocking conditions. People 
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struggle to find shelter and food, and many have no access to health care or schools. This 
situation hits unregistered refugees especially hard, as they have no access to aid. Furthermore, 
the escalating conflict in Syria has created more refugees, increasing social and political tensions 
against Syrians in some areas of Lebanon, which started in the mid-1970s because of Syria’s role 
in the Lebanese civil war. Such hostility forces refugees to maintain low profiles and avoid 
interaction with local populations.  
     Many Syrians in Lebanon work in seasonal farming and building, but most are exploited  and 
many receive no pay, as employers exploit their precarious legal status, which affects every 
aspect of their everyday life (Banki, 2013; Sigona, 2012), including housing. Such status of 
precarity negatively impacts their socio-economic and subjects them to severe marginalization 
and exploitation in the absence of protection and support structures. For example, Ammar, who 
crossed into Lebanon, moved into an old abandoned building in the north, 10 km from the 
nearest village. Despite its inaccessibility, the rent was high. Because of widespread hostility 
against Syrians, Ammar found it best to avoid the locals. Like many of his compatriots in 
Lebanon, he found work in building and farming, but received virtually no pay. He was 
mistreated and abused by the Lebanese police, but could not complain due to his illegal status.  
Ammar therefore considered resettlement in a third country. He tried to register as a refugee at 
the UNHCR offices in Beirut, but the massive crowds of applicants every day, and the abusive 
Lebanese security forces there, discouraged him, so he thought about leaving for another 
country. He explained: 
My situation was very miserable in Lebanon; I was hungry and cold most of 
the time and thus started planning to leave to a third country where I could 
claim asylum. I thought of going to Europe through Libya, but my mother 
strongly rejected the idea, given the high number of casualties through that 
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route. Then I heard from a relative, who had moved to Thailand that the 
UNHCR are accepting refugee resettlement applications there. (Ammar, 
Hanover, Germany, April 2016) 
     Ammar’s words show how illegality can shape daily life for refugees in Lebanon. Lack of 
adequate international protection pushes many refugees into illegality, which further 
marginalizes them and leaves them open to exploitation. Ammar, desperate for social acceptance 
and protection, considered Thailand after he learned that the UNHCR there had resettled some 
refugees from Syria. He borrowed money from family members and friends for a new phase of 
his journey, and he headed to Thailand. But he found life there different from what he had 
expected, creating new forms of vulnerability for him: 
I was not legally allowed to work due to my tourist visa, so I maintained a low 
profile and found a job at a Pakistani restaurant for a minimum wage, which 
barely covered my rent and daily expenses. Working conditions were tough. I 
worked 13 hours a day, seven days a week. After two months, I found another 
job at an Iraqi restaurant. The conditions were not better. In fact, it was a kind 
of slavery, but I had no other alternatives. Time, as well as my illegal status, 
were not on my side. My visa had expired while I was trying hard to look for 
better working conditions.  
I registered with the UNHCR hoping that I will be resettled in a third country 
… After a year of waiting, I was informed by the UNHCR that my second 
interview was postponed for another seven months. Moreover, my 
resettlement application will require three years at least to be complete. At that 
moment, I had to consider other options; I thought about turning myself into 
the Thai police, where the UNHCR is supposed to interfere six months after 
my detention, but I was discouraged due to the horrible conditions at Thai 
prisons.  
Instead, a friend of mine offered to assist me to travel to Germany through 
Turkey. The journey would cost $5,000 U.S., which I didn’t have. My friend, 
whom I helped many times before, offered to give me $3,000 U.S., and another 
friend in Egypt gave me $1,500 U.S. So I started a journey towards Germany 
via Turkey. (Ammar, Hanover, Germany, April 2016) 
     Ammar summarizes some of the factors that push refugees to consider an expensive and risky 
journey to Europe. Living illegally, social and economic marginalization, and lack of protection 
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may lead them to conclude that Europe is their only choice. Yet such a journey may be messy, 
complicated, and unpredictable, as it was for Ammar, who travelled from Syria to Lebanon, then 
to Thailand, only to head back to Turkey in order to reach Europe.  
Jordan 
     Jordan displays exploitation similar to Lebanon’s -- poor workplace conditions, risk of 
detention and deportation, minimal access to social rights, and absence of support. The UNHCR 
(2016) reported that Jordan had more than 600,000 Syrian refugees. It worked with the national 
government to establish four official camps for them, locating 115,000 of them near the Syrian 
border in Zaatari, one of the region’s largest camps (Akram et al., 2014). Conditions in the 
camps are shocking – no schools for children and people crowding into small tents with no 
privacy (UNICEF, 2013). The catastrophic conditions in the camps has pushed some desperate 
families to marry off their daughters very young, creating new levels of victimization and 
vulnerability (Save the Children Fund, 2014). Urban refugees in Jordan, about 80 per cent of the 
total, frequently face rejection and discrimination, since it’s an expensive country to live in, and 
refugees have few job opportunities and limited aid and humanitarian support (Akram et al., 
2014).  
     For example, Khaled, who left Daraa, Syria, and crossed into Jordan illegally, spent two years 
in Amman without humanitarian assistance. His Jordanian employer humiliated and mistreated 
him. Khaled explained to me that the situation was so desperate that many families were willing 
to return to the camps. He believed that the majority of Syrians were mistreated in their jobs, 
because of their illegality. Many put up with this, fearing detention or deportation back to Syria:  
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“In Jordan, we had no rights, we were not allowed to work, which is essential to survive” 
(Khaled, Berlin, Germany, April 2016).  
     In July 2014, Jordan, assisted by the UNHCR, introduced biometric scans, including of the 
iris, to facilitate registration of Syrian refugees (Jordan Times, 2014). Khaled worried that such 
measures, especially the iris scan, might reveal that he was a Palestinian refugee from Syria, 
since the authorities had previous scans from his pre-war visit to the country.  He returned to 
Syria in order to avoid detention. At the border, he found himself among hundreds of Syrian 
families exiting Jordan. That day, Jordanian security forces assigned three buses to transport 
people to Syria through the same illegal border point where they had entered Jordan. Khaled re-
entered Syria to start another chapter of his journey.  
Turkey 
     Turkey is often held up as one of the more promising options of escape for Syrians, yet living 
conditions there can be very precarious, creating differential inclusion (Baban, Ilcan, and Rygiel, 
2016). Since the Syrian crisis began in 2011, Turkey has received more than 3.5 million Syrian 
refugees (UNHCR, 2018) and opened camps for more than 200,000 of them, although most 
Syrians live in urban centers. Yet, as I noted above in this chapter, refugees in Turkey – officially 
“neither refugees nor guests” -- have precarious and problematic status and so limited access to 
health care, education, permanent residency, and work permits (Baban, Ilcan, and Rygiel, 2015). 
Many families live in crowded places with poor facilities. In Gaziantep, in southern Turkey, 
many rent dilapidated houses with no running water or electricity. Humanitarian assistance 
amounts to minimal quantities of food, and children collect plastic from the garbage to gain some 
money (my field observation as a research assistant, Gaziantep, June 2015).   
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     Arad, who crossed illegally into Turkey, found charities selective in offering aid: “They 
preferred to support Arabs over Kurds and more favourably Muslims … It wasn’t hard to tell that 
they were affiliated with the Syrian opposition coalition, like most charities in Turkey” (Arad, 
Kitchener, Canada, March 2016).  Arad and his family found social interactions very awkward: 
We moved to Avcilar district in Istanbul …11 Syrian refugees were badly 
treated by the officials at that area. They prejudged all Syrian refugees as 
traitors for escaping their country; instead, they thought we should have stayed 
in Syria to fight the extremists. Some locals even refused to rent houses to 
Syrians and kept questioning us about reasons for leaving Syria. They 
persistently asked us to return, but how is that possible? There is war there, our 
house was destroyed, how can we go back? Municipalities managed by 
[President Recep Tayyip] Erdoğan’s [AK] party treated Syrians a little bit more 
humanly and provided some assistance. (Arad, Kitchener, Canada, March 
2016) 
     Many Syrian refugees are subject to stigma, humiliation, even rejection while they struggle to 
establish new lives. Such barriers may affect work too. For example, Arad’s boss refused to pay 
him for five months and forced him to work non-stop for many hours. Arad found another job 
but was again at his employer’s mercy. He could not complain to the authorities because he had 
no legal status:  
In Turkey, they do not recognize us at all; our existence is simply not 
acknowledged … My employer was generous with me but expected me to 
work very long hours; he would wake me up early in the morning and kept 
asking for more working hours. He was nice, but the working conditions 
were pretty tough. Many people could not continue working in such 
circumstances. (Arad, Kitchener, Canada, March 2016) 
                                                          
11 Avcilar has a majority population of Alevis, who generally oppose Turkey’s policy vis-à-vis the Syrian conflict. 
Alevism is a branch of Shi’a Islam  practiced in Turkey and the Balkans among ethnic Turks and Kurds and is 
related to —though distinct from—Alawism  in Syria. Alevis make up 20 per cent of Turkish Muslims and comprise 
the country’s largest religious minority (Harvard Divinity School, https://rlp.hds.harvard.edu/faq/alevism). 
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     Such conditions exploit refugees in the absence of security and social protection (Banki, 
2013). This legal limbo also affects access to health care:  
Hospitals refused to accept us because we are Syrians. When my daughter 
broke her arm, I took her from one hospital to the other (three hospitals in 
total), only to be denied by all three. I was desperate and contacted my 
employer, who drove us to a hospital near Aksaray [in Istanbul],12 but when 
they found out she is Syrian, they referred us to another place and a third place 
… It was a public hospital, and if you are not registered within the system, 
they won’t let you in. (Arad, Kitchener, Canada, March 2016) 
     The government introduced identity cards (kimliks) for Syrians in order to ease access to 
social services such as health care. But, Arad explains: “There was no kimlik when we arrived in 
Turkey. We were among the first people who had the kimlik. But it did not help much and did 
not make any difference. We were still denied access to health care even after we received it.” 
Kimliks did not help with schooling either. Arad’s children could not attend Turkish schools 
because they could not speak Turkish. To study Arabic (Syria’s language), they would have to 
attend private schools, which Arad could not afford, so they missed school for two years:   
I wanted to move to another country just to secure education for them. I 
wanted them to go to school. I was ready to go back to Syria. I did not care 
about the war there. I wanted to see my kids attending schools. They have 
been out of school for more than three years. I could not see them roaming 
the streets without any education. (Arad, Kitchener, Canada, March 2016)  
     Arad became one of the few lucky Syrians in Turkey to register with the UNHCR’s 
resettlement program in Istanbul in 2013. The UNHCR interviewed him in Istanbul and in 
Ankara, and a few months later the Canadian embassy in Ankara accepted his resettlement 
application. While he and his family waited for the paperwork, they remained in legal limbo, 
with no social assistance or schooling and minimal access to health care and other public 
                                                          
12 Aksaray is a district in Istanbul.  
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services. A year later, when they arrived in Canada, they received permanent residency at the 
airport, which gave them full access to social rights, including education, employment, health 
care, and social welfare. His wife cried tears of joy and relief watching her children enter their 
Canadian school for the first time.  
     For Arad, displacement had given way to resettlement. Acceptance by the UNHCR’s program 
had launched him and his family on a long process of applications, interviews, and waiting, but 
his journey towards protection was now legal and regulated (Johnson, 2014). They arrived in 
Canada legally, as Convention refugees. Thousands of other refugees, including Ammar and 
Khaled, were desperate to achieve the same but, unable to become Convention refugees, lived, 
often in rough conditions, as displaced persons, experiencing “mobility in ways that are outside 
the strict policies and procedures of management and control governing border regimes” 
(Johnson, 2014: 3).  
     During this process, many find themselves captives of a global system of border control that 
prevents and deters them rather than protecting them (Johnson, 2014; Mountz, 2010; Squire 
2011). Many aiming for Europe encounter the EU’s “non-entrée” regime as irregular migrants 
(Hathaway and Gammeltoff-Hansen, 2015), as I discussed in chapter one -- hence their 
precarious journeys to circumvent restrictive border controls. They have failed to gain 
international protection through asylum after fleeing war in their homelands, but reject the 
uncertainty of displacement, and their illegal journeys towards Europe show them to be both  
extremely vulnerable yet acting politically, “taking politics through which refugees assert their 
own capacity to decide their own life conditions” (Johnson 2014: 181). Yet, as chapter two 
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explained, these acts of survival and resistance are also moments of extreme vulnerability and 
uncertainty.  
    The particular case of Palestinian refugees from Syria illustrates the devastating impact of 
regional political unrest, restrictive border controls, and social marginalization on these stateless 
refugees, who, fleeing war in Syria, endure acute precarity and rejection.  
Escape and Displacement: Palestinian Refugees from Syria  
    In this section I examine the case of Palestinian refugees from Syria who experience wartime 
and displacement in neighbouring states. I do so to illustrate the acute precarity and rejection that 
statelessness imposes on these refugees. It is worth noting here that Syria was considered home 
by many Palestinian refugees who, as illustrated earlier, were forced out of Palestine in 1948. 
Until 2011, they enjoyed better living conditions than their compatriots in neighbouring 
countires. They integrated into social and economic life, faced few barriers to work or mobility 
(Brand, 1988), and had full access to public services, such as education and health care. They 
also received assistance from UNRWA, which provided Palestinian refugees in Gaza, the West 
Bank, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria with education, health care, relief and social services, camp 
infrastructure and improvement, microfinance, and emergency assistance (UNRWA, 2016a).  
     Since March 2011, security has deteriorated for Palestinian refugees in Syria, as for their 
hosts. The intense fighting has affected all the Palestinian camps in Syria and displaced most of 
their residents, adding to their vulnerability as stateless persons (UNRWA, 2014a). More than 
160,000 of them lived in Yarmouk (Mukhayyam al-Yarmouk or Yarmouk Camp), the largest 
Palestinian refugee community in Syria (UNRWA, 2002). It was my home all my life before 
coming to Canada in June 2011. Thus my notes and observations about the crisis there derive 
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from my life there and from my daily interactions and communications with my family, friends, 
and community members who witnessed the events before and after being forced to leave 
Yarmouk on 17 December 2012.  
     Yarmouk was not a refugee camp in the standard sense, but rather a densely populated district 
at the southern edge of Damascus, with a diverse demographic that included impoverished 
neighbourhoods and also thriving commercial areas, home to thousands of Palestinian and Syrian 
middle-class professionals, such as doctors, lawyers, and wealthy merchants. During the first 
months of the conflict, Yarmouk seemed a safe haven for thousands of Syrian families seeking 
refuge from the intense fighting in the surrounding areas, and the population mushroomed. On 16 
December 2012, however, a Syrian fighter jet attacked a local mosque, killing tens of civilians. 
The next day, the Free Syrian Army (FSA) opposition militia and fighters of the extremist Jabhat 
Al Nusra entered the district from the south. Fearing the consequences, on the morning of 17 
December thousands of inhabitants fled towards other parts of Damascus. People dragged their 
families and carried their small suitcases and plastic bags, leaving everything else behind, and 
started a long journey of displacement and vulnerability. Safieh is a Palestinian woman from 
Yarmouk, whom I interviewed in Sweden. She reported:  
We lost everything. We used to live in Yarmouk. The armed groups attacked 
the area in December 2012, so we had to leave. It was impossible for us to stay 
with them because the area will be a hot zone and we will be under fire from 
both sides. We will lose our lives. We were mainly afraid about our kids. 
(Safieh, Stockholm, July 2016)  
     For many, leaving Yarmouk was a painful reliving of the memories or the story of the 
Nakbeh (Catastrophe) of May 1948, when their parents were forced to leave their homes and 
towns in Palestine and later became stateless refugees. After fleeing Yarmouk, people shared 
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overcrowded apartments with relatives or neighbours, often in dire conditions, while others with 
fewer resources slept in the public parks or streets of Damascus. Returning to Yarmouk quickly 
became impossible because of the intensified fighting there and regime forces’ subsequent siege 
in July 2013. In April 2015, UNRWA announced that lack of safe access had crippled its 
humanitarian efforts there for the thousands of civilians trapped inside and under the control of 
two extremist fighting groups, including ISIS (UNRWA, 2015a).  
     What is distinctive about the Palestinian refugees from Yarmouk, and from other Palestinian 
camps in Syria, is the collective sense of loss that they have shared since their statelessness 
began in 1948. They and their descendants are now reliving this through the Syrian conflict, yet 
again leaving everything behind and seeking refuge elsewhere. In fact, as I showed in chapter 
two, this new displacement once again challenges their conceptualization of home, identity, 
return, and visibility as refugees. For the young generation, born and raised in Yarmouk, leaving 
it created a new crisis of loss, with the district as the “home” to “return” to. For these young 
people, Palestine had always been the lost “homeland,” which they knew only through the 
stories of their parents, whereas Yarmouk presented their actual “home,” where they lived and 
belonged.  
     Estimates suggest that more than 50 per cent of Palestinian refugees from Syria are now 
displaced (BADIL, 2015). This new diaspora flows directly from their precarious legal status 
and unresolved statelessness, as the Introduction outlined. Palestinian refugees have been 
unable to practise their right of repatriation, arguably the only way to achieve recognition for 
and preserve their collective identity, national narrative, and right of self-determination (Said, 
1986). The systematic denial of their right of return is imposed by Israel and is maintained by 
128 
 
excluding them from international protection. Ironically, this denial is sustained at a time when 
some governments in the global north increasingly encourage repatriation as the ideal solution 
for refugees, even against their will (Chimni, 1998). Thus Palestinians demonstrate how 
stateless refugees become subject to other states’ (un)willingness to accept them as citizens and 
how proposed solutions are the result of political and authoritarian calculations and international 
relations, regardless of refugees’ rights and well-being. Even so, UNHCR statistics omitted 
Palestinian refugees from Syria when it estimated that 10 per cent of the 3.2 million refugees in 
Syria’s neighbouring countries were “acutely vulnerable individuals and need resettlement 
elsewhere” (UNHCR, 2014b). Thus they could not resettle elsewhere or exercise their historical 
“right of return” (an idea anathema to Israel, which made them stateless). 
     Those Palestinian refugees who left Syria for neighbouring countries entered legal limbo, 
with no protection, restrictions on their movement, and social marginalization (Human Rights 
Watch, 2014a, 2014b, and 2014c).  Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt criminalize, detain, and 
discriminate against some of them (ibid.). Hundreds have been detained and, on some 
occasions, deported back to Syrian war zones, in a clear breach of the international principles of 
refugee protection (Amnesty International, 2014a; Human Rights Watch, 2014a, 2014b, 2014c).  
     Since 1948, Lebanon has been host to approximately 450,000 Palestinian refugees (UNRWA, 
2014a). Today more than half of these people live in refugee camps, all much poorer than 
Yarmouk. In Lebanon, Palestinian refugees have always faced legal restrictions and structural 
discrimination (Amnesty International, 2014a, 2014b), engendering  poverty, overcrowding, 
unemployment, poor housing, and lack of infrastructure. Lebanese political tensions towards 
Palestinian political factions, a legacy of the mid-1970s’ civil war, make a bad situation worse.  
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Officials in Lebanon often treat Palestinian refugees as a security burden and a political threat 
(Nayel, 2013), and the xenophobic rhetoric against them is clear in, for example, politicians’ 
public statements (ibid.).13 Palestinians in Lebanon are prohibited from owning property, 
entering a number of professions, including medicine and law, or obtaining social security (ILO, 
2012), making them marginal socially and economically, so they crowd in slum-like camps that 
lack even basic infrastructure (Amnesty International, 2014b).  
     The general Lebanese disdain for Palestinians extends to Palestinian refugees from Syria 
(IRIN, 2012). The government was reluctant to receive them (IRIN, 2012), so they had to obtain 
special visas and pay large fees before entry (UNRWA, 2014b). New rules of August 2013 
restricted their mobility within the country and totally blocked any more of them from arriving 
(Human Rights Watch, 2014). Further, authorities have detained many who were using forged 
documents to leave Lebanon through Beirut Airport. These Palestinians are often deported to 
Syria, which may detain, torture, even kill them (Human Rights Watch, 2014a).  
     Even Palestinian refugees from Syria who entered Lebanon before the total blockade of 
August 2013 have no legal status or protection (ibid.). They lack the basics, including food, 
housing, health care, and schooling, although UNRWA, which was already badly stretched 
(BADIL, 2015; IRIN, 2012), offers them limited assistance. Even though Lebanon does not 
recognize them as refugees, the UNHCR won’t deal with them because they are under 
UNRWA’s umbrella, as I explained above. Yet in May 2015, even UNWRA, short of resources, 
halted cash assistance to them for housing (UNRWA, 2015b). Severe poverty and costly housing 
                                                          
13 For example, Foreign Minister Gebran Bassil announced on twitter that he “supports giving citizenship to children 
of Lebanese female nationals, except if they were married to Palestinians and Syrians” (17 September 2016). He 
later added: “This restriction will preserve Lebanon’s entity,” (An-Nahar, 2018). 
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forced many families to share overcrowded shelters without furniture, clean water, and sewage 
utilities. The adults may not work in Lebanon, leaving them on the margins.  
     In Jordan, Palestinians from Syria face similar restrictions and discrimination. Since the 
Syrian conflict began, Jordan has further restricted their mobility (UNRWA, 2014c). In January 
2013 the prime minister announced: “Jordan has made a clear and explicit sovereign decision to 
not allow the crossing to Jordan by our Palestinian brothers who hold Syrian documents … They 
should stay in Syria until the end of the crisis” (Al Monitor, 2014). Authorities would now detain 
illegal entrants and deport them to Syria (Human Rights Watch, 2014b and 2014c), so any such 
arrivals from before January 2013 would need to keep a low profile to avoid the same fate (Al 
Monitor, 2014). This state of fear prevents such refugees’ integration within host communities 
and increases their chances of facing exploitation and discrimination.  
     Making matters even worse, Palestinian refugees from Syria lack official legal status in 
Jordan. Like Lebanon, Jordan does not recognize them as refugees, and – they are ineligible for 
UNHCR protection as they are subject to UNRWA’s mandate. Thus they may not settle in 
UNHCR refugee camps or seek humanitarian relief outside the camps. As well, lacking legal 
status and UNHCR recognition, they may not work or receive Jordanian social services (Al 
Monitor, 2014), all of which makes their situation almost unbearable.  
     As in Lebanon and Jordan, so in Turkey: the 10,000 Palestinian refugees from Syria who 
went there experience similar precarity and illegality. Authorities there often refuse to recognize 
their Syrian travel documents (BADIL, 2015). A Palestinian refugee whom I met in Kills, in 
southern Turkey, had entered Turkey illegally with her family through a 3-m-deep tunnel: 
131 
 
As Palestinians, we face another tragedy on the top of the horrible journey that 
we went through to reach the borders -- they won’t allow us to enter. The 
Turkish government does not recognize our travel document as Palestinian 
refugees from Syria. They do not accept us as refugees the way they accept the 
Syrians. (Palestinian refugee family in Kills, Turkey, June 2015) 
    Like other states in the region, Turkey does not recognize Palestinians as refugees. They have 
limited access to health care and education and may not obtain work permits or legal status 
(Baban, Ilcan, and Rygiel, 2016). Families lack aid and a sustainable income, and, although there 
are no UNRWA services in Turkey, the UNHCR is outside their grasp (BADIL, 2015). The 
husband of this Palestinian refugee described the struggle for survival: 
I am now in debt of about $600-700 U.S., and I am not the only one. All of us, 
all the families here, are suffering and are in debt for their food bills. I was 
supposed to pay the rent two days ago. I do not have the money for that, and 
many, if not all, the families are in the same position. (Palestinian refugee in 
Kills, Turkey, June 2015)  
     As in Turkey, so in Egypt: Palestinian refugees from Syria who arrived after 2011 also lack 
protection. In fact, the country’s political tensions have hurt them, particularly the close links of 
such Palestinian political factions as Hamas to the currently banned Muslim Brotherhood. The 
politicization of their situation affects their living conditions and limits their access to schools 
and health care (Relief Web, 2014). Wassim, a Palestinian refugee from Syria, moved to Egypt 
with his wife, Rajaa, and their sons, Rami and Shadi, in March 2013. Wassim explained to me:   
The main thing was the legal limbo in Egypt. According to the Egyptian law, 
if you are an Arab who is living in Egypt and you enrolled your kids at local 
schools, you are eligible to receive a renewable temporary residence for one 
year. Palestinians who came to Egypt at the early stages of the Syrian conflict 
when Muslim Brothers were in power [June 2012-July 2013] were issued with 
such residencies and were able to renew them. When Muslim Brothers came 
out of power, there was a total mess. No one could take a decision, while 
restrictions started to increase on the entry and residency of Palestinians from 
Syria. For example, members of my family who arrived in Egypt before me 
were able to obtain and renew their residencies. This was not the case for me. 
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I used to check on my status regularly, and the officers used to send me away 
without an answer. At the end, I had to pay a bribe in order to obtain a 
residency. (Wassim, Stockholm, July 2016) 
     Political unrest in Egypt has affected Palestinian refugees from Syria, as it has for other 
refugees. Wassim, for example, wanted to set up a business and stay, but political events 
interfered:  
During this time, I established a business with an Egyptian partner. However, 
while I was waiting for my residency, the partnership agreement was not 
officially recognized. We were involved in exporting frozen vegetables from 
Egypt to the Gulf States. I invested the amount of $300,000 in that business 
and I was still without a residency. Things went really bad when the military 
forces came in power [July 2013] and Gulf States stopped importing stuff from 
Egypt. We were affected badly as the value of our products went down by 
about 80 per cent. Electricity rates went up madly when President Sisi came 
in power [June 2014]. The cost of freezing our product increased dramatically 
from 200 Egyptian pounds to 700 pounds and we were not able to sell it. This 
situation lasted until I left Egypt in July 2015. It lasted about two years. 
(Wassim, Stockholm, July 2016)  
     The UNHCR, as I discussed above, may not help Palestinian refugees from Syria living in 
Egypt to resettle outside the region (UNHCR, 2014b), and, as stateless refugees, they lack the 
means to facilitate their “right of return.” As a result, thousands of them join other desperate 
refugees from the region who seek protection and acceptance elsewhere, most of them in 
northern Europe (Almustafa, 2018). As Wassim explained, “We were determined to try leaving 
Egypt … We had no other choices. We were left with only one option, which was to depart for 
Europe” (Wassim, Stockholm, July 2016).  Yet “non-entrée” regimes there have restrictive 
border controls and visa policies against would-be arrivals from Syria, so such measures forced 
them to travel illegally and through dangerous routes.  
     Such restrictions hit Palestinians from Syria hardest of all. In fact, restrictions against their 
movement started early in their journey. For example, Egypt criminalizes refugees who attempt 
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to depart illegally towards Europe (Amnesty International, 2014c), and while it might release 
Syrians quickly, it often detains Palestinian refugees in shocking conditions and then deports 
them to Syria (Amnesty International, 2014d; Human Rights Watch, 2013). The case of the 
“Karmooz Refugees” is notorious. A group of 74 Syrian and Palestinian refugees fled Turkey by 
boat on 23 October 2014 hoping for refuge in Europe. After a dispute, the smugglers left them on 
Nelson Island, close to Abu Qir, Alexandria. Egyptian coast guards then arrested the group, 
which included 15 women and 15 minors, seven under 10, and one only 10 months old. The 
group was detained in poor conditions in the Karmooz police station in Alexandria for almost a 
year and released in the summer of 2015 after being accepted as resettled refugees in Germany, 
Sweden, and France.14 The last group departed the police station in September 2015, leaving 
behind one Somali refugee, 17, whom no resettling country would accept (Center for Refugee 
Solidarity, 2015). This example, like other similar cases, illustrates how lack of sufficient 
protection and legal routes to claim refuge and rights has pushed many refugees into multiple 
forms of precarity and irregularity. Their  precarity expands from wartime Syria to include its 
neighbours and all phases of their journey towards their destinations in Europe. The conditions 
of these journeys are the focus of the following chapters.  
Conclusion  
     In this chapter, I have illustrated, using refugees’ own stories, the circumstances of wartime 
that pushed them to escape Syria. Thereby displaced, they first sought to settle in neighbouring 
countries. Later they journeyed to Europe in search of protection (see chapter four). Through 
their words, I have examined the severe precarity that many experienced and that in turn shaped 
                                                          
14 I followed  news of this particular group of refugees through a facebook page set up for them:   
https://www.facebook.com/search/str/%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%A6%D9%8A+%D9%83%D8%B1%D9
%85%D9%88%D8%B2%23karmooz+refugees/stories-keyword/stories-public  
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their decisions about the journey. By using their stories and words, I have shown their experience 
of insecurity, fear, and uncertainty during the war in Syria, and then their conditions of limbo 
and inadequate protection during their displacement in Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey. In the 
distinctive case of Palestinian refugees from Syria, I have showed how leaving added another 
painful episode of statelessness and further distanced them from Palestine, their homeland, which 
they or their families lost in 1948.  
     These precarious and vulnerable conditions emerge in the absence of protection and because 
of restrictive policies on asylum and border control. Such circumstances turn refugees into a 
“disposable commodity” (De Genova 2004:179), subject to normalized violence and 
marginalization, all of which make them more socially vulnerable through further displacement. 
It is these chaotic conditions that they reject when they decide to leave the region in pursuit of 
greater protection and security. Their decisions to depart – first Syria, later the region -- are in 
fact acts of survival that they make to protect themselves and their families from the horrors of 
war and the vulnerabilities of displacement.  
     Through this understanding of the refugee journey, I aim to challenge the negative portrayal 
of refugees as merely victims and show rather how their decisions to leave reflect high degrees 
of agency. Their stories reveal their refusal to accept a vulnerable and marginal situation when 
they decide to journey towards other destinations in search of greater safety and access to rights. 
In other words, and as I noted in chapter two, they emerge as political actors, who reject 
wretched conditions and strive for more rights and security, despite their reluctance to leave their 
country or their region. Their agency is visible through their ability to create unexpected scripts 
and trajectories (Squire, 2017). Yet, as their stories make clear, this agency is not a deliberately 
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political move, as most did not wish to leave their home. They acted out of their fear and need 
for protection as they sought to escape the precarious conditions and violence around them.  
They usually decided to leave in extremely vulnerable and constrained circumstances. Thus their 
agency here is interwoven with precariousness. Consequently, because of those unsettled 
conditions, we should not overemphasize the notion of agency or romanticize the act of leaving. 
Nevertheless, this approach to the journey can inform our understanding of the global crisis of 
protection and reveal its harrowing impact on the lives and trajectories of refugees who escape 
war for the confines of structures of control and a failing refugee regime incapable of protecting 
them, as they deserve. I develop this discussion of the refugee journey hoping to help create new 
ways to think about refugees and protection based on the human experience, which can 
ultimately inform refugee studies and global frameworks of protection and acceptance.  
     As refugees continue their journeys towards northern Europe, they encounter European “non-
entrée” regimes, which, as the previous chapters revealed, many states have set up to keep 
refugees away. The resulting legal and official blockade leaves refugees with few choices but to 
try risky, illegal routes, which further mess up their journeys and increase the human suffering en 
route, as chapters four and five reveal.   
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Images of Yarmouk 
 
Yarmouk June 2012: https://arunwithaview.wordpress.com/2012/07/24/yarmouk-damascus/   
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Yarmouk (January 2014): https://www.unrwa.org/crisis-in-yarmouk  
 
 
           
 
Yarmouk (April 2015): https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-20773651    
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Yarmouk (May 2018): http://www.actionpal.org.uk   
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Chapter Four: The Non-linear, Messy, Complex Journey to Europe  
 
Introduction 
     In chapter two, I developed a three-part framework for exploring the refugee journey:  
survival and resistance, leading the refugee to escape from Syria and to displacement within the 
region (chapter three); the non-linear, messy, complex journey to Europe (this chapter); and the 
emotional, transforming, life-changing experience (chapter five). Chapter three examined the 
escape from Syria and displacement within the region – as forms of survival and resistance. 
Refugees talked about their insecurity and fear during wartime and their marginalization and 
exclusion in displacement. I showed how refugees’ decisions, while in displacement or still in 
Syria, to leave the region reflected a refusal to live with such poor conditions. Their devastating 
situation, combined with restrictive border control shaped refugees’ decisions on how and where 
to head, often through dangerous, illegal routes, to find protection and acceptance. A number of 
the refugees I interviewed were determined to avoid the humiliation of displacement in 
neighbouring countries and decided to journey towards northern Europe directly from Syria, but 
they too had illegal and precarious journeys.  
     Through the refugees’ stories, I examine the messy, sometimes-violent unpredictability of 
their journeys, notably the multiple loops of their non-linear movements. My approach speaks to 
the literature of non-linear, precarious, “unauthorized” journeys made by forced migrants, 
including refugees (Briden and Mainwaring, 2016; Crawley et al., 2018; Gill, Caletrioa, and 
Mason, 2011; Hassan and Biorklund, 2016; Kaytaz, 2016; Khousravi, 2011; Squire et al., 2017). 
Such endeavours often prove costly. Journeys often end with death, and survivors may emerge 
with transformed identity, self-awareness, and positionality (discussed in chapter five), all of 
which affect their new lives and trajectories.  
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     As I explained in the Introduction, I follow the storylines of refugees’ journeys and hold my 
reflections until the end to avoid breaking the flow of the stories and to place refugees’ words at 
the center of the analysis. I draw on the stories I collected during the spring and summer of 2016, 
when I interviewed 60 refugees from Syria who made the journey to Sweden, and two of whom 
ended up in Germany during 2012-16. I focus on a few of these stories -- for example, on one 
family’s multiple routes, as they became separated and took multiple routes -- a  powerful 
instance of refugees’  messy, unpredictable, often-harrowing  journeys in search of protection.  
     I consider these stories I concentrate on to be representatives of the many others I heard about 
the journey from Syria to Sweden and treat them as such. I selected them because they reflect 
clearly and deeply the intense messiness and unpredictability of refugees’ journeys and share 
much in common with other journeys refugees made during the study period. Through these 
stories, I explore the realities of the journeys, especially three. First, how did they decide who 
should go and who should stay? Second, how did they choose certain routes and pathways over 
others? And, third, how did they travel from Syria? what types of transportation did they use? 
and how did they cross borders and engage  with  smugglers, coast guards, and other actors while 
on the move? 
     I follow the refugees’ stories during their actual movements towards northern Europe, through 
three main pathways (see maps of routes and journeys):  
- the ‘Egyptian route’: by sea from Egypt to Italy and thence with smugglers or by train to 
Sweden  
- the ‘Turkish route’: by sea from Turkey to Greece and thence by air or on land through 
the Balkan corridor to Sweden  
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- the ‘Libyan route’: by sea from Libya to Italy and thence with smugglers or by train to 
Sweden 
     Migration and border scholars have examined these routes to map and document refugee 
journeys towards Europe. “Crossing the Mediterranean Sea by Boat” (Squire et al., 2017) 
examines the impact of European policies 2015-16 on the journeys to Europe, especially through 
the European Agenda on Migration, which aimed to provide legal routes and improve reception 
facilities. “Unravelling Europe’s ‘Migration Crisis’: Journeys over Land and Sea” (Crawley et 
al., 2018) explores patterns of migrant journeys to Europe and decision-making conditions. It 
challenges the so-called European migration crisis and the notion of migrants’ linear journeys 
from country of origin to that of resettlement. Both research projects explore Mediterranean 
routes and shed light on conditions of the journeys (often non-linear and complex) and of the 
arrival points in Europe. Both projects use in-depth qualitative interviews to unravel the impact 
of immigration and border policies on refugees’ journeys. In my work, I engage with refugees’ 
stories, but do so as an insider. I observe the refugees as an ethnographic participant myself, and 
my knowledge of the interviewees’ refugee community, and my personal journey of 
uprootedness and loss, inform my research. My position as insider allowed me to explore 
refugees’ detailed experiences, feelings, and transformations of positionality and identity while 
mapping their journeys towards their aimed destinations. Through this process, I position 
refugees as the prime source of knowledge and examine the painful, sometimes-tragic, yet near-
heroic events refugees experience during their search for protection. 
     By using refugees’ personal stories, I explore the daily realities and conditions of their 
journeys and reveal the diversity of their experiences, backgrounds, and aspirations, as well as 
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showing how messy and complex their journeys can become. My work engages with refugees’ 
stories to explore the personal impact of the global crisis of protection on their bodies and lives. I 
examine the journey’s transforming impact and draw on refugees’ emotional and innermost 
struggles en route, which change them dramatically. By doing so, I conceptualize refugee 
journey as a friction between the global structures of governance and the intimate space of 
refugees’ bodies. I argue here that refugees’ words uncover these connections and help us fathom 
the global crisis of protection, which, as discussed in chapter one, results substantially from 
containment and deterrence policies of parts of the global north – especially, in this study, the 
EU -- against refugees from the global south. The suffering of refugees on their journeys brings 
home the effects of these policies on the ground, as this chapter reveals. As I said in chapter 
three, refugees rarely share these sentiments with foreign researchers, but I was able to learn 
about these particular feelings due to my positionality as a Syrian researcher, who had 
undertaken a journey, and had been through similar experiences. Most of my interviewees 
treated me as an insider who could feel their pain and who, in addition, shared similar sentiments 
of loss and helplessness, but also determination and hope. 
The Egyptian Route  
     On this route, refugees use the services of smuggling networks to depart from illegal points 
on  Egypt’s Mediterranean coast near Alexandria and take fishing boats across the sea in towards 
Italy – usually  Sicily -- and then head north by land  towards Milan. From there, they continue 
north, either with smugglers in their cars or by train, to Sweden. Until July 2013, Syrians did not 
need an Egyptian visa and could fly from Damascus to Cairo using passports, making it a 
popular route. When Egypt’s military overthrew President Morsi, they imposed visa rules on 
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Syrians (Fox News 2013; The Guardian; 2013).15 Palestinian refugees from Syria had until then 
used travel documents issued by the Syrian authorities.  
     In Egypt, smuggling networks target refugees from Syria by using mediators (middlemen), 
often Syrian. Some ‘mediators’ are themselves refugees trying to collect money for their own 
journey or working in exchange for a trip with the smugglers’ help. The mediator facilitates 
payment for the smugglers -- usually $3,000-$4,000 U.S. per person. The mediator holds onto 
the money and pays the smugglers only after refugees arrive in Italy.  Refugees link “payment 
upon arrival” to their safe arrival in Italy, whereas many smugglers ask for it as soon as their 
vessel reaches Italian waters, assuming that the Italian coast guard will rescue the refugees. As 
refugees’ stories reveal, rescue often takes a few days and can be dangerous and troubling. The 
Italian government’s recent refusal to receive boats of migrants and refugees indicates that 
rescue is not always possible (MSF, 2018a).   
     I examine the Egyptian route here through the journeys of Wassim and his family. Wassim, a 
Palestinian refugee from Syria, ran a catering business in Damascus. He moved to Egypt in early 
2013 with his wife Rajaa and their sons, Rami (early 20s) and Shadi (16). I introduced them at 
the start of chapter three. Rajaa did not want to leave Syria, but her family, concerned about her 
mental and emotional condition, forced her to depart with them to Egypt, where Wassim hoped 
to build a new life and set up a business. But political instability and growing hostility to 
Palestinians from Syria, particularly after July 2013, changed his plans. Compulsory military 
service ruled out Syria, so the family decided to try for Europe: “We were determined to try 
leaving Egypt … We had no other choice. We were left with only one option, which was to 
                                                          
15 Syrians in Egypt were considered supporters of Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood movement, which was banned 
in Egypt after the summer of 2013.  
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depart for Europe” (Wassim, Stockholm, July 2016). But they could not obtain European visas 
due to restrictive European polices against Syrians and Palestinians from Syria, so  Wassim 
decided to send the sons with relatives who were planning to travel from Egypt to Italy using the 
services of smugglers. Wassim and Rajaa, who did not want to travel illegally, were planning to 
join the young men in Sweden through family reunification. Shadi, as an unaccompanied minor, 
would be able to apply for his parents to join him in Sweden after his arrival there. Yet, like 
many other refugees, who were forced to make such journeys, Wassim and his family ended up 
making separate, unpredictable, and complex journeys to Sweden by different routes. The 
journeys cost them all their savings and lasted for several months.  
     After several failed attempts to depart Egypt for Italy with the help of smugglers, Rami finally 
left, with a number of relatives. Shadi decided to stay. On the Egyptian route, Rami, like other 
refugees, experienced vulnerability, violence, and yet high degrees of agency.  
     Rami departed on 2 December 2013 with two uncles. That night, they met the smugglers and 
were taken to a gathering point, where they met up with hundreds of other refugees, some of 
whom had been waiting for days, even weeks. For each would-be departure, the refugee pays the 
mediator; wraps passports, IDs, and phones in plastic bags; and prepares life-jackets, snacks, and 
water. Each person may take one backpack of clothes. Some sew special pockets inside their 
underwear for passports, money, and phone cards. A failed attempt means doing all this again.  
     Smugglers transport the refugees in small, covered, crowded vehicles, sometimes for hours, to  
departure points --  usually abandoned houses near the beach. Refugees must then walk through 
the sand for a few hours to reach the beach itself. In many cases, Egyptian police arrest the 
145 
 
refugees, with smugglers often ‘escaping.’ Rami described his fear and uncertainty the night of 
his departure when people hid from the police: 
It was in the dark. People were terrified. They started feeling things moving 
around them like animals and insects. Many of them thought of going back. 
We encouraged them to stay and to continue after all of this, and also no one 
knew the way back or how to reach the main road, since we walked a lot to 
reach our location. We were worried about people’s safety if they left the 
place. There might be gangs out there. Nobody was certain of anything. 
(Rami, Stockholm, Sweden, July 2016) 
     Even after several attempts, and despite the fear and uncertainty, many refugees still want the 
journey, such is their desperation to leave. Many refugees have put all their savings into the 
endeavour so must continue. As Rami said. “We were convinced that this was our last chance -- 
we either use it or we will lose everything.”  
     In such circumstances, departing from the beach can be chaotic, especially if armed smugglers 
force refugees to board small rubber or wooden boats to go to the bigger fishing vessel in the sea. 
Many families become separated at this early stage: 
There was a Syrian woman with a baby boy and three girls who were 
between two and twelve years old. Her husband did not manage to get on 
the boat. There was not a place for him. He was left behind and was then 
caught by the police who arrived later and stopped those who did not 
manage to get on the boat. So this woman continued her journey with her 
children and her brother in law. (Rami, Stockholm, Sweden, July 2016) 
     The trip in these small boats takes usually less than 15 minutes, but many refugees reach the 
fishing vessel wet and exhausted. The approach occurs usually in darkness and through high 
waves. The refugees are then pushed or thrown up to the larger vessel by the smugglers, whose 
colleagues grab them and drag them onto the deck of the fishing vessel -- any mistake can mean 
drowning. This transfer was particularly terrifying for children and embarrassing for women, 
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totally wet, some of them separated from their husbands or children, and pushed and grabbed by 
strange men. Some journeys may include several such transfers. As they approach Italian waters, 
smugglers move their passengers from the fishing vessel, usually steel, to a smaller, perhaps 
dilapidated wooden boat and send the fishing vessel back to Egypt for other journeys.  
     After this trying launch in Egypt, most refugees reach the fishing vessel without their 
belongings and life-jackets. Rami’s uncle lost his glasses while being pulled up onto the fishing 
vessel and was hardly able to see during the whole journey. A mother lost her baby’s milk bottle 
and struggled to feed her infant for days. Once on the vessel, refugees often wait days as 
smugglers await more refugees – and more profit. Most refugees who waited describe becoming 
sick and dizzy during this hiatus, and newcomers often leave some earlier boarders unable to sit 
properly or move. Additionally, as Rami explained, most of the food the smugglers provided was 
rotten and the water tasted bad. In most of the journeys described to me, people ran out of food 
and water even before sailing towards Italy. In Rami’s case, they did not have food or water for 
the last thirty hours before being rescued and received proper meals only when they reached the 
camp in Sicily.  
     Yet, according to the stories I heard from refugees who travelled this route, the scariest 
experiences are the storms. Most of them happen near Derna, in eastern Libya, known for bad 
weather even in summer. Rami’s boat was sailing in December. He, and most of the other 
refugees, spent the whole journey on the deck, while young Egyptian men, who paid less, 
crowded in a room under the deck. At one point, Rami explained, “the waves were very high … 
We had to sail for about 12 hours through that area where the waves were horrible … The waves 
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were very high so the boat used to go deep and get full of water and then go up again and the 
water goes out from the sides. People were really terrified.”   
     Another terrifying experience occurred when the vessel stopped in the middle of high waves. 
This happened during their fourth day of sailing, while they were already running out of food and 
water: 
Then we had the most dangerous night during the journey. The boat went up 
and down sharply and seemed totally out of control. It was horrible. People 
believed that the boat is sinking and that they were all dying. They started 
praying and reciting Quran loudly. They created a horrible atmosphere. It was 
as if we were surrounded by death. And the problem was that we could not 
stop them because for them this was praying and asking God for help. The 
boat driver could not do anything. He kept the engine running, but things were 
really out of control. He told us that we were going backward by the current 
and we were losing time. (Rami, Stockholm, Sweden, July 2016) 
     The captain and other smugglers on board left the cabin and joined the refugees on deck. Rami 
and a group of Syrian and Palestinian refugees decided to take control and sought to send rescue 
calls. They discovered that there were no telecommunication kits in the captain’s cabin, except for 
a simple old radio device – even though the smugglers had promised a number of satellite phones 
for such moments. The group managed to send an SOS and heard from an Italian fishing boat in 
Italian, which they could not understand. Hours later the Italian navy inquired about their 
location. None of them knew it, but the navy vessel spotted a flashing light on their boat’s top. 
Rami said that everyone then rushed to the deck, looking desperately for the lights of the rescue 
ship.  
    The rescue vessel’s arrival caused further chaos. When the rescue team started to throw life-
jackets to the boat, refugees rushed towards them, and the boat threatened to capsize. Rami and 
his group took the lead again and tried to calm everyone. They had to hit those who would not 
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listen, as the Italian officer refused to provide more jackets due to the confusion. After a few 
hours, all the passengers were transported to the deck of a Red Cross boat, where they soon 
became soaked. Rami explained to the rescuers that they were shivering from cold and exhaustion 
and finally convinced the team to allow them inside for a few minutes.  
     After 12 hours of sailing in such conditions, they reached the port of Catania in Sicily. To their 
surprise, the port was full of police cars, media with their cameras, and medical teams as well. 
Doctors examined the refugees as soon as they departed the boat. The police then provided each 
of them with a sign that had a number written on it and took pictures of them holding the signs. I 
heard stories of refugees who were wiped down with sterilizers by medical teams before receiving 
bracelets with numbers on them. I heard stories where Italian police interrogated refugees before 
they were allowed to receive any food or water or change their wet clothes. Most of these 
refugees recalled deep humiliation and outrage about such shocking treatment, which seemed to 
alter them  from refugees deserving  protection to contaminated criminals who needed to be 
examined, sterilized, and then detained rather than being rescued and assisted.  
     The refugees were then transported to camps, where they received new clothes, proper meals, 
pillows, and blankets. Rami explained that the Italian police were not keen on keeping Syrians 
and Palestinians there and left the camp entrance open most of the time. He did, however, have to 
sign a number of documents in Italian, which he did not understand. In later years Italian security 
increased. and I heard stories  of  refugees  forcibly fingerprinted on arrival,  particularly  during 
2015, when Italy imposed the system of hotspots after  thousands of refugees started arriving in  
Sicily and Lampedusa each day (Tazzioli and Garrelli, 2018). The same stories spoke of refugees 
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organizing protests and strikes against such treatment. They sought to avoid fingerprinting and to 
leave the camps for Milan to take trains or use smuggling services to reach northern Europe. 
     In Rami’s case, after he spent two days in the camp, a family friend helped him to escape. The 
friend had driven there from Sweden and brought Swedish passports for Rami and his uncles to 
use in Italy. He helped them to cross police checkpoints at the port in Sicily and drove them to 
mainland Italy. He had to leave them afterwards to avoid being caught by the police for human 
trafficking. From there, the group took a train to Milan and then paid a smuggler $6,000 U.S. to 
drive them to Hamburg, Germany. There, they met Rami’s other uncle, who drove them to 
Copenhagen, Denmark, whence they took a train to Malmö, Sweden. They made their way to 
Stockholm, where family members, who had arrived earlier, received them. After his two-week 
journey from Egypt, Rami applied for asylum in Sweden, but he had to wait for months for the 
rest of his family, who journeyed through different routes and had different experiences of 
illegality and precarity, as the next section reveals.   
The Turkish Route  
     This route involves a journey across the Aegean Sea from Turkey to one of the Greek islands, 
from which refugees continue to Athens and then either fly from Greece or walk through the 
western Balkan corridor. Refugees who can afford to buy forged travel documents from 
smugglers in Athens, or receive genuine European travel documents from family members or 
friends in Europe, may fly to Sweden from one of the Greek airports. Others refugees, with 
fewer resources or who fail to pass through Greek airport security, travel from Greece through 
the western Balkans.  The western Balkan route, or corridor, involves crossing from Greece to 
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Macedonia and through Serbia, Hungary, and Austria to Germany – and some then travel 
through Denmark to Sweden.  
     In 2015, more than 880,000 people used this route by crossing from Turkey to Greece. 
According to European Commission (EC) records, the majority took the western Balkan corridor 
(EC, 2016). However, on 8 March 2016, Macedonia, Croatia, and Slovenia closed their borders, 
stranding about 55,000 refugees and migrants in Greece (Danish Refugee Council, 2016)). 
Crossings from Turkey to Greece slumped from 885,386 in 2015 to 182,534 in 2016 (Squire et 
al., 2017), due mostly to the EU-Turkey deal of March 2016 (see chapter one). By that 
arrangement, Turkey prevents “irregular” crossings to Greece, which returns all new arrivals to 
Turkey (Crawley et al., 2018). Also in early 2016, NATO and Frontex increased their border-
control operations in the Aegean to prevent “unauthorized” crossings from Turkey to Greece 
(Düvell, 2018). I examine both paths (air and land) of this route through the story of Shadi, 
Wassim’s younger son, as he tried both after his failed departure from Egypt.  
     I explained in the previous section that Shadi, had joined his older brother, Rami, in many 
failed attempts to leave Egypt but was not with him when he finally succeeded, via sea. Shadi 
was terrified and discouraged from trying again until April 2014, when he decided to join some 
relatives who were departing also by sea, but with different smugglers. Egyptian police stopped 
him at the beach and detained him with a number of relatives, including his aunt and cousins. 
Shadi, who was now 17, was imprisoned with adult criminals. Wassim, his father, still in Egypt 
with his wife, Rajaa, was trying every day to get his son out of prison: 
The prison experience in Egypt was unbearable. You cannot imagine the real 
situation. I used to be at the police station from 9 a.m. till 7 p.m. every day. I 
used to hear horrible stories while I was there. We [Wassim and Rajaa] used 
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to spend our days between the police station, the court, the judge, and the 
offices of State Security. They used to take us around and around just to take 
our money …  I used to cry while waiting for one of them to take my money, 
knowing that he was lying. I used to pay money for officers in order to take 
me to see a judge, and at the end there was no judge and no court. (Wassim, 
Stockholm, Sweden, July 2016)  
     Being a Palestinian refugee in Egypt, Shadi was at risk of being deported to Syria for trying to 
leave Egypt illegally. This risk pushed his father to pay a huge bribe to secure Shadi’s release. 
Many Palestinian refugees from Syria detained while trying to leave for Europe live in fear of 
deportation to Syria. When Shadi was released, his father arranged for him to obtain a Turkish 
visa through some business contacts in Turkey. The plan was that Shadi, together with some 
relatives, would cross illegally from Turkey to Greece and then fly from Athens to Sweden, 
assisted by a smuggler who would provide him with a fake travel document.    
Flying from Greece  
     Compared with other stories of crossing from Turkey to Greece, Shadi had a relatively 
smooth trip. His father arranged for him to be smuggled on a luxurious yacht that cruised from 
Marmaris in Turkey to the Greek island of Symi. Yet the Greek coast guard intercepted the 
vessel while it was approaching the island. The guards detained the yacht‘s captain after beating 
him, seized the passports and phones of Shadi and his group, and took them to the police station 
on the island. The refugees had to stay in jail for a few days on Symi before obtaining the kharti, 
a Greek permit that allows six months’ residence in Greece, crucial if Greek police stop the 
holder.  
     Shadi, who arrived in Athens with relatives, was planning to fly to Sweden with a forged 
travel document. All his relatives managed to depart from the airport, but security stopped him 
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every time he tried and was stranded alone in Greece for more than six months. Each new 
attempt to leave failed. Eventually his mother, Rajaa, travelled from Egypt to Turkey and then 
made a similar crossing to Greece. They tried to depart together from Santorini island after a 
smuggler provided them with fake travel documents. Rajaa was able to pass the security point at 
the small airport and board the plane, but Shadi failed again. The security team interrogated him 
but did not detain him. He returned to Athens to try again while his mother headed to Sweden.  
On one of the attempts, he was stopped at Athens airport while pretending to be the son of a 
Swedish smuggler and was detained at a juvenile detention center in Athens. He was supposed to 
stay until he turned 18 but was released a week later thanks to his uncle, who travelled from 
Germany to act as his guardian. Shadi continued to try to leave Greece and even departed from 
western Greece to Italy on a fishing boat, but the Greek coast guard stopped that vessel at sea 
because of its bad condition – it could easily have sunk.  
Traveling the Balkan Corridor      
     In addition to Shadi’s story, I look again at the journeys of Khaled and Ammar, who travelled 
from Turkey through the Balkan route in the summer of 2015 -- the most popular route for 
refugees that extraordinary summer. 
Shadi 
     After his multiple failing attempts at Greek airports, Shadi decided to travel by land out of 
Greece, starting a new chapter of his precarious journey by joining the tens of thousands of 
refugees who trekked the Balkan corridor before it closed in March 2016. He was detained in 
horrible conditions in Macedonia for 40 days and was released only when the same uncle 
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travelled again from Germany to assist him. He then pushed on through Serbia and used 
smugglers to cross into Hungary and thence into Germany, where his uncle helped him to 
continue to Sweden. He arrived there on 26 February 2015, about nine months after he left Egypt 
and two years after departing Syria. His journey cost more than €40,000 and involved detention 
in Egypt, Greece, and Macedonia.  
     Wassim, his father, who tried initially to avoid such a journey and was looking forward to 
family reunification in Sweden, finally could not bear Egypt any longer. He applied for visas for 
himself to various EU countries but was rejected every time. He then travelled to Turkey, made 
the same crossing to Greece, and used a fake travel document to fly to Sweden, where he joined 
his wife and two sons. 
     The unpredictability and precariousness of this one family’s journeys towards Sweden 
resemble those of thousands of other EU-bound refugees who became trapped in similar 
challenging circumstances. The stories about this route show most refugees passing through the 
same borders and with similar raw experiences because many EU governments have further 
restricted entry (see chapter one), leaving refugees to travel illegally through dangerous paths, 
using smugglers who often  treat them badly.  
     As with Shadi,  Khaled and Ammar’s stories, which I introduced in in chapter three, reflect  
refugees’ messy journeys and provide rich insights into their devastating yet courageous   
experiences on this route.  
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Khaled 
     In chapter three, I explained how Khaled, after two years in Jordan, decided to journey to 
Europe through Turkey. He did not have a detailed plan and simply worked it out en route. His 
goal was to enter Turkey via Syria, cross into Greece, and continue towards northern Europe. He 
planned to seek asylum there and then apply for family reunification. However, his journey 
became precarious inside Syria, as smugglers moved him from one war zone to another in 
disturbing conditions. On one occasion, a careless smuggler locked Khaled and 11 other 
passengers in a small truck:  
Suddenly the truck stopped in front of a Military Forces Club. We ran out 
of gas, so we had to wait for half an hour until the driver got some and then 
continued the journey. During this half-hour, I felt I was going to suffocate 
and die, the truck was boiling hot, and we were overcrowded like sheep 
inside. There was no oxygen inside, and suddenly I felt immense fear, I 
panicked, and started hysterically knocking on the walls of the truck. People 
were afraid of the noise I was making and tried to calm me down but I felt I 
was fighting for my last breath ... When we finally got out of the truck we 
were soaked wet. (Khaled, Berlin, Germany, April 2016)  
     Khaled crossed the Syrian desert in a convoy with 80 other people, including women and 
children, and the trip took almost 3½ days because the drivers avoided the main roads. Khaled 
was on the back of a truck that usually transported sheep. The passengers were covered with dust 
and had no food or water and no idea about their destination. They were received by Islamic 
State forces (ISIS) in Al Maydeen, who moved them to their capital, Al Raqqa. After difficult 
negotiations, they were allowed to continue and headed to the countryside near Aleppo, whence 
they proceeded to Rehanieh, which was under the control of the Free Syrian Army and Al-Nusra 
Front militia. From there they were taken to Khirbet Al-Jouz, near the Turkish border, a major 
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hub for smuggling, with offices and agents operating openly. Thousands of people moved around 
in groups trying to negotiate deals to cross to Turkey. Khaled explained what happened next:  
We were a group of ten, including women and elderly people; our smuggler 
was a 16-year-old boy. We started walking around 1 a.m. after midnight, as 
we heard the Turkish police shouting through microphones and shooting in 
the air. That was our sign to stop and move forward again when the shouting 
and the shooting stopped. It took around six hours to cross a relatively short 
distance. (Khaled, Berlin, Germany, April 2016)  
      While Khaled and his group were crossing the border fence, the smuggler shouted that the 
Turkish police were nearby. Scared, they ran in all directions, as the police shouted and shot 
bullets in the air. The smuggler ran away, and Khaled and his group hid for half an hour, until 
another smuggler appeared and gathered them into one group again. This time they took a 
different route and were ordered to run across a road that was usually used by the Turkish 
border police.  Khaled’s voice broke as he explained:  
 While running, I saw a dead body, the body of a man with one leg, who looked 
exactly like someone from our group. I rushed to him and performed CPR, 
when, suddenly, I saw the man who looked like him standing over my 
shoulder, asking me about the dead person. Shocked, I left the dead man on 
the ground because the police were approaching. I think he had a heart attack 
... We could not get back to bury him. (Khaled, Berlin, Germany, April 2016)  
     Khaled continued to Izmir, on Turkey’s Aegean coast, where he met up with his youngest 
sister, her husband, and their three young boys. They had left the United Arab Emirates after the 
authorities cancelled their work and residency permits and had decided to journey to Europe to 
avoid returning to Syria. In Izmir, Khaled and his brother-in-law looked for a smuggler to 
convey them to Greece in the city’s Basmane district, which has a plethora of smugglers who 
operate openly.   
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     Rather-precarious “deposit offices” accept refugees’ payments for their crossing to Greece -- 
about €3,000-€5,000 per person. The offices keep these payments in trust and give refugees 
secret codes to pass to the smugglers on arrival at the Greek island. Refugees know that 
smugglers and deposit offices are part of the same network and that they offer no guarantees of a 
safe or timely journey. In fact, after making their deposits, most refugees are subject to delays 
and false promises, which may make them desperate to leave and willing to accept any 
conditions when the actual journey starts. For example, Khaled reported that his smugglers 
changed plans and routes many times without informing the group: “Why would they consult 
with us? They treated us like sheep.”  
     The trip across the Aegean often takes place in the dark. Smugglers usually load refugees into 
closed trucks, where they might spend hours en route to their departure point. Most trucks are 
overloaded: Khaled’s had another 30 people, and they travelled for about five hours. At the 
shore, they joined hundreds of other refugees who had been waiting for several days, under the 
control of armed men, and with no idea of when and how they would leave. Some had to help 
prepare the inflatable rubber dinghies, or balams. They would unload the balams and carry them 
a few kilometers. Khaled and other interviewees assumed that Turkish police were aware of the 
smuggling operations and intervened only selectively: 
We were about to board the balam when a helicopter appeared above our heads. 
We tried to escape and took the balam under the trees, but soon realized that 
we were surrounded by the police, and the smugglers just disappeared. The 
police took all of us in seven buses to a police station that overlooked the shore 
and all of the smuggling operation. It was clear that the Turkish police were 
aware of the whole process. They only intervene when they receive an alert 
about a particular smuggling activity. (Khaled, Berlin, Germany, April 2016) 
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     Khaled and his group were held for two days. A few days later they tried again. Under the 
supervision of armed men, they were transported again to the shore and departed in two balams. 
Khaled recalled:   
The water reached our necks ... We had 12 children and 20 women with us, 
and they were really scared. In fact, everyone was terrified. People prayed 
and recited the Quran loudly … At one point, the engine stopped because 
someone stepped on the cable. We silently sat holding our hearts in our 
hands, until my brother-in-law managed to fix the problem. Yet hostility 
started to increase between refugees as they shouted and fought with each 
other. This is when my brother-in-law purposely stopped the engine and 
refused to move ahead until everyone calms down and listen to him. He even 
threatened to kill anyone who does not listen and reminded everybody that 
he was in charge, and he would not accept any complaints or resistance. 
Everyone complied until we reached Samos island. (Khaled, Berlin, 
Germany, April 2016) 
     At the Greek islands, conditions were very harsh, particularly during the summer of 2015, as 
refugees waited for the (six-month) kharti [introduced above].  Khaled and his group took a long 
and exhausting walk to the town of Samos. The island had no registration camps then, but hotels 
refused to receive them, so they slept without blankets on cardboard boxes in the streets, among 
thousands of refugees, with whom they shared three public washrooms. Three days later, the 
police issued them khartis, and they boarded a ferry for Athens.  
     When Khaled reached the Macedonian border, it was open, and refugees were crossing under 
the aegis of several NGOs and charities, which provided food and water generously. This “five-
star treatment,” as Khaled called it, was due to the presence of a Greek minister, who was 
supervising the situation after several days of border closure. Macedonian police then organized 
the refugees into groups and helped them book train tickets for Serbia, where they pushed on 
towards Hungary.  
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     Serbia’s border with Hungary proved precarious and violent. Refugees heading to northern 
Europe were keen to cross Hungary without applying for asylum or being fingerprinted, because 
that would keep them in that country, which, they knew, offered few rights and growing anti-
migrant and anti-refugee sentiment. The EU’s Dublin Regulation – version I (1990), II (rev. 
2003), and III (2013) -- determines which member state examines asylum claims – usually the 
one where a migrant first enters the EU (European Commission, 2017a). Those who apply in 
another member state face deportation to that initial country. Although most refugees were aware 
of this rule, the majority did not know about the changes taking place that summer, as thousands 
of refugees were arriving daily on Europe’s shores.  Germany suspended its regulation vis-à-vis 
refugees from Syria and instructed its immigration officers not to deport them to the initial EU 
country of arrival (The Telegraph UK, 2015), while Hungary closed its border with Serbia as part 
of its harsh policies against refugees (The Guardian, 2015b).  
     Even refugees with high-tech communication connections to family and friends in Europe 
could not keep track of the changes when the journey’s harsh conditions interrupted such links, 
which added to their uncertainty. Such ruptures exposed them to further official harshness and 
violence at borders such as Hungary’s.  
     Khaled aimed to reach the Netherlands after learning that it processed applications for family 
reunification faster than its neighbours -- a crucial matter for him. He and his group decided to 
cross from Serbia into Hungary under police supervision, unwilling to cross illegally and 
jeopardize the safety of Khaled’s sister and her children. But, with Germany’s policy changes 
and Hungary’s tightening borders (except towards Germany), the group’s decision made 
Germany, rather than the Netherlands, Khaled’s ultimate destination. He could not afford to 
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continue by himself, so he followed his group towards Germany. Yet, despite crossing into 
Hungary under police supervision, the group ended up in a detention center there: 
The borders were heavily militarized, with drones and helicopters. Those 
who tried to escape and cross the borders through the corn fields were 
captured and brutally treated ... We crossed the borders under heavy police 
supervision … After, we walked for about 500 meters and found thousands 
of people sitting on the floor. We sat there for about ten hours through the 
night. At 6 a.m. in the morning we boarded one of the buses, and it drove 
ten minutes and dropped us at a prison … Yes. It was a real prison. (Khaled, 
Berlin, Germany, April 2016) 
     This facility denied the refugees basics, including food and water, and security forces treated 
them viciously:  
A policeman placed colored bracelets around our arms and took us through 
another fence to an area that was full of military tents … Thousands of 
people were there; some have been waiting for days and others for weeks. 
We thought that we will have our fingerprints taken and we then continue 
our journey, but soon discovered that we were actually detained. We were 
in a prison with our children, with no food and no water for days. The police 
refused to give water even for children, and they treated us extremely bad. 
(Khaled, Berlin, Germany, April 2016) 
     Such practices subjected Khaled and his group to violent border restrictions. Yet they 
resisted: 
The situation in Hungary was the worst. We were hungry, humiliated, and 
imprisoned … We were getting very frustrated as they shouted and 
threatened with sticks at anyone who complains. My brother-in-law found a 
carton board and wrote in English that we needed to drink water. He went 
around tents trying to get as many people as possible to join in carrying the 
board in front of the media who were standing outside the fence. We 
immediately managed to attract the media’s attention, and they started asking 
us questions about the situation inside. (Khaled, Berlin, Germany, April 
2016) 
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     As a result, the police took them water and sandwiches, but not enough, and many starving 
refugees, mostly devout Muslim,16 refused to eat the ham sandwiches. These conditions 
continued for a few days, until Khaled and his group, like other refugees in the camp, were 
forced to provide fingerprints and sign Hungarian-language documents in exchange for food and 
water. Later, Khaled learnt that the papers stated that the authorities treated them in accordance 
with international human-rights agreements and provided them with both food and water. They 
were then handed official documents stating that they were asylum seekers in Hungary, which 
was not their intention.  
     Finally, they made their way to Budapest, where they joined thousands of people who had 
been trapped there for more than ten days. Smugglers were charging €700 per person to take 
refugees to Germany, which many refugees could not afford, including Khaled, who contacted a 
cousin in Germany. His cousin reached out to a group of activists, who were part of a large 
solidarity network that helped refugees stranded in Hungary to travel to Germany.   
     It was the end of August 2015 when Khaled finally reached Germany and was granted 
temporary protection, subject to annual renewal. This status did not allow him to apply for 
family reunification, his journey’s ultimate goal. Thus, for him, the journey had not ended. He 
was desperate to reunite with his family after more than three years. He wanted to offer his 
children a new life and to save them from the horrors he had seen during the war in Syria and 
through his long journey of displacement and statelessness. In February 2018, Khaled finally 
received German permanent protection, and in April, he brought his family to Germany after six 
years of separation.  
                                                          
16 Devout Muslims do not eat pork.  
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     I could not stop my tears when I watched the video of him meeting his children and wife at 
Berlin Airport. I recalled the details of his horrible journey, which he shared with me, while I was 
thinking about other refugees who are still waiting or who are unable to reunite with their families 
due to their temporary status in Europe.  
Ammar 
     The third journey I examine here is Ammar’s. His story reveals further realities of refugees’ 
journeys through the Balkan route, where refugees experience extreme precarity and yet agency. 
Like Khaled, Ammar arrived in Turkey in the summer of 2015 heading to northern Europe. As 
explained in chapter three, he had a disturbing displacement experience in Lebanon and 
Thailand, where he did not find sufficient protection and could not obtain UNHCR resettlement. 
After his arrival in Istanbul, Ammar sought help from smugglers: 
Everyone knew what was going on in those gathering places. Refugees who 
were about to embark on their journey to Greece gathered in big numbers. 
There are shops filled with life-jackets … I mean it was so obvious. It was 
ironic that some Turkish locals started waving goodbye to us while policemen 
ignored us totally. (Ammar, Hanover, Germany, April 2016) 
     In the absence of legal and safe routes, refugees take this illegal path to Greece. Public 
awareness and official indifference leave the refugees at smugglers’ mercy and render the route 
even more precarious and chaotic. Refugees such as Ammar were unable to complain about any 
violations or poor treatment because they have little or no legal or social protection. 
     On the night of Ammar’s departure, the Turkish coast guard appeared at the gathering point 
and started shooting in the air, but the armed smugglers shot back and forced the police to 
withdraw. Ammar spent the night in the woods near the shore among hundreds of refugees. It 
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was still dark when more refugees arrived and the smugglers gathered people in groups of 40-50 
and ordered them to board the balams. Ammar recalled that the smugglers, who threatened them 
with guns, did not allow people to carry any of their belongings on to the boat and forced them to 
throw everything in the water. They attacked those who complained and even beat some of the 
men. The Turkish coast guard intercepted the first balam. However, the smugglers continued to 
send one balam after another. Ammar and other refugees experienced a waking nightmare: 
The situation was horrifying. The balam behind us capsized, and the fate of 
the people in it became unknown. As we reached international waters, another 
balam capsized too. It was terrifying in the true sense. The loud cries of the 
women and the children filled the air. We threw our life-jackets to the people 
who were struggling in the water.  Happily they were then rescued by Greek 
coast guards … A group of six young men on our boat, including myself, 
decided to jump into the water and swim next to our boat in order to make it 
lighter and faster. We held the ropes on the sides of the boat and swam. The 
plan worked, and we made it to the shore in one hour. Unfortunately, only 13 
of the 18 balams that departed that night reached Mytilene island. (Ammar, 
Hanover, Germany, April 2016) 
     Like Khaled, Ammar experienced harsh conditions in a registration camp on the Greek island:  
Thousands of Syrians, Africans, and Afghans were waiting there. People 
waited in long queues to register their names. Then, they had to wait at the 
camp for their names to be called so they can obtain the passing papers. The 
camp was an olive-tree orchard outside the town, where people had to spend 
about a week to obtain their papers. There were no services, no NGOs, and 
no humanitarian agencies. Hostility between refugees started to increase as 
people were frustrated and tired. The Greek police intervened on many 
occasions and used violence against refugees. (Ammar, Hanover, Germany, 
April 2016).  
     During the summer of 2015, thousands of refugees boarded buses that headed from Athens 
towards the Macedonian border. Ammar noted that the Greek police stopped their bus in order to 
verify that each refugee held the kharti permission, but he felt they were not serious, because, in 
the end they allowed everyone to depart, with or without the card.  
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     The arbitrary treatment and unpredictability intensified at the Greek-Macedonian border. 
Compared with Khaled’s smooth crossing, Ammar, who arrived at the same point of border a 
few days later, in August 2015, had a startling experience. He encountered an entirely different, 
more militarized border. Thousands of refugees had arrived at the fence that runs along the 
border. However, the Macedonian army blocked them from moving forward while Greek police 
prevented their return to Greece. Ammar explained the situation: 
The Macedonian army were heavily present at the borders, which was a razor-
wired fence. The army used violence and tear gas to deter refugees from 
approaching the fence. Clashes between refugees and the Macedonia army 
increased in frequency and violence. The Red Cross teams, who were initially 
trying to assist pregnant women, the sick, and the elderly, started to focus on 
those who were injured by the army … Many families and groups were 
separated because of this situation, and I lost the group that I hanged out with. 
(Ammar, Hanover, Germany, April 2016)     
     As Ammar’s words illustrate, such violence rarely deters refugees, but only worsens their 
situation. He explained that masses of desperate refugees faced the Macedonian army and 
demanded the soldiers let them proceed.  He and several other young men helped the Red Cross 
teams by translating for and moving injured people, and eventually the Macedonian army 
rewarded them: it let them cross into Macedonia. Ammar boarded a train from the border with 
Greece to the Macedonian border with Serbia, only to join thousands of refugees in a prison-like 
registration center there, in extremely hostile and miserable conditions that exacerbated 
hostilities between groups of refugees:  
In Serbia we were gathered by the security forces in an old, abandoned 
factory building surrounded by heavy security. We were left with no food 
or water. The movement was strictly restricted until authorities collected 
our personal information. This process took two days to complete, during 
which basic needs and services were non-existent. It was a miserable 
situation ... Add to that the frequent and harsh attacks by Serbian police. At 
one occasion, violence broke out between Syrian and Afghani refugees due 
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to accumulated sensitivities between the two groups. The Serbian army 
intervened and detained young men from both sides. I was detained with 
the Syrian group. We were released after two days and continued our 
journey towards Belgrade. (Ammar, Hanover, Germany, April 2016)  
     The changes in European asylum policies and border control during the summer of 2015 
added ambiguity and unpredictability to refugees’ journeys as they made their way north. As 
Ammar recalled: 
The border fence between Serbia and Hungary was three meters high, with 
police forces all over the place. It was impossible to get through without being 
caught. The police made accessible one exit through the fence for refugees to 
cross, in order to take them to gathering camps. Refugees were forced to 
provide fingerprints to the Hungarian police, which meant that they cannot 
seek asylum in Germany. (Ammar, Hanover, Germany, April 2016) 
     Stranded refugees had to make crucial decisions. Ammar, unaware of Germany’s new policy 
on refugees from Syria, was desperate to avoid Hungarian border control and attempted to cross 
illegally. Serbian armed gangs attacked him as he neared the border, and smugglers made false 
promises to help him. He tried to cross through the fence with a group of Afghani refugees but 
failed after a horrible experience at the border fence: 
I decided to join a group of Afghani refugees whom I communicated with 
in Persian. Our plan was to cut through the fence and escape. At 5 a.m., we 
entered a swamp close to the borderline accompanied with women and 
children. The Afghani group had special scissors, which they used to cut 
the fence, but only a few seconds after crossing through the hole in the 
fence we were attacked by the Hungarian army forces with a helicopter 
above our heads. They captured the guy who made the hole, while we 
escaped through the swamp and hid in the waters for close to five hours. 
They released the guy who was captured, and he soon joined us. Signs of 
torture marked his body as he limped towards us. His money was stolen as 
well. While in the water I saw a snake passing by me and felt hopeless that 
we are not going to make it through. I convinced the group to return to the 
forest and decided to try again at night. We were certain that we will be 
caught, but we had to try. (Ammar, Hanover, Germany, April 2016) 
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     Ammar’s words convey both powerlessness and determination -- common, contrasting 
motivations for refugees and their movement. He and his group were desperate to avoid border 
controls, and, after many attempts, and with guidance from his smartphone’s system navigator, 
Ammar reached a Hungarian gas station well-known to refugees for taxi drivers who can convey 
them to Budapest. Ammar found one who would take him there for €100.  
     In Budapest, however, Hungarian authorities had stopped all trains from running, trapping 
thousands of refugees in front of the central station for days. Even though there were no trains, 
smugglers refused to take refugees because of new restrictive measures. That was the week a 
truck full of refugees’ bodies was discovered on an Austrian highway (BBC, 2015a). Due to this 
tragic incident, smuggling stopped briefly in Hungary, and Ammar was stranded at the central 
train station. With disbelief, he saw 20 buses arrive and start loading refugees to take them to 
Austria without asking for documents or fees. Thus he joined hundreds of refugees on a journey 
to Vienna and went on by train to Munich, where groups of Germans cheered their arrival at the 
station. Ammar moved on to Hanover, where he currently lives, after receiving renewable three 
years of protection in Germany. 
The Libyan Route 
     The third route to Europe for refugees from Syria (and elsewhere) originates in Libya, where 
smugglers take them to Italy in fishing boats. They arrive in either Sicily or the island of 
Lampedusa and then continue their journey to Milan. From Italy they either take the train or hire 
smugglers for the trip to northern Europe. In December 2012, Libya attempted to restrict the 
number of refugees seeking to enter the country and imposed visa restrictions against Syrians 
and Palestinians (Lifos, 2016). After July 2013, when Egypt did the same, illegal crossings from 
166 
 
Egypt to Libya none the less escalated (ibid.). Yet insecurities continued in Libya as violence 
between militia groups intensified. Thus, after 2014, many refugees, particularly those with 
families, avoided the Libyan route. In January 2015, the Libyan government decided not to admit 
any Syrian and Palestinian refugees from Syria17 (ibid.), which made it even more difficult for 
them to use this route.  
     Refugees’ journeys through this route become particularly messy because of the shocking 
violence and brutality of Libya’s smuggling networks, which render these refugees extremely 
vulnerable. The stories I heard show that such incidents traumatized refugees. I was able to trace 
their scars in their words and tears during our interviews. Perhaps even more poignant: the 
pauses between their words. 
     To examine refugees’ journeys through Libya, I draw on the story of Fares, which provides 
profound revelations about the horrifying conditions they encounter on this route. Fares, whom I 
introduced in chapter three, departed Syria because he feared further detention. The details of his 
story illustrate clearly refugees’ experiences through wartime, displacement, and the trip to 
Europe via the Libyan route.   
     In chapter three, I explained how Fares felt that his journey from Syria started emotionally on 
his wedding day, when his best friend was killed by the security forces in Hama. He himself was 
then detained near Hama by one of the country’s most brutal security departments. Fares shared 
with me the details of the unspeakable torture he experienced there -- another turning point in his 
life and departure, when he began to feel that he could not protect himself from oppression and 
                                                          
17 Syrians and Palestinians were accused of being connected to radical Islamist groups such as Ansar Al Sharia 
(Lifos, 2016). 
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torture. His physical departure became imminent when, a few months after his release, he 
learned that he was still wanted by the security forces. He paid a huge bribe to a security officer 
in Hama to obtain passports for himself, his wife, and their two-year-old son. The same officer 
facilitated their safe departure from Damascus airport to Cairo. 
     The three arrived in Cairo in August 2012 without any plans or contacts. Fares had chosen 
Egypt because its government did not require Syrians to obtain visas. Yet within a week he 
realized that he would not be able to find a job and a decent income there. He shared the same 
concerns that I heard from other refugees: “There was nothing for me in Egypt. There were no 
jobs, no income, nothing at all … I stayed there for one week only. I could not stay longer” 
(Fares, Stockholm, Sweden, July 2016). Additionally, during his brief stay in Egypt he could feel 
what many Syrian refugees feel there. He believed that “the humiliations of Syrians there, and 
particularly of Syrian women, were unbearable.” He did not elaborate, but during my interviews 
I heard many stories about refugees from Syria having to beg in the streets. Accordingly, Fares 
decided to continue his journey towards Libya.  
     Fares grasped the reality of Libya’s degrading conditions at the border, when an armed gang 
attacked his bus and forced each and every passenger to pay $3,000 U.S. in order to continue 
towards Benghazi. Benghazi was complete chaos. The terrible accommodations and extortionate 
rents appalled Fares. He spent all his savings within a few weeks. In the absence of any aid or 
social assistance, he had to find a way to support his family. Despite lack of experience, he 
rented a small shack and turned it into a falafel shop. He soon became popular in the 
neighbourhood and established good relations within the community, enjoying a level of social 
acceptance: “There was no state, no system, and no rules. But the Libyan people were 
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sympathetic with us, the Syrians. They considered us as brothers” (Fares, Stockholm, Sweden, 
July 2016).  
     After the humiliation he experienced in Egypt, the supportive atmosphere he found in 
Benghazi enabled him to survive the difficult living conditions. He felt some protection, even 
though his area was a hub for drugs and weapons. Fares was able to create his own social space 
and to build a network of contacts that prevented the sort of discrimination and social 
marginalization other refugees suffered in Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, and Egypt. Because 
Benghazi, like most of Libya at the time, had no meaningful official institutions or structures of 
authority, Fares escaped the legal precarity that other refugees from Syria experienced in the 
region.  
     In early 2014, after about 18 months in Libya, Fares was finding life increasingly tough. The 
intensifying political unrest and extreme insecurity made him consider looking for protection 
elsewhere. Like thousands of refugees, he set his sights on Europe:  
We were surrounded by death. It was everywhere. We escaped death back 
home to find death in Libya. Death is around us. The way ahead might bring 
death or life. We did not know. We were not sure. We were not sure of 
anything, except of the death that was around us. (Fares, Stockholm, Sweden, 
July 2016) 
     It was in such a precarious and violent context that many refugees decided to leave and began 
to make plans. Forced first to escape death in Syria, Fares was now planning another chapter of 
his journey to escape death in Libya, knowing that the trip too could bring death. His awareness 
of the danger prevented him from forcing his decision on his wife, who opposed the idea, which 
terrified her. However, when Fares was beaten by a group of armed men, who stole his money 
and his car, his wife changed her mind.  
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     Fares did not have enough savings so labored in the building sector to collect money for the 
journey. During this period of immobility, he continued to learn about the journey to Europe. He 
discussed the available options with his Syrian friends, who were also desperate to leave. They 
navigated the internet, looking for stories of refugees who made the journey from Libya. They 
investigated particularly any social media sites where refugees shared the details of their 
journeys and provided tips for those who were thinking of doing the same. They examined the 
conditions of the journey, the smuggling networks, rescue stories, and all the other related 
details.  
     A few months later, Fares and his Syrian friends moved to Tripoli with their families and 
began to organize their journey for 25 people to Italy. They met 14 smugglers during their first 
visit to the coast at Tripoli, where such services were openly peddled. They were asked to pay in 
full in advance and were given no definite departure times. They insisted on two  conditions:  
they would buy their own   life-jackets, and they would  leave Tripoli only on the day the boat 
was to depart from Zuwara, about 118 km west of Tripoli – they refused to stay at gathering 
points, where refugees were treated badly. The group of 25 was promised a two-storey boat, with 
a capacity of 60 passengers and with washrooms and storage facilities. They agreed to pay 
$1,400 U.S. per person -- $35,000 for the group. The price included food, water, and necessary 
medication.  
     On the day of departure, Fares and his group (including his own family) received 15 minutes’ 
notice. They had to leave without their life-jackets and headed towards a gathering point in 
Zuwara, where they were to be “stored” (Fares’s word) with other refugees in a gathering house. 
They were shocked by the conditions and decided to return home, as they had not yet paid the 
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smuggler, but he arrived with four armed men and forced them to continue. They were locked in 
that house, forbidden to move or make any noise  The armed men brought them boxes of bread 
and canned tuna.  
     Most refugees who travelled the Libyan route experienced similar conditions. Smugglers kept 
them in such houses for weeks or even months, unable to predict what would come next or to 
decide or act. Fares and his group spent three days locked up, until the smugglers told them they 
would depart by midnight and in 24 hours reach the gas pipeline in the Mediterranean near Italy, 
where the Italian coast guard would rescue them. The smugglers collected the money and took 
Fares and his party to another house, where they joined some 400 people. Next, the smugglers 
forced them onto a meat truck and drove them for half an hour, to the beach, where armed men 
forced them onto small rubber boats, which would transport them to the fishing vessel, and many 
families became separated. One of Fares’s friends had a panic attack, which almost paralysed 
him.  
     Each rubber boat carried about 70 people, and Fares gathered his and his disabled friend’s 
families in his arms to protect them as they sailed at gun point, in complete darkness. Like the 
refugees in Egypt, they were transferred to the fishing vessel in harrowing circumstances. Some 
470 people filled the old, 13-m-long vessel, with no room to move or sit. They were soaking and 
lacked life-jackets, food, and water. People soon started feeling sick, children were crying, and 
more men had panic attacks.  
     After six hours, they discovered that there were another 200 people under the deck -- Africans 
crowded inside one room and trying to climb up to breathe. Fares and a group of other Syrians 
worried about the boat’s balance and negotiated with the Africans to coordinate their movements 
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so it wouldn’t capsize. Suddenly, the boat came to a complete stop and water began to seep in. 
Fares believed that someone had stopped the engine in order to force the driver to let the 
Africans onto the deck. The captain could not restart the engine. Someone contacted the Libyan 
smuggler, who promised to send support, while they waited in high waves, close to Tunisia. The 
Tunisian captain wanted to ask his national coast guard for help – as a citizen, he would spend 
perhaps a year in prison there, while Italy imposed harsher penalties. Yet, for the refugees from 
Syria, Tunisian assistance might lead to their being detained and deported to Syria, so they 
prevented the captain’s call.   
     Instead, they used satellite phones to contact activists in Italy, who were assisting refugees in 
the Mediterranean.18 After providing the boat’s location, they learned that they were too far from 
Italy and still in Libyan waters. Five hours later, a rubber boat appeared in the distance. The 
excited refugees started moving towards the approaching craft. As happened on Rami’s journey 
from Egypt, Fares and a group of Syrians and Palestinians took control to prevent a disaster. 
They urged calm, but ended up beating those who did not listen or refused to cooperate, 
including members of Fares’s own group. It quickly became apparent that the approaching boat 
was the Libyan smuggler, who gave them new batteries for the engine but was afraid to board. 
They fixed the engine and were able to sail again.  
     It was at this moment that Fares wept for the first time on the boat. He paused before telling 
me: “When I looked at my wife, I could sense the blame in her eyes. She was silent, but I could 
                                                          
18 Many groups of activists have been assisting people crossing the Mediterranean and Aegean to Europe. 
WatchTheMed Alarm Phone is a prime example. Established in October 2014, it runs a ‘24/7’ hotline to assist 
people at sea. It thereby provides European coast guards with GPS positions of boats in distress, monitors rescue 
missions, supports and calms people waiting for rescue, and provides credit so people at sea can keep using their 
satellite phones during the journey. The project also documents deaths at sea and advocates for solidarity with 
migrants at sea (www.watchthemed.net). 
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hear her shouting that she would never forgive me for this experience.” Fares could not stop his 
tears when he recalled the moment on the boat when his son asked him for food. They had none, 
but Fares could not bear to see his son hungry. He attacked the captain and forced him to open 
the locked fridge in his cabin, where he found some chocolate bars, which he quickly distributed 
among the starving children, including his son. 
     They sailed for almost two more days, without food or water, until they reached Italian waters 
and spotted flames on the horizon from the notorious pipeline. They contacted Italian authorities 
and gave them their location. Soon a helicopter flew above them, took pictures, and disappeared. 
Four hours later, a rubber boat approached them, and the occupants informed them of the rescue 
plan but departed without offering food or water. The driver stopped the boat and started to 
mingle with the people to avoid arrest. Everyone was wet, cold, and exhausted and had no idea 
when rescue would come. The rubber boat returned after more than an hour and dragged the 
fishing boat to an oil tanker, which they boarded.  They were told to sleep on the deck. After 
some negotiations, the tanker team agreed to let the children and women stay inside, while the 
men remained on deck without food or covers. They formed groups of four or five to hug each 
other and warm their wet and shivering bodies. In the morning, the tanker crew gave them boiled 
potatoes. The male refugees spent two days on the deck, until the vessel reached Sicily.  
     The port of Catania was full of Italian police, the Red Cross, and media teams. Fares and 
other refugees refused to disembark with the police to avoid fingerprinting. Instead, following 
advice from the activists in Italy, they asked for Red Cross members. Fares was shocked to see 
the Red Cross team documenting the rescue operation before assisting the distressed refugees. 
This action upset and humiliated the refugees. They learned that Syrians and Palestinians would 
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not be fingerprinted in the port, while other arrivals would remain under police supervision as 
detainees. They were all taken to a reception center, where they spent two days. Fares explained 
that the Italian police did not force them to stay at the camp and did not ask for their fingerprints 
at all. He and other members of his group were told that they were free to leave, and the police 
helped them find the train station, where they boarded a train for Milan.  
     In Milan, Fares and members of his group stayed at the Islamic Society while they looked for 
a smuggler to take them to Sweden. They were afraid of taking the train by themselves. 
Refugees’ fear of being stopped by police, their lack of trust after such perilous journeys, and 
misleading information from other refugees pushed thousands of them, including Fares, to pay 
smugglers sizable sums to reach northern Europe.  
     The Islamic Society in Milan offered Fares and his family beds in a basketball stadium that 
held over 200 men, with no privacy dividers or walls. After ten days there, Fares found a Syrian 
smuggler who agreed to take them to Copenhagen for €3,500. They drove for 36 hours through 
Italy, France, Austria, and Germany. When they reached Copenhagen, Fares, who could not 
figure out how to buy tickets to Malmö (only €12 each), hired another smuggler to take them 
there.  They arrived at the immigration reception center in Malmö in May 2014 -- not yet 
journey’s end for Fares. A new chapter began in his search for protection, with new forms of 
vulnerability and precarity vis-à-vis privately managed reception centers and government 
‘migration’ offices.  
Reflections on Refugee Routes 
     The stories discussed in this chapter inform us that many journeys lack a definite point of 
departure or arrival but rather involve unanticipated loops of movements and periods of stillness. 
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Journeys turn out to be a set of complex and chaotic actions unreeling in precarious and violent 
conditions, with refugees becoming victims in disastrous circumstances. Nevertheless, they can 
also bring moments of individual and collective agency, where refugees challenge inhumane 
conditions and restrictive border controls and create their own spaces and trajectories (Johnson, 
2014; Squire, 2017).  
     The stories detail conditions on the three routes – Egyptian, Turkish, and Libyan. Yet, as I 
noted earlier, I sought to answer particularly the following questions about refugees from Syria 
and the three routes. How did they:  
- decide who should go and who should stay? 
- choose certain routes and pathways over others?  
- travel -- with what types of transportation? What about negotiating border crossings with 
smugglers, coast guards, and others?  
     These are important elements of the journey and can help in revealing the realities and 
conditions through the three routes. Based on the details of the stories described in the above 
sections, the following information about the journeys can be summarized as follows: 
Deciding Who Should Travel 
     In some stories, families chose to send their children, particularly boys, with relatives or 
friends so they could apply for family reunification and bring their parents to Sweden. The child 
had to be under 18 and hence an unaccompanied minor, with the right to be reunified with his 
parents in Sweden. Some families chose this method because they could not afford the journey 
for the whole family: for example, at least $12,000 U.S. for a family of four via the Egyptian 
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route. Other parents, such as Wassim and Rajaa, sent their sons with other relatives so as to avoid 
travelling illegally themselves.  
Deciding on the Route 
     Circumstances compelled members of some families to travel through different routes.  The 
trip from Egypt or Libya to Italy is cheaper ($3,000-$5,000 U.S. per person) than that from 
Turkey (sometimes more than $10,000 per person). Yet leaving from Egypt or Libya is more 
dangerous and risky. Crossing the Mediterranean -- for many refugees the journey’s hardest and 
scariest part -- can take a few days, with the constant threat of storms and high waves, and the 
trip across the Aegean, only a few hours. Additionally, and as the stories highlight, smuggling 
networks in Egypt and Libya (especially the latter) are more violent, and refugees cannot resist 
or complain.  
     Methods of payment may add additional insecurity. In Turkey, refugees place money in 
deposit offices, and pay the full amount (usually $2,500-$5,000 U.S. per person) to the 
smugglers only on reaching the Greek island. Similarly, in Egypt, smugglers’ mediators deposit 
payments (usually about $3,000 per person) and pay the smugglers when the refugees reach 
Italian waters or ports. In Libya, in contrast, refugees pay the full amount ($1,400-$2,500) to the 
smugglers on the night they depart.  
     In addition, the choice of route is always subject to political unrest, security conditions, 
border controls, and mobility restrictions. When refugees from Syria were required to obtain 
visas to Egypt beginning in July 2013, more chose Turkey instead of the Egyptian and Libyan 
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routes. Yet the EU-Turkey deal of March 2016, controlled the Aegean crossing tightly and 
slashed the number of arrivals in Greece.  
Methods of Travel and Encounters with Various Actors 
     The stories also show how many refugees failed several attempts at departure, despite 
extensive preparation. In Egypt, police may interrupt departures:  Palestinian refugees risk 
deportation to Syria, while most Syrian refugees obtain relatively quick release. In Turkey, the 
police detain refugees for one or two days and then release them; anyone with a valid passport or 
travel document is able to continue their journey. 
     Refugees may hear smugglers’ false promises of luxurious journeys on lavishly equipped 
boats. In reality, particularly in Egypt and Libya, refugees crowd on the deck of dilapidated 
fishing boats that lack basic facilities, even water and food. Chaotic departures and the tense 
transfer to fishing vessels cause many refugees to lose their belongings. I heard stories about 
people with conditions such as diabetes and high blood pressure losing their medication. In the 
end, refugees often find themselves sailing on treacherous journeys without life-jackets or even 
the basic elements of care.    
     On the Egyptian and Libyan routes, the arrival of rescue teams does not always end refugees’ 
hardship. Chaos and tension with the captain may result from conflicting interests, as we saw in 
Fares’s story. Most captains try to avoid arrest for human trafficking and pretend to be refugees. 
Tension also occurs between refugees themselves on the journey, particularly when rescue 
vessels pull up and refugees are desperate and excited after their difficult journey. As well, the 
rescue process takes time, with unpredictable outcomes for refugees. At Italian ports, many 
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refugees receive humiliating treatment. The stories show that refugees arriving from both Egypt 
and Libya experience similar conditions at the receiving camps in Italy and take the same route 
to Milan en route to northern Europe.  
     Through the Turkish route, refugees have fewer encounters with smugglers, but must go by 
truck to gathering points and along the coast and may encounter Turkish police and coast guard 
along the coast. Their short Aegean crossing is dangerous because of its precarious conditions. 
Many balams sink, as Ammar described, and most survivors face dire conditions in the Greek 
islands before they depart to Athens to continue their journey. In Athens, refugees who can 
afford airfare and forged travel documents can try to fly, hoping airport security does not 
intervene. Many refugees end up stranded in Greece for months before they succeed in boarding 
a plane out.  Alternatively, they might walk the western Balkan corridor, like thousands of other 
refugees who could not afford to fly. Along this path, refugees encounter multiple forms of 
border control, and many are detained in terrible conditions, as happened to Shadi and Khaled.  
Conclusion 
     The stories I described in this chapter reveal how each journey consists of complex and 
chaotic actions that occur under precarious, even violent conditions, which make refugees 
victims and often end up in disaster. Nevertheless, the journeys may bring moments of individual 
and collective agency, where refugees challenge inhumane conditions and restrictive border 
controls in order to create their own spaces (Johnson, 2014; Squire, 2017). By following the 
storylines of these particular journeys, I have sought to highlight messiness, violence, and agency 
as three key aspects of refugee journey. 
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Messiness  
     The messiness and complexity of refugee journey are revealed through the refugees’ multiple 
loops of non-linear movements, often under stressful conditions, which are chaotic and 
unexpected. We see these features also in multiple moments of departure, including emotional 
experiences in advance of physical leaving, where one disconnects from one’s own community. 
Home is no longer a secure place for such people, especially when violence and precarity touch 
them in their own communities. Hence many refugees mark multiple moments of departure.  
Fares, for example, had two: the murder of his best friend and his experience in detention, both 
months before he left Syria.  As well, many refugees do not describe their arrival at their 
intended destinations as their journey’s end, especially -- as we see in chapter five -- those who 
have had to wait months or years to reunite with their family.  
     Messy and complex journeys may crisscross borders and continue after physical completion -
- examples (see chapter three) of the refugee journey as “a trajectory of wandering” (Khosravi, 
2011: 51). Ammar’s loops of movements included Lebanon and Thailand before he journeyed 
from Turkey through the Balkan corridor to Germany. Wassim’s family had their own circular 
movement when they left Syria for Egypt and made complex and separate journeys to Sweden 
that spread out over more than a year and involved teenaged Shadi’s detention in Egypt, Greece, 
and Macedonia.  
     Additionally, as the stories here detail, refugees’ journeys can be extremely unpredictable and 
ambiguous, combining mobility and immobility (Brigden and Mainwaring, 2016; Innes, 2016; 
Kaytaz, 2016). Even during periods of stillness, refugees were navigating the next chapter of 
their journeys. Fares was learning about the conditions of the journey while waiting for his wife 
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to make a decision to leave. Similarly, Shadi, who was stranded in Greece for months, made 
many attempts to leave for Sweden before departing via the Balkan corridor. Refugees’ abilities 
to navigate different options and paths along their journeys depend substantially on their 
economic and social resources. For example, Wassim could pay for his family’s journeys, which 
cost about half a million U.S. dollars. His social networks in Europe, which included friends and 
relatives, helped his sons when they were stranded in Italy, Greece, and Macedonia. Other, less 
affluent refugees may experience much more challenging conditions and long periods of 
immobility.  
Violence  
     Refugees’ actual movement often proved messy and unpredictable: illegal crossings of 
multiple borders and encounters with structures of control, all while using smugglers, some of 
them rough, even violent. The stories showed extreme violence, sometimes encounters with 
death, as with Khaled, who recalled with distress the dead man at the Turkish border. Ammar 
spoke about crossing the Aegean when three boats capsized, leaving dozens of people to drown 
in the dark water. In fact, refugees’ encounters with smugglers were usually nasty, as most of the 
stories indicated graphically -- especially on the Egyptian and, above all, the Libyan routes. The 
stories implicitly referenced the racial hierarchy of refugees’ vulnerability and their treatment by 
smugglers and coast guard – most pointedly in Fares’s story about the treatment of African 
people, locked below deck on the fishing vessel.  
    As well,  the stories show how  through the journey, refugees can be criminalized and 
penalized, changing them from people deserving  protection to illegal migrants, simply for 
challenging sovereign borders (Schuster, 2011). I analyse this transformation in chapter five, but 
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I did touch on  the impact of such unpredictable treatment and the feelings of humiliation that  
Rami described  upon his group’s arrival  in Sicily and which was common to many of my  
interviewees. The criminalization of refugees at the Serbian border and Khaled’s experience in 
detention are further examples of transformation. Through these stories we can see that refugees 
often find themselves in real prisons, together with their children, facing “biopolitical 
amendment” (Vaughan-Williams, 2015), which deprives them of their basic needs and rights.  
Agency 
    Through the storylines I have also addressed refugees’ notable agency and resilience despite 
the precarious conditions of such journeys. In fact, their agency is clear in their very decisions to 
leave in the first place. Many decided to make the journey despite genuinely not wishing to 
leave, as Khaled, Fares, and Rajaa indicated. At many points of the interviews, refugees 
reiterated their reluctance to leave their homes and explained that lack of safety and protection 
forced their hand. For example, Wassim and Fares, like many other refugees, wanted to establish 
new lives in their new localities within the region, but political unrest and increasing insecurity 
changed their plans. The journey is indeed complex, right from the early moments of departure. 
The stories showed how refugees felt they were left with no other choice but to leave for Europe, 
often against their wishes.  
     The notion of complexity also involves individual and collective expressions of agency. As 
Ammar, Rami, Khaled, and Fares told us, their moments of agency were usually acts for 
survival. Many refugees clearly had no intention of acting politically but ended up taking control 
and creating unexpected scenarios in order to survive. Some moments of agency were 
controversial and painful, as when Rami and Fares attacked other refugees on board in order to 
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maintain order and to avoid capsizing. This relates to my caveat in chapter two about 
romanticizing refugees’ agency or making it appear deliberate.  
     The stories also revealed constraints on refugees’ agency and ability. At the gathering points 
or when boarding the boats in Turkey, Egypt, or Libya,  refugees were clearly at the mercy of 
armed smugglers and could not  resist or even change their minds, as was explained by Fares, 
Khaled, and Ammar. Refugees travelling the Balkan corridor confronted heavy security and 
militarized borders. The stories of Ammar, Khaled, and Shadi share multiple elements of 
helplessness and surrender at the securitized borders of Macedonia, Serbia, and Hungary. Yet, in 
moments of agency, refugees engaged, navigated, and maneuvered through such border controls 
and were able to continue their journeys. Protests at gathering camps, multiple attempts to cross 
through border fences, and even refusals to leave rescue boats were all cases of agency and 
resistance where refugees challenged the structures of control and tried to create their own spaces 
and assert their rights as refugees and as human beings. Through such practices, the stories 
revealed illegality and increasing human cost at the borders and showed how refugees transform 
borders into sites of resistance and places to exert agency (Johnson, 2014; Squire, 2011).  
     At the end, the intense messiness and precarity of these journeys, demonstrated by the stories 
detailed in this chapter, reveal the human cost of the global crisis of protection. It is the price  
that refugees from the global south must pay for challenging the structures of governance that 
aim to contain and deter them  from the global north, regardless of the inhumane circumstances 
of war or of displacement, when sufficient protection and access to rights are limited, if not 
absent. In the next chapter, I examine the emotional impact of their experiences en route as part 
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of the human cost of the protection crisis, which transform refugees after their frequently 
traumatic journeys.  
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Chapter Five: The Emotional Toll of the Refugee Journey  
 
Introduction 
     In chapter two, I proposed a three-part approach to the refugee journey. Chapter three dealt 
with survival and resistance through its “stories of escape and displacement.” Chapter four 
explored the “non-linear, messy, and complex” nature of the trip to Europe. The third dimension, 
which I discuss in this chapter, is about the journey as an emotional process that transforms 
refugees’ identities, positionalities, and perspectives towards self, family, and life. The journey is 
a life-changing experience that is highly intense, emotional, and transformative (Benezer, 2002). 
As I noted above, this emotionally transformative element of the journey occurs substantially 
because of the global crisis of protection and is part of its human cost. For this reason, this 
chapter aims to expose and explore the journey’s emotional toll on refugees who have escape the 
horrors of war and the challenges of  displacement only to come up against  closed borders.  
    As in chapters three and four, the stories of the refugees themselves, as they shared their 
experiences and feelings with me during my field research, inform my analysis. By relying on 
their stories, I hope to draw attention to the emotional element of refugees’ journeys and reveal 
the fear, exhaustion, anxiety, humiliation, and confusion that were common to most of the stories 
I heard. I focus on stories of mothers who journeyed with their children and, some of them, 
without their spouses. These cases were intense experiences for both mothers and children. They 
also highlight the mothers’ substantial agency as they created ways to survive the fraught 
journey. The remainder of the chapter also shows refugees encountering intense physical and 
psychological challenges that may undermine, even shatter their positionality (second part of the 
chapter) and their identity (third part) as a result. I aim to examine these transformations, which 
in turn affect refugees’ integration within their new communities. I look, especially at the 
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experience of Palestinian refugees from Yarmouk in Damascus, who, as I showed in chapters 
three and four, are reliving the trauma of their people’s statelessness through their new 
displacement from Syria. Their journeys in search of protection result in unique identity 
transformation. 
The Journey’s Physical and Emotional Toll   
     In chapter four especially, I proposed that the refugee journey is not only about the physical 
movement from one land point to another but also involves moments of emotional departure. 
When people can no longer cope with precarity and violence, they may leave their home 
communities emotionally, even before their body moves elsewhere. This shift may rupture their 
deep psychic ties to home, leaving some of them feeling powerless, alienated within their own 
communities. Such emotional departures reflect extreme social vulnerability, where 
“hopelessness” and “purposelessness” may prevail (Khosravi, 2017). This was probably the case 
after spring 2011 for millions of refugees from Syria, who lost emotional connections with their 
home communities, because of wartime insecurity and violence, and later, during displacement 
elsewhere in the region.  
      The stories in chapter four showed how this form of emotional departure often precedes the 
physical action of leaving departure, which may take time and require  resources and planning. 
As well, refugees often feel torn between the need to leave and their desire to stay either at home 
or nearby. The examples of Rajaa and Khaled showed that refugees may resist leaving but 
eventually have to because of the extreme conditions. The cases of Wassim and Fares revealed 
how refugees may try to establish new lives within their region, but have to leave again and 
journey even farther. For Wassim, hostilities in Egypt against refugees from Syria became 
185 
 
unbearable. Similarly, insecure conditions in Libya intensified, forcing Fares to flee. Yet, as 
chapter four pointed out, the precarious and messy journeys make refugees more vulnerable 
emotionally and socially. They leave many refugees with traumatic stories and transform their 
lives.  
     In the remainder of this section, I discuss four powerful sets of feelings -- fear and exhaustion, 
anxiety, humiliation, and confusion -- which refugees may experience during their journeys. 
These feelings have emerged in most of the stories I heard about the journey and reflect the 
impact of the precarious conditions on refugees’ perceptions of self and others. The second and 
third sections examine the transformation –of refugees’ ‘positionality’ and, of their identity -- 
while highlighting the emotional elements of uprootedness in refugees’ journey and experience 
of exile, which is undertheorized in the literature of refugee journey. Through this approach, I 
aim to present refugees as real individuals who suffer from normal fears and anxieties when 
facing extreme precarity and humiliation while they search for acceptance and safety. My 
approach here speaks to the argument of Anderson and Smith (2011) for examining emotional 
relations and challenging the absence and marginalization of emotions and feelings in social 
research. In their work on emotional geographies, Anderson and Smith call for “a fuller program 
of work, recognizing the emotions as ways of knowing, being and doing in the broadest sense, 
and using this to take geographical knowledges – and the relevance that goes with them – beyond 
their more usual visual, textual and linguistic domains” (2011: 8). I build on this discussion and 
suggest  that exploring the journey’s emotional and transformative elements can both help us 
grasp  refugees’  predicament  during their search for  protection and also challenge the dominant 
perception of them as faceless and voiceless  people who must  prove legally their need for  
protection to obtain recognition and  protection as  refugees. As I explained above, these feelings 
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and transformations epitomize the human cost refugees pay for challenging control structures 
and border practices. These feelings demonstrate at the human level the emotional toll of the 
global crisis of protection and how it invades the intimate space of refugees’ bodies and minds. 
Fear and Exhaustion  
      As I discussed in chapters two and three, refugees experience greater precarity and fear 
during their journeys. Their unfamiliar situations start with their first encounters with smugglers 
and extend to include natural hazards, dealing with border control, and even coping with other 
refugees. In the absence of legal and safe routes to intended destinations, refugees remain 
invisible while encountering border controls or police forces. They may have to travel in the 
dark, avoid main roads, and cross through wilderness, often guided by smugglers who rarely 
show compassion. In addition, they often face natural dangers and police rides by themselves, as 
their smugglers often disappear at critical points. On the Egyptian route, as Rami explained, 
refugees had to hide every time the Egyptian police showed up, just as the refugees were 
departing by sea, while the smugglers always managed to disappear: 
It was in the dark. People were terrified. They started feeling things moving 
around them like animals and insects. Many of them thought of going back. 
We encouraged them to stay and to continue after all of this, and also no one 
knew the way back or how to reach the main road, since we walked a lot to 
reach our location. We were worried about people’s safety if they left the 
place. There might be gangs out there. Nobody was certain of anything. 
(Rami, Stockholm, Sweden, July 2016) 
     Thus anxiety and stress may start early in the journey. Rana’s story of crossing from northern 
Iraq to Turkey also revealed how stressful the moments of departure were. In chapter three  I 
talked about her initial journey, with her husband and two sons, from Yarmouk to elsewhere in 
Damascus and then to Irbil. In Irbil, they decided that she would go to Sweden with her mother, 
187 
 
who was in her late sixties, and her younger son. Rana and her group crossed from Zakho in 
northern Iraq to Silopi, in eastern Turkey. Travelling in the dark, they passed through a swamp 
and became covered with mud up to their necks. They had to climb a rocky mountain and up a 
steep cliff, walk through a forest, and then move through cornfields. They were not allowed at 
any point to light a fire, use their phones, or make noise. Despite these hardships, her mother was 
concerned and ashamed more about their illegality:  
She was not literally afraid. She was emotionally exhausted more than being 
physically tired. She was stressed about the idea of being smuggled illegally 
in the middle of the night where it was totally dark and we could not see 
anything while we were crossing through a forest, cornfields, muddy water, 
and mountains. (Rana, Stockholm, July 2016) 
     After a long bus journey from Silopi to Izmir, on Turkey’s Aegean coast, Rana was joined by 
her two elderly aunts, from Damascus, who hoped to cross to Greece with her. The family spent 
almost a month in Izmir, with smugglers promising to leave every night. Rana explained the 
stress: 
We were emotionally exhausted because of the false promises … It was very 
stressful to get everyone ready for departing, including the old ladies and my 
son. We went through this stress every night. We used to call the smuggler 
every day to inquire about the trip. In fact this was the first thing we used to 
do every morning. He never called. He used to tell us to prepare ourselves for 
departing by midnight and keeps delaying until there is no chance for 
departing that night. (Rana, Stockholm, July 2016) 
     Smugglers’ promises proved false, and Rana and her group ended up exhausted and 
frustrated. Sometimes the smugglers would walk them to the shore, only to discover that either 
the time was not right to leave or conditions were not convenient for travel. Rana noted: 
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So every time we failed to travel, we had to walk back the long distance 
carrying our life-jackets and our bags to return to the hotel, by ourselves most 
of the time. At one attempt, the old aunts were carried by the men in the group 
because both of them were too exhausted and were not able to walk. One of 
them started crying. She felt humiliated. (Rana, Stockholm, July 2016) 
     The intensity was so great that one of her aunts decided to return to Damascus; as Rana 
explained, “She was not emotionally able to continue and was too stressed and scared. She could 
not handle the stress of the journey” (Rana, Stockholm, July 2016).  
     As I noted in chapter four, the exhausting waits, combined with smugglers’ false promises, 
pushed many refugees to accept horrible circumstances for their departure -- they become so 
desperate to leave that they will agree to any price and any condition. Those who manage to 
depart, however, still have hurdles to surmount. For example, Safieh, in her mid-sixties, whom I 
introduced in chapter three, shared with me her fear during her journey from Turkey. She and her 
husband were forced to leave their home in Yarmouk in December 2012 and moved to Tartous 
on the Syrian coast. They then decided to join their son and his family in Norway. They travelled 
via the Turkish route and experienced the sorts of conditions we saw in chapter four.  They 
finally reached the uninhabited part of Rhodes island in Greece with no assistance or guidance 
from the smugglers: “It was totally desolate. There was nothing around us. I was so afraid and so 
tired. I could not catch my breath. I felt the blood freezing in my veins” (Safieh, Stockholm, July 
2016).  
     Yet natural hazards of the Egyptian and Libyan routes (chapter four) created the most 
terrifying experiences for many refugees. Like Rami and his group, with the terrible storm in 
Libyan waters, Qamar and Issam, Palestinian refugees from Syria travelling the Egyptian route 
with their five children, faced a similar scare: 
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Issam: During the storm, the front point of the boat was broken. It was a 
horrifying hurricane. We felt as if we were on the top of a mountain and then 
down in a deep valley. The boat was carried high by the waves and then used 
to go down in the water. We were all wet. Everything was totally wet. The 
boat was surrounded by high waves from all sides. People were not able to 
talk. They were all pale.  
Qamar: When the captain had his life-jacket on, I was really scared. I felt 
that we were done.  
My question: Did you have life-jackets with you? 
Qamar: No. We paid for them, but smugglers did not get us any.  
Issam: The storm lasted for 28 hours. 
Qamar: We were dying. 
  Issam: The storm stopped after midnight, and the sea became flat. 
Qamar: Those hours were from hell. It was really scary.  
(Qamar and Issam, Stockholm, July 2016) 
     Qamar summed up her feelings: “I have forgotten my pain in Syria, but I will never forget 
those moments on the boat. It was horrifying.” She also spoke of her physical pain during and 
after the journey. En route from Egypt to Italy, the boat was overcrowded, and she had to hold 
her five children close to her chest for most of the eight days: “There was not enough space to sit 
… My five children had their heads on my chest for the whole journey. I still have pain because 
of their pressure on my chest. It has been two years and I am still in pain” (Qamar, Stockholm, 
July 2016).  
     Those who survived the sea journeys still felt fear and anxiety due to their illegal crossings.  
Khosravi’s work explains: 
Border crossing can be experienced in terms of honor and shame. A legal 
journey is regarded as an honorable act in the spirit of globalism and 
cosmopolitanism. The legal traveler cross[es] the border gloriously and, in 
so doing, enhances his or her social status, whereas the border transgressor 
is antithetical, being seen as shamed and anti-ethical. (2011: 66) 
     Khosravi illustrates how refugees may perceive illegal crossings as morally wrong and 
therefore shameful, adding to their vulnerability. Their illegality and the need to remain invisible 
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may generate fear and anxiety at any encounter with security officers and border control. For 
example, those on the Turkish route who attempted to fly from Athens experienced stress in 
every direct contact with airport security, which made them visible. Their experiences speak to 
Khosravi’s argument about “a kind of gambling. Information, payment and networks are crucial 
and necessary components of an ‘illegal’ border crossing, but it is, after all, always a matter of 
chance” (2011: 62). The story of Rana at Athens airport provides a compelling example. Rana 
spoke of the first of her many failed attempts:  
I did not have any idea about how to behave and what to do. So, when I 
reached that point, I was looking directly at the security, and that was my 
biggest mistake. One of them noticed my looks and recognized that I was 
nervous. He was so smart, as it took him one second to discover me. So, he 
called me out of the line and asked me for the passports. I am not sure about 
the reactions on my face because it was my first time and I was really nervous 
... I believe that being confident and calm is very important. You should not 
have any eye contact with the officers. You should behave as a normal 
passenger. I am talking from an experience because I tried four times and 
only managed to fly in the fifth attempt. (Rana, Stockholm, July 2016) 
     Rana confirms Khosravi’s argument about border crossing being “a matter of performance” 
(2011: 62). Refugees need to look and behave in certain ways in order to be trusted as genuine 
and legal travellers. Otherwise, they will end up as illegal figures, who may be criminalized. 
Salam, from chapter three, who crossed from Turkey to Greece before his attempt to fly from 
Athens airport, shared similar anxiety. However, Salam prepared himself by going to the airport 
the night before and observing the procedures at the gates for a few hours. He described his 
departure the next day: 
At the time, I had no idea where they check the boarding and where they 
check the IDs. So, I approached the gate and passed. I learnt that I should not 
look straight to the security guards. I should avoid any eye contact. I was left 
with one security check to pass, which was the gate of the plane. So, I stood 
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in the line and passed my ID and my boarding pass to the officer, who 
checked everything and said OK. Those moments were too long.  
I could not feel relieved yet, because I heard about people who were stopped 
inside the plane. We took the shuttle from the terminal and went inside the 
plane. By the way, that flight was the only flight available for that week, and 
I had to book business class to avoid waiting for another week in Athens. It 
cost me around €300. I sat in the business seat and was keen to see the door 
of the plane closed. I only felt relieved when the plane took off. (Salam, 
Stockholm, July 2016) 
     Salam flew to Warsaw and then to Stockholm. His words summarize most refugees’ anxiety 
and fear at airports. He was able to behave as a legal traveller and passed the security check.  
Illegal travellers experience airport procedures differently from other passengers. The routine 
waiting periods at the gate, the shuttle trip to the plane, and the preparations for takeoff change 
into anxious waits for refugees, who feel relief only when the plane takes off.  
     And refugees often suffer from other forms of anxiety, and the pain of separation, at the 
airport. The story of Rajaa, introduced in chapter three, who travelled from Egypt to Turkey and 
then to Greece to meet her son, Shadi, so she could accompany him to Sweden, provides another 
typical example. In chapter four, Rajaa passed airport security in Santorini island while Shadi 
was not allowed to board the plane:   
Rajaa (weeping frequently): I did not know what to do. I called my family and 
asked them what to do. I came all the way to Greece for him. How can I leave 
him now? They all encouraged me to continue my way to the plane … Even 
Shadi himself encouraged me to continue by ignoring me. I was crying while 
I am watching him caught by the police.  
Shadi: … I left the room and found my Mom outside. She was so close. There 
was only one door between me and her. If she turned her face towards me, 
they would discover that she was the one in the pictures in my phone. So, I 
looked down and left the airport. I did not want to have any eye contact with 
her, because she just managed to go through, and I did not want her to come 
back for me. I did not look at her at all. It was impossible for me to do anything 
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different. I would never tell them that this was my mother. (Rajaa and Shadi, 
Stockholm, July 2016) 
     Mother and son provide a poignant picture of refugees’ stress and anxiety at border control. 
Her words and tears expressed the predicament of a desperate mother who has to act as a 
stranger, while watching her younger son, whom she journeyed long and hard to be with, is 
prevented from departing. Shadi acted as an adult who protected his mother by totally ignoring 
her. His performance reflected a maturity and masculinity unexpected from a 17-year-old 
stranded by himself in a foreign country for months.  
Anxieties about Family Members 
     Rajaa and Shadi’s distressing experience are shared by many refugees with children. The 
majority of parents whom I interviewed told me that they had few expectations in Sweden for 
themselves but undertook such terrifying journeys for their children’s sake. Indeed, their hope of 
better lives for their children led sometimes to difficult choices that actually made their journey 
messier and more precarious. Some families were so desperate that they sent just one child to 
Sweden with relatives or friends, as Wassim and Rajaa did. They assumed quicker processing for 
an unaccompanied minor requesting family reunification. In 2015, more than 96,500 such 
children arrived in Europe, with 35,000 of them going to Sweden; in 2016, 63,300 reached 
Europe, including only 2,200 for Sweden -- a 94-per-cent drop (Eurostat, 2017). In Sweden, 
unaccompanied minors enjoy access to rights including education, health care, and legal 
facilities. According to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, which Sweden adheres to, 
they are entitled also to be reunited with their parents. The Swedish Migration Agency searches 
for relatives while examining a child’s asylum application so as to reunite the young person with 
his/her family in the country of origin or other safe country outside Sweden. If reunion elsewhere 
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proves impossible and the minor receives refugee status in Sweden, the authorities may grant 
residence permits to the family (Swedish Migration Agency, 2018). Yet the high number of 
arrivals in 2015 resulted in a backlog of cases and delays in processing applications, and hence 
long separations for many families (Human Rights Watch, 2016g).  
     Similarly, many refugees who journeyed solo, hoping to reunite with their families in Sweden 
have had long separations, some still continuing to this day. Mahmoud, for example, whom I 
introduced in chapter three,  decided to leave Syria to avoid his oldest son, Mazen’s, being 
conscripted. He could not pay for the whole family’s travel, so made the agonizing decision to 
leave his wife and children in Syria while he took  Mazen, 18, and  Samer, the youngest, who 
was 8, (he had heard from other refugees that having his youngest child with him would  
expedite  family reunification).  
       Mahmoud and his two sons experienced a horrific sea journey from Egypt to Italy and were 
travelling by train from Milan towards Sweden when French police stopped them and arrested 
Mazen, detaining him for a few nights. After Mazen’s release, the three continued towards 
Sweden until German police stopped them. Mahmoud managed to avoid fingerprinting, but when 
the police found out about Mazen’s detention in France, they said that he had either to seek 
asylum in Germany or be returned to France. Mahmoud, who had begun this journey to save 
Mazen from the war in Syria, was forced to leave him, alone, in Germany and to push on with 
Samer, because family reunification in Germany is long and difficult. The two reached Sweden 
in August 2013 and reunited with other family members 13 months later. However, Mazen was 
forced to stay in Germany, separated from his family, with no hope of reunification.   
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     Refugees with older children feel increased pressure to reach Sweden before their offspring 
turn 1819 and may pay excessive amounts to get there in time. Some could not cover travel for 
the whole family and left partners and younger children behind. Others, worrying about their 
children’s safety en route, particularly for the girls, decided to leave them at home and later seek 
family reunification in Sweden. Youssef, who I introduced in chapter three and who chose the 
Libyan route, serves as a poignant example. Youssef chose to leave his wife and children in 
Damascus with the hope of reaching Sweden and reunifying them all before their daughter 
turned 18 as she will not be treated as a minor and will be excluded from the family reunification 
application. Youssef’s boat from Libya broke into pieces, and 49 people died before Italian 
rescue teams arrived.  Once in Sweden, Youssef became concerned about the long processes for 
residency and family reunification. He told me that he contacted his lawyer and case manager at 
the Swedish Migration Agency every day to expedite his applications. Reunification took more 
than three years. The new Swedish rules on asylum and protection, mentioned in the 
Introduction, came into effect in the summer of 2016. Family reunification for refugees from 
Syria who arrived after November 2015 became very complicated and almost impossible.  
Humiliation 
     The stories show that throughout the journey, refugees are subject to various forms of 
humiliation. As I mentioned above, refugees shared with me their feelings of humiliation, which 
began as early as their first illegal crossing of a border. I heard similar expressions of humiliation 
from Arad’s wife, introduced in chapter three, who crossed into Turkey with her husband and 
                                                          
19 According to the Swedish Migration Agency, “The following are counted as family members: husband, wife, 
registered partner or cohabiting partner, and your children under the age of 18 years. Other relatives and 
children that are 18 years or older cannot join you in Sweden if you have been given a temporary residence permit. 
If you are under 18 years, your parents are counted as your closest family.” (Swedish Migration Agency, 2018).  
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their two sons. She could not stop her tears when she recalled their reaching Turkey totally 
exhausted and covered with mud. These harsh conditions, paired with the shame of being illegal, 
overwhelmed some refugees. For example, Safieh shared with me her intense feelings while en 
route from Turkey to Greece with her husband. Told by the smugglers to speed up, they had to 
walk through the shallow water and board a yacht after spending three nights in the forest hiding 
from the Turkish police. She was soaked and her leg was almost broken when a smuggler pushed 
her up to the yacht: 
Then I started crying because I was too frustrated. I was weeping loudly and 
asking how we ended up like this. Why God is doing this to us. I almost lost 
it. (Safieh, Stockholm, July 2016).  
     To her surprise, their arrival in Oslo, Norway, involved new forms of humiliation. At the 
police station: 
One police officer grabbed my handbag in a nasty way. They sterilized 
everything. I felt so bad. I cried because it was humiliating. We had never 
dealt with the police before, and have never been at a police station. Why did 
we end up like this? We did not do anything wrong to be treated like this. I 
could not control myself. (Safieh, Stockholm, July 2016) 
     Other refugees had similar experiences in Italian ports. In chapter four, I discussed Rami and 
Fares’s outrage and humiliation after their boats were rescued and the Italian police received 
them at Catania. Qamar and her husband also felt great shame at the Italian port:  
When they received us, they covered their faces with masks and wore gloves 
as if we were infected. We were very humiliated and annoyed by this 
treatment … When we arrived to Sicily, they took our pictures and gave us 
numbers as if we were criminals. I was so mad and humiliated again. I felt 
ashamed. They gave us covers and blankets but left us to sleep outside in the 
cold weather and in our wet clothes. (Qamar, Stockholm, July 2016) 
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    The same sorts of feelings affected Rasha, the Syrian widow from chapter three who 
journeyed to Sweden through Turkey and the Balkan route with her three children: a girl, 15, and 
boys 13 and 9. She shared with me her frustration over their treatment by the Greek army at a 
military base on one of the Greek islands: “They treated us badly as if we were criminals or 
dangerous people. There were guns pointed at us all the time. We did not escape the war in our 
country to end up like this” (Rasha, Laxå, Sweden, July 2016).  
 Confusion 
     The precarious nature of the journey stresses refugees emotionally, which can generate deep 
guilt and regret. As a result, many have conflicting emotions about their decisions and their 
journeys. Most refugees I interviewed feel such confusion, particularly those who travelled with 
their families and who felt guilt about imposing the harrowing journey on them. For example, in 
chapter three, we learned that Fares did not plan his journey and was still confused about its 
development, “My journey has been a complete shock for me. After all this time, I am still 
confused about its events. I have not yet understood how did it happen, how it developed and 
how I managed through it all” (Fares, Stockholm, July 2016).  
     This confusion problematizes the notion of agency and reflects the messy and precarious 
refugee journey/survival act. The confusion also may signal refugees’ profound guilt and shame 
for imposing these conditions on their families. Yamen, for example, left Syria for Libya and 
travelled thence to Italy with his four-year-old daughter. His wife and other children made their 
way to Sweden through Turkey. Yamen’s words reveal his confusion and guilt vis-à-vis his 
daughter: 
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Maybe it was right and maybe it was wrong. I do not know. I am not sure. I 
am not sure what was right and what was wrong. I am confused about the 
whole experience and about the decisions I made during the journey. I could 
not evaluate my decisions at the time. For example, the smugglers I chose 
were too bad, but I did not know that at the beginning. No one can judge me 
since I was too desperate. I was totally trapped. (Yamen, Hässleholm, 
Sweden, June 2016) 
     This complex mixture of confusion, guilt, and shame about the journey’s decisions and 
conditions illustrates its transformative effect, which targets mainly a refugee’s positionality and 
identity.  
     I propose that these feelings en route reflect in refugees’ bodies and psyches the terrible 
human price they pay for the crisis of protection and the resulting exclusionary policies. 
Focusing on the emotional dimension of the refugee journey may help us to reform government 
policies and international structures on migration.  This method re-humanizes and re-
individualizes refugees by presenting them as individuals with diverse experiences and 
aspirations. It challenges the “universalization” and “standardization” that dominate 
representation of refugees in official narratives as a faceless, homogeneous group of powerless 
people, but it may also pose a threat to the political, economic, and social identity of the global 
north (Johnson, 2011).  Such “re-individualization” necessitates further examination of the 
transformative elements of the journey as explained by refugees. Refugees experience these 
elements during various stages of their journey, and they last after arrival at the new 
destinations, which rarely marks the end of their journeys.  
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Transforming Refugees’ Positionality 
     In addition to refugees’ fear, exhaustion, anxiety, humiliation, and confusion during the 
journey, the stories in this research show dramatic changes in their positionalities and roles 
within their families and communities, which reshape their perceptions of selves and others. 
Refugee studies say little about these transformations, as the literature about the refugee journey 
in general is minimal, as we saw in chapter two. Through my work, I aim to narrow this gap and 
contribute to the literature by focusing on refugees’ stories and their intimate perceptions about 
the journey and its transformative impact, which will help us grasp the emotional toll and human 
cost of the global crisis of protection. For this work I focus on the loss of roles refugees 
experience en route, especially those of protector and provider. 
Loss of Protector’s Role   
     To understand the loss of role as protector, which affects mostly male refugees, we need to 
explore how violence and precarity during wartime, displacement, and journey often shake 
refugees’ self-image and perception of life, upsetting their familial and social roles. Yet women 
too experience similar changes in their positions as mothers, wives, daughters, and members of 
the community. I discuss those shifts in the coming sections with a particular experiences of 
refugee mothers. As with other transformative elements of the journey, this topic is 
undertheorized in the literature. Nombasa Williams (2011), for example, refers to the absence of 
masculinities conceptualization in migration studies and proposes that the challenges facing 
refugee males during displacement can illuminate gender dynamics in refugee communities and 
men’s profound role in sustaining their families’ well-being: 
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An understanding of masculine identities must be included if gender analysis 
is to be used as a tool for understanding the dynamics of refugee parenting, 
refugees’ representations of gender relations -- particularly the ways in 
which youth and men are challenged by new identity creation and 
reconstruction of their understandings of their gender roles as fathers, 
husbands, protectors, and providers. (2011: 107)  
     To further understand refugee men as protectors, I draw on the logic of masculinist 
protection, as it explains the journey’s transformative influence on individuals and families as 
well. In her work on the logic of masculinist protection in feminist theory, Iris Marion Young 
(2003: 4) links being male head of family to the role of protector: 
The gallantly masculine man is loving and self-sacrificing, especially in 
relation to women. He faces the world’s difficulties and dangers in order to 
shield women from harm and allow them to pursue elevating and decorative 
arts. The role of this courageous, responsible, and virtuous man is that of a 
protector. 
Connecting masculinity with protection also speaks to Jullie Peteet’s (1994: 34) definition of 
Arab masculinity as she explains:  
Arab masculinity (rujulah) is acquired, verified, and played out in the brave 
deed, in risk-taking, and in expressions of fearlessness and assertiveness. It 
is attained by constant vigilance and willingness to defend honor (sharaf), 
face (wajh), kin, and community from external aggression and to uphold and 
protect cultural definitions of gender-specific propriety.  
     These accounts of manhood, rooted mainly in lack of fear and ability to protect self and 
community, hint at how refugee males may perceive and internalize powerlessness, victimhood, 
and vulnerability during the journey partly as assaults on their masculinity and manhood. The 
stories in this dissertation indicate that experiences of violence early in wartime may feel like an 
assault on their masculinity. Violent and precarious conditions humiliate and devalue men (and 
women), diminishing their ability to protect themselves, their families, and their communities. 
This shift became particularly intense in cases of detention and torture, as with Fares, who shared 
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his feelings with me about the hesitation he felt during his first intimate meeting with his wife 
after his release. His words reflected his concerns about his positionality as a husband and a man. 
I revisit Fares’s words here, as they reflect the humiliation he felt for being subject to torture and 
unable to protect himself. But, most important, he doubted his ability to regain his wife’s respect:  
What should I show her? The blisters of my skin, the cigarette burns on my 
legs, on my back, and on other parts of my body? She is too young to 
understand this … How could I describe the humiliation I experienced in 
prison? Would she still see me as the man who could protect her from the 
whole world? Would she still be able to respect me? (Fares, Stockholm, July 
2016) 
     The sometimes-extreme violence and precarity during their journey may further shake 
refugees’ perceptions about their fearlessness. The stories in chapter four show refugees, at 
certain points, unable to defend their families from “external aggressions” by smugglers, police, 
and border security. Wassim and his family’s story -- travel together to Egypt and then separate 
and perilous journeys to Europe -- provides a profound case of such conditions. Wassim 
experienced various forms of humiliation at the Egyptian police station while seeking his son 
Shadi’s release. Wassim felt powerless as he was forced to silently watch police officers harass 
his wife: “My wife was sexual harassed in front of me while I kept silent. I used to cry every day. 
I could not control my tears while I was standing there” (Wassim, Stockholm, July 2016). 
Wassim’s broken voice here reminds us how the trauma shattered his perception of himself as a 
husband and as a man.  
     The stories also demonstrate how encounters with smugglers restricted refugees’ ability to 
protect selves and families. Refugees using the Libyan route received the worst treatment. Fares 
recalled the gathering house in Zuwara: 
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The smugglers treated us like dogs. We were all stressed, and we started 
fighting with each other. The wives were mad and started fighting with their 
husbands, blaming them for the conditions we ended up at. They questioned 
our decisions and called us criminals. Except for my wife. She was silent all 
the time. She did not express her emotions, but I could feel that she was dead 
inside. She was dead … (Fares, Stockholm, July 2016) 
     Fares’s words show how smugglers’ brutality could cause family and group conflicts and 
further undermine refugees’ roles and positionality. As happened to other refugees, this brutality 
and uncertainty continued throughout the journey. Refugees faced countless moments of 
constrained agency, unable to act or to respond to threats. Men who value brave deeds and risk-
taking lost their roles as protectors when they could not look after their families while at the 
mercy of armed smugglers or during nightmarish experiences at sea. Upon arrival at EU ports, 
refugees also could not prevent their families from being treated as carriers of disease and filth. 
The stories show how such instances of powerlessness scarred refugees and undermined their 
positionalities as they failed to protect selves and families.  
     Yet these stories also reveal moments of accomplishment and self-assertion. In fact, refugees’ 
journeys may involve multiple moments of agency where they act fearlessly and create their own 
spaces and trajectories (Squire, 2017). I discussed the notion of agency in previous chapters and 
pointed it out in refugees’ decisions to leave despite their desire to stay or, at the very least, 
remain close to home. By leaving, they challenge their own feelings and risk their own and their 
families’ lives by setting out on journeys towards foreign destinations in an atmosphere of 
violence and precarity. Yet, and as I explained in the previous chapters, many of these moments 
of agency are, in fact, acts of survival.  Ammar, Rami, Khaled, and Fares’s words in chapter four 
reveal that they had no intention of acting politically but rather sought desperately to continue 
their journeys towards their intended destinations. To accomplish their goals, they had to create 
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their own trajectories through the disastrous conditions of the journey. Accordingly, and as I 
argued above, these performances of agency are acts of self-assertiveness that need examination 
apart from the notions of intentionality and free choice. 
Loss of Provider’s Role 
     The examples above indicate the extent to which many refugees experience social 
transformations during the journey that affect their self-awareness, roles, and positionalities 
within their families. But at their destinations, refugees experience another transformation, in 
losing their roles as providers. Refugees who arrive in EU states as asylum seekers take on a 
long, frustrating asylum process that lasts months, even years. During this period, refugees may 
not work and have to depend on the welfare system in their new communities, leaving them poor 
and dependent. They stop being breadwinners and providers (Heelsum, 2017; Moztic, 2018).  
     The impact of this loss is particularly intense for middle-class refugees with high academic 
credentials. Not only are they illegal, but their new country may not recognize their professional 
credentials. After surviving the journey, and despite feeling safe in Europe, many professional 
refugees cannot acquire the social acceptance they aimed for when they decided to leave their 
home regions. In her work on forced migration and uprootedness, Elizabeth Colson (2003: 8) 
observes: 
Since people define themselves in terms of the roles they play and it is thus 
that they are evaluated and valued, the loss of role structures means that they 
cannot know who they are or who anyone else is until new roles are 
constructed and people assigned to them. It takes time to assess the loss of 
old roles or their transformation.  
203 
 
     The shift in positionality due to loss of role  still attracts little interest in the refugee literature, 
despite some recent studies about highly skilled refugees in Europe (Heelsum 2017; Mozetic 
2018; Pietka-Nykaza 2015; Smyth and Kum 2010; Valenta and Thorshaug 2012). Anja van 
Heelsum (2017), for example, investigates the aspirations and frustrations of refugees who 
arrived in the Netherlands during 2015-16: “Refugees very much aspire to work and become a 
full member of the local community but are not allowed to work and live isolated in refugee 
shelters. Even though the Syrians are often better educated and seem better prepared for life in 
the Netherlands, they experience many obstructions” (2017: 2148).  
     In the UK, Emilia Pietka-Nykaza explores refugee doctors and teachers’ perspectives on re-
entering their professions  (2015) and notes generally:  “Studies into refugee experiences in the 
labor market show that refugees are one of the most disadvantaged groups when compared to 
other ethnic minority groups or to the indigenous local population” (2015: 525). Her findings 
confirm what I heard from professional refugees I interviewed in Sweden about institutional 
barriers that exclude professional refugees from resuming their professions, thus changing their 
positionality and role within their families and their new communities. These barriers include 
their need to master professional language and their wait for verification of their qualifications. 
Pietka-Nykaza explains, “Assessment and accreditation of refugee doctors’ and teachers’ 
overseas qualifications represent an example of institutional barriers, as refugees’ professional 
qualifications and work experience are not recognized as equivalent to the UK standards” (2015: 
525). Pierka-Nykaza summarizes the major impediments for refugee professionals: “Experiences 
of forced exile, restrictions attached to the legal status of asylum seeker, labels attached to 
refugee status and lack of accreditations of pre-migration qualifications and work experience 
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have an impact on resources and choices available to refugees to re-enter their professions” 
(2015: 526).  
     In her work on highly skilled refugees in Sweden, Katarina Mozetic (2018) focuses on 
refugee doctors’ self-perceptions and identity formation. Mozetic differentiates between self-
identification and others’ categorization of this group and notes that “refugee” is a form of 
institutional categorization imposed on them that does not reflect their identities as professional 
doctors:  
Their profession is positively connoted and seen as a source of strength. It 
means providing for oneself while at the same time actively contributing to 
society. Being a refugee is, on the other hand, burdened with negativity. It is 
therefore a term that they reluctantly use in relation to themselves. Instead, 
“refugee” is a label that is appointed to them. (Mozetic, 2018: 249) 
    This argument speaks to Colson’s observation: “Self-definitions derived from work are at risk 
when professional skills are ignored in a resettlement area or camp or they [refugees] are denied 
the right to practice or work in old occupations as immigrants” (2003: 10).  
     The experience of many refugees I interviewed in Sweden confirms these analyses of 
professionals in a new land. During my field research, I met with many of them, including 
doctors and engineers, who were shocked by the requirements of the Swedish job market, 
especially as it did not recognize their academic and professional credentials and years of 
experience. Most of them were deeply depressed and frustrated by their marginalized social 
positions, as they lost their former roles of providers and sense of accomplishment. Most felt 
unable to maintain their roles within their families and in their new localities. For many, this 
frustration meant their journey had not ended, since they did not receive the acceptance for 
which they had aimed when they left Syria. This condition was particularly painful for refugees 
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in their fifties or older, who were already struggling to master basic Swedish -- the first step in 
the long and complicated process of seeking academic recognition. Such depressing 
circumstances pushed a doctor from the Yarmouk area, who owned and managed a well-known 
medical center there, to describe his journey and his more than five years in Sweden as “a total 
disaster.”  
    Through such social marginalization and loss of role, refugees become a “disposable 
commodity,” or, as Khosravi (2011: 3) puts it, “Sent back and forth between sovereign states, 
humiliated, and represented as polluted and polluting bodies, stateless asylum seekers and 
irregular migrants are excluded and become the detritus of humanity, leading wasted lives.” 
While these refugees’ inability to integrate into their new localities relates to the discussion of 
positionality transformation in Europe and elsewhere, it is beyond the scope of this dissertation.  
Positionality of Refugee Women 
     During their journeys, refugee women have their own moments of transformation and agency. 
Like male refugees, they are subject to various forms of violence and precarity, and as I 
explained above, they experience transformation through their multiple positionalities as 
mothers, wives, or sisters. The stories of Jenna, Qamar, Rajaa, Rana, Rasha, and Safieh, 
discussed above, show how the violence and insecurities during wartime and throughout the 
journey transformed the lives of these refugee women. They left their homes out of fear and 
desperation for their own and their families’ lives. They undertook precarious journeys with their 
families, where many of them experienced intense vulnerability and victimhood. The 
transformations are particularly intense when women journey with their children but not their 
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spouses. Their positionality as mothers, focusing around their role as caregivers, expands to 
include main decision makers and only protectors of their children during the difficult journey.  
     The story of Rasha, the young widow who journeyed to Sweden with her three children, 
presents a superb example. During their perilous 23-day journey, she was the only guardian for 
her youngsters:  “It is not their fault that I am suffering. I brought them to this world, and I 
should be responsible for them” (Rasha, Laxå, Sweden, July 2016). Rasha made her journey in 
October 2015, the month of one of Europe’s highest rates of refugee arrivals (Reuters, 2015). 
She and her children trekked the Balkan route together with a massive group of about 4,000 
refugees. In addition to the humiliating treatment at borders and camps, Rasha worried about her 
children’s safety, and particularly her own and her daughter’s. Rasha was not able to sleep for 
much of the journey: 
I do not know how I managed and from where I got my strength. But I recall 
that the tears in my youngsters’ eyes pushed me to stay strong and to continue 
… I was supposed to be strong for them … They saw life through me, and I 
had to be strong for them … I used to talk to them about tomorrow and about 
the things that we will do together when we arrive … I used to tell them that 
they will sleep peacefully and will not be scared any more. I used to promise 
them with a new, good life. That was their hope, and therefore I had to be 
strong. I had no other choice. (Rasha, Laxå, Sweden, July 2016) 
     As with Safieh, reaching Sweden did not end Rasha’s anxiety. After their fraught journey, the 
four of them reached Malmö in November 2015:  
When I arrived there, I collapsed … I could not believe that we have made it 
to safety. I kept wondering, so that was it. Can we now relax after all these 
years of war and after such a journey where we experienced cold, hunger, and 
humiliation? (Rasha, Laxå, Sweden, July 2016) 
     Rasha and her children were sent to a reception center in Hasselfors, six hours’ drive north of 
Malmö. They found themselves in a basketball stadium, full of mattresses, with no dividing 
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walls or even curtains, so no privacy.20 They stayed there for more than five weeks, surrounded 
by hundreds of men of different nationalities: 
During that period, I used to sit at a corner and cry … I could not do anything. 
That was the moment when I had a deep regret for making the journey. I felt 
that I did not deserve all this humiliation … I kept asking myself, why should 
I be treated like this? Was it because I am Syrian? Was that a crime? I did 
not choose my nationality. I did not choose my fate. It was not my fault that 
my country went through a war … It was not my fault. (Rasha, Laxå, 
Sweden, July 2016) 
     Despite her deep frustration and regret, Rasha was able to summarize what other refugees 
have shared with me about why they made such a journey. She ended her interview by stating: 
I do not want anything for me … I do not want a citizenship. I do not want a 
luxurious life … I do not want any of this. All I want is to give my children 
a chance to live and achieve their dreams … I am here only for them and 
because of them … I am here so their dream can come true. (Rasha, Laxå, 
Sweden, July 2016) 
     Hania, a Palestinian mother from Syria who journeyed to Sweden with her six children, 
shared a similar sense of responsibility. Her husband had already landed in Sweden, but she 
could not wait for family reunification, so she decided to travel with her children through Turkey 
and the Balkan route in 2015. Because of her limited finances and large family, her journey was 
more difficult and precarious than other interviewees’. Many smugglers refused to assist her, and 
the ones who did were manipulative and deceptive. At the Hungarian border, the seven were 
detained, like thousands of other refugees. Hania was determined to reach Sweden but, to avoid 
ending up in Germany, had to evade fingerprinting by Hungarian police. She  could not afford  
being smuggled through the country’s border, so paid  €60 for someone  in the camp at the 
                                                          
20  Although any woman would find such treatment humiliating [as would men], refugees in general are often 
criticized for raising such “unnecessary” complaints. This complaint is rooted in the dominant representation of 
refugees as “others” who should be grateful for whatever they have been offered (Nayeri, 2017).  
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Hungarian-German border to  scrape her bodily fingerprints with a sharp rasp and then burn 
them repeatedly with a heated iron rod and obliterate them. When I asked her about the process 
and how painful it was, she explained that she would do anything to get her children safely to 
Sweden. As we finished her interview, Hania expressed great satisfaction and pride: “At the end, 
I did everything by myself. My husband did not face any of the difficulties I had during my 
journey. He travelled by himself where he crossed to Greece and flew from Athens with no 
children” (Hania, Laxå, July 2016). This sense of accomplishment and assertiveness, however, 
clearly came at a very high price.  
     During my interviews, I met with a number of mothers who, at some point on their journey, 
had to send children ahead to Sweden with smugglers. Most became stranded at certain points. 
For example, Rana, who crossed from Turkey to Greece with her mother and her ten-year-old 
son, was separated from her mother during the journey and was stranded for months in Athens. 
All the smugglers she dealt with told her she could not continue the journey with her son. Thus 
she chose to send him with a smuggling network to family friends in Copenhagen. The friends 
then sent him to another family in Sweden, where he waited for her. Rana explained her 
decision: 
I was so scared and nervous about the whole thing. I had a fight with my 
husband, who was against the idea of sending our son with these people ... 
He was far away from the stress that I was going through. He looked at things 
differently. Whereas I was very hesitant but also very desperate.  I was so 
afraid but, at the same time, I was desperate to get out of Greece. I was 
trapped. My husband asked me for guarantees. He told me that he needed to 
know the lady who is taking our son, but I did not have any guarantees. How 
could I provide him with guarantees? Should I go to the police and tell them 
about the lady who is taking my son with her? ... See what I have done? I left 
a son in Erbil and I sent the other with a smuggler to Copenhagen. (Rana, 
Stockholm, July 2016) 
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      Rana’s tears at this point of the interview reflected the regret, pain, and shame she 
internalized as a mother for leaving one son at home and sending the other with smugglers to 
Copenhagen. Through her tears, Rana explained how smugglers instructed her son how to lie 
about his identity and how to behave: 
They taught him about his [new] Greek name and his new family during the 
journey to Copenhagen. They told him that the lady was his mom and the 
other girl was his sister. They also told him about how to behave at the airport 
in case he was asked anything by the security officers. They told him to smile 
and to act as if he was shy. (Rana, Stockholm, July 2016)  
     To add to her distress, Rana was stranded in Greece for six weeks after he left. This period 
was hard on her son: 
First, he was happy in Copenhagen, but he started to get emotionally stressed. 
He used to ask me [on phone] to come to him every day. He did not expect 
that I will be away from him for that long period. Our friend did not tell me 
about his emotional problems at the time. She told about everything later 
when I arrived in Sweden. She did not tell me that she used to find him in the 
living room at the middle of the night crying. (Rana, Stockholm, July 2016) 
     As I explained in chapter three, Sweden did not end her journey, as she still awaited her 
husband and their other son.  
     I heard similar stories from other mothers who were stranded in Greece who did the same as 
Rana. Jenna and her husband, Karam, are Palestinian refugees from Syria who travelled to 
Turkey with their three children and crossed into Greece in October 2013. Their plan was to fly 
from Athens to Sweden, but they ended up stranded. After several failed attempts at the airport, 
they decided to hire smugglers to take their oldest son, who was 8, to Sweden. Jenna told me 
about her concerns and fears: 
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He departed Athens on December 27, and it took him one day to reach 
Sweden, but we felt it was like hundreds of years. It has been a long time 
since that date, but we are still confused and unable to understand how we 
dared to take that decision and to send him by himself. But life is cruel, and 
we often have to take decisions that are as hard as death. Sending our son to 
Sweden was better than keeping him in Greece, where we were suffering 
from hunger and desperation. He used to cry every time we called him. He 
missed us a lot, and we missed him too … We felt like dying. (Jenna, 
Hässleholm, Sweden, June 2016)  
     Later, the couple sent their daughter, who was 9, to Italy and then to Sweden through 
Denmark with the help of another smuggling group. Jenna recalled that their daughter’s trip was 
long and hard, as she was travelling with a Romanian family who did not speak Arabic, so 
communication was impossible. Jenna and her youngest child were able to cross as tourists from 
Greece into Italy. On 2 January 2014, they arrived in Sweden, where she was reunited with her 
other two children. Six weeks later, Karam left Greece on a truck, hiding between large slabs of 
marble, crossed to Italy, and proceeded to Sweden. He rejoined his family after a journey of 
about six months.  
     As their words make clear, the shift in mothers’ positionality in these stories intertwined with 
their deep guilt and shame over their children’s risky journey. These sentiments reflected 
changes in their role as mothers, protecting their children and teaching them about values.  Their 
handing their offspring to smugglers undermined these roles.  
     Encounters with smugglers clearly render refugees’ situations more precarious, but refugee 
women feel particularly vulnerable. For example, the transfers from the small dinghies to the 
larger fishing vessels in Egypt and Libya were difficult for all refugees, but especially for 
women, being pushed and grabbed by strange men in the dark sea. These often-traumatic events 
harmed many of them emotionally and physically and could end tragically, as the following story 
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indicates. My prime source for it is a family friend whom I trust and who personally journeyed to 
Sweden through Egypt. I was not, however, able to verify it from other sources because of its 
sensitivity and lack of documentation.  
     In the summer of 2013, Egyptian smugglers took 250 Syrian and Palestinian refugees, 
including 40 women, to a gathering point on the coast near Alexandria. They separated the men 
and women and took the men and the older children to a fishing vessel in the sea. The women 
and the remaining children, 5 and younger, were taken in small boats to a tiny, uninhabited 
island, 35 miles (22 km) from the shore. There, the smugglers took the money and the gold from 
the women, raped most of them, abandoned them on the island, and informed the coast guard of 
their presence. The coast guard arrested the women and children and detained them for more 
than 40 days in a police station in Alexandria. The women were released but not deported back 
to Syria, because the ministry of interior was keen to avoid possible public outrage. As the events 
unfolded, the men of the group were on their way to Italy and remained unaware of the tragedy. 
     These disturbing details remind us of the shocking violence and brutality some refugees 
experience en route, shattering their perceptions of selves and lives. Such journeys may result in 
deaths, which shake up survivors’ lives. The story of Rahma, a young Palestinian mother from 
Syria, is telling. Rahma was pregnant when she made her journey from Syria to Turkey, hoping 
to reach Sweden with her three-year-old son. She and the boy were boarding a rubber boat 
(balam) and crossing to Greece when a ship hit them. The balam broke into two pieces, and a 
number of refugees went missing, including Rahma’s son.  
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     I met Rahma in Hässleholm, Sweden, three years later, and she was still looking for her son. 
She described that horrible night: 
After one hour of our departure towards the Greek island, our rubber boat was 
hit by a big ship, and it went into two pieces. I became unconscious, but I 
remember having my son in my lap at that moment. When they rescued us, I 
was cold and blue, so they thought that I was dead. They put me with the dead 
bodies until someone discovered that I was still alive. When I woke up, I 
could not remember anything. I forgot my name, I forgot that I was pregnant, 
and I forgot that my son was with me. I was not able to talk. I was extremely 
dehydrated … Later on, I discovered that my son was not rescued and his 
body was not found at the shore. They took us to a prison while I was 
screaming and crying that my son is lost … No one paid attention to me. 
(Rahma, Hässleholm, Sweden, June 2016)  
     Rahma told me that she is convinced that one of the families on the boat rescued her son. But 
she wept as she explained: “It was too dark at the gathering point. I was not able to see a thing. I 
was not able to see the face of my son … It was too dark … too dark” (Rahma, Hässleholm, 
Sweden, June 2016). Rahma’s words and tears capture the trauma affecting many refugees, their 
lives unraveled by the loss of loved ones en route and by their inability to find their bodies or 
trace their fates. When Rahma showed me her son’s photograph, I could comprehend her 
despair. The look in his eyes was calling for a rescue. The picture brought to mind Jenny 
Edkins’s work on missing persons: 
The line between presence and absence cannot be drawn clearly, certainly not 
for some time for those whose relatives or friends cannot be found after a 
disaster, and maybe not at all for any of us. Photographs are interesting in this 
context. A photograph appears to record a moment that has inevitably passed, 
but in itself, as a photograph, it is equally clearly present. The eyes in the 
photograph still gaze determinedly directly at us, undaunted by the 
impossibility of the look. The photograph “is” the person. (Edkins 2011: 16) 
     Similar horrors have been occurring on the shores of Europe and other global frontiers. We 
can trace them through the thousands of bodies of those who did not survive the perilous journey 
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in the seas and are found washed up along the shores or left inside the sunken boats. The world-
famous picture of Alan Kurdi, the three-year old Syrian boy whose body was found washed up 
along the shore of Turkey in September 2015, captured one of the thousands of tragic events that 
reflect the high human cost of refugees’ journeys. These harrowing events are also relived in the 
stories of the survivors, who relive their painful memories through their transformed lives. After 
this nightmarish incident, Rahma crossed to Greece after many failed attempts and continued her 
journey to Sweden, where she delivered a baby girl. Her resilience and determination as a young 
mother were remarkable, especially given her haunting uncertainty about her son’s fate.   
Transforming of Refugee Identity 
     The transformed positionalities of refugees, as we saw in the previous section, intertwine 
closely with changes to their identity. Malkki (1992: 37) observes: “Identity is always mobile 
and processual, partly self-construction, partly categorization by others, partly a condition, a 
status, a label, a weapon, a shield, a fund of memories, et cetera.” Malkki captures the fluidity of 
refugees’ identity as their shifting internal identification of self combines with outsiders’ 
(re)categorization of them. The stories in this dissertation speak to this understanding and show 
how refugees’ notion of what it means to be a refugee – or refugeeness – keeps altering during 
their journeys. In times of war, refugees go from being citizens or residents of their home 
countries into displaced individuals who strive for protection elsewhere. The absence of this 
protection in their home communities and neighboring countries pushes refugees to undertake 
journeys to destinations beyond their regions. Their  journeys are often difficult, as this 
dissertation details, and render them illegal subjects, whom authorities punish and criminalize for 
challenging the structures of control represented by the sovereign regime of borders (Schuster, 
2011; Vaughan-Williams, 2015) ). Along with this process, refugees’ decisions and actions 
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transform them from powerless victims to political actors who may display substantial agency 
and perhaps create their own paths to safety and protection (Scheel and Squire, 2014). On 
reaching their destinations, refugees become asylum seekers who claim the right of protection 
through temporary or permanent residency. Many become citizens of their new countries.  
     Through their words, I have shown how refugees negotiate, even shape, their complex new 
identity, starting with their initial act of leaving and then in their choices of routes and 
destinations. Yet the decision to leave often produces emotional scars that last through their exile 
and in turn influence their perceptions of self, home, and belonging -- intimate parts of their 
identity. Colson (2003: 15) argues that the scars of displacement disrupt refugees’ memory and 
stay with them even after the war in their countries ends. She notes, “Whatever the outcome, 
people resent uprooting, find it traumatic, and in the long run look back in grief and with an 
anger that lasts longer than the war or the dam that forced them out.” For refugees who feel 
compelled to undertake journeys towards foreign destinations in search of protection, their 
precarious journeys heighten their sense of grievance. When they add the journey’s fear, 
exhaustion, anxiety, humiliation, and confusion to their sense of uprootedness, all that pressure 
may shatter and perhaps reconfigure their identity.  
     Qamar journeyed to Sweden with her husband and five children, and she summed it up, “We 
were kings in our country. Here we are just beggars” (Qamar, Stockholm, July 2016). Karam, 
who went to Sweden with his wife and three children, expressed similar sentiments: 
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It breaks my heart that back home we had everything and now we became 
refugees who have nothing and who are starting from scratch. (Karam, 
Hässleholm, Sweden, June 2016) 
     The words of Qamar and Karam reflect refugeeness as degradation, poverty, and dependence, 
disconnected from the past. In his reflection on exile, Edward Said (2000: 173) portrays such a 
state: 
Exile is strangely compelling to think about but terrible to experience. It is 
the unhealable rift forced between a human being and a native place, between 
the self and its true home: its essential sadness can never be surmounted … 
The achievements of exile are permanently undermined by the loss of 
something left behind forever.  
     Said, however, differentiates between exile as an emotional state of loneliness and isolation, 
and the narrow political definition of “refugee,” a legal term in international conventions on 
refugees and protection, which we met in chapter one. Khosravi points to the same limitations of 
the political definition: 
To have a chance of getting refugee status, one must have the ability to 
translate one’s life story into Eurocentric juridical language and to perform 
the role expected of a refugee … Only those few who could ‘translate’ their 
local stories into Eurocentric judicial language had a chance. (Khosravi 
2011: 33-4)  
     So, in order to gain legal and political recognition as “protected refugees,” uprooted 
individuals, who have escaped war and survived displacement, have to undertake precarious 
journeys in search of acceptance and protection. They then must, in Khosravi’s view, translate 
their traumatic experiences into “Eurocentric” legal frameworks. Alexandria Innes frames this 
process in the “subjectivity of fear”: 
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Yet, the refugee definition establishes fear as part of the refugee identity – a 
subjective feeling. To assess whether someone feels the right kind of fear to 
be genuinely a refugee means subjecting that person’s narrative account to a 
positivist knowledge framework. The person’s own knowledge and 
experience fearing persecution is [sic] only recognized if it meets the 
established framework. (Innes 2016: 270) 
     Peter Nyers (2006: 12) also addresses the shortcomings of such legal frameworks: “The 
juridical definition of the refugee is less important than the pervasively shared cultural 
conception of what the experience of displacement – or “refugeeness” – involves.” The 
definition and the legal frameworks do not acknowledge the fear, exhaustion, anxiety, 
humiliation, and confusion that refugees experience during their search for protection, as I 
discussed above in this chapter. They fall short in front of refugees’ traumatic journeys and do 
not recognize the human cost refugees pay  to reach destinations that  accept them as “protected 
refugees” only after they meet certain legal and political criteria. 
     The transformative notion of refugee identity involves other forms of complexity presented 
by the re-formation of memory. Colson notes the tension between identity and memories in 
exile: “Resettlement does not wipe out memory, but rather provides a medium through which it 
is reworked, and the memory of shared experience of uprooting helps to create new forms of 
identity” (Colson 2003: 9). The relationship between identity re-formation and memory is 
profound in Palestinian refugees from Syria. Their new displacement during the Syrian war has 
reconceptualized their collective sense of identity, belonging, and loss (see chapter two), but the 
words of Issam, the Palestinian refugee from Syria, who travelled with his wife, Qamar, and their 
five children to Sweden through Egypt, reveal the personal significance of identity and memory:  
“The Swedish citizenship will not change us from Palestinians to Swedes. We will remain 
Palestinians, and we will always belong to our native roots” (Issam, Stockholm, June 2016).   
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     I explained above that Syrian refugees do not appear to share the same sentiments as 
Palestinians, since they have not yet re-mastered this collective sense of identity and belonging 
after their displacement. This is a result particularly of how the current conflict, often perceived 
as a civil war,21 has sharply divided their own communities. The hostility has destroyed Syrians’ 
common sense of identity and thus made them less able to share feelings of grievance and loss. I 
explained in chapter two that these divisions have increased the pain and vulnerability of the 
Syrian experience in exile.  
     In addition to memory formation, the change in refugee identity also influences refugees’ 
perceptions of place and home. Khosravi addresses the “multi-place” identity of people in exile:  
Exile is when you live in one place and dream in another … A life in exile is 
like being condemned to purgatory, a state between life and death, a limbo 
between here and there … In exile, the past exists side by side with the present 
… Exile is only parenthetic of life, though it lasts and lasts, though I know 
return is only a myth, a never-to-be-realized dream, though I know there is no 
home to go back to. Even though the house is there, the home is gone. I am 
not the same person … However, the dream keeps me hoping. It liberates me 
from the unbearable burden of alienhood. (2011: 74) 
     Khosravi understands the illusion of return as a survival tool in the midst of uprootedness. 
Yet, for most of the refugees I interviewed, the house is no longer there. By losing their houses, 
these refugees have also lost the dream of return. The illusion of return cannot help them through 
the alienation of their exile. In her work on the meaning of home for Palestinian families, Bree 
                                                          
21  Many commentators see the Syrian war as a regional sectarian conflict pitting Sunni Muslims, supported by 
Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey, against Alawites and other minorities, supported by Iran. Others perceive it as a 
proxy war between the United States and Russia. Yet another group considers it a civil war between the Syrian 
governments, with its supporters, against its opponents. Regardless of the adopted narrative, I believe that the 
ultimate result of the war is the destruction of the country and the sharp divisions between its own people. 
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Akesson (2014) explores the impact of losing home on families and children in the occupied 
Palestinian territories. She frames this loss as a loss of right and explains that, for Palestinians, 
“when a home is destroyed, the physical structure is lost in addition to the entire emotional 
essence of home, including aspects of centeredness and self-identity” (Akesson, 2014: 17). Yet, 
she notices that such loss contributes to the formation of Palestinians’ collective identity, 
particularly for residents of Palestinian refugee camps, who “identify with their villages and 
towns of origin even if they have lived in exile for two or three generations” (ibid.).  
     This connection between forming identity and losing one’s home is experienced by 
Palestinian refugees from Yarmouk. In chapter two I explained that most of Yarmouk’s 
inhabitants had to leave their homes in December 2012 and have been prevented from returning. 
A military operation in April 2018 destroyed much of the district and reduced most of its 
buildings to rubble. The loss of Yarmouk has felt tragic to all of its people, both those who 
remained in Syria and those who left. For those who made the journey to Europe, the loss has 
complicated their perceptions of identity and place (Colson, 2003). They have lost their second 
home, Yarmouk, after their people lost their first diasporic home, Palestine. They also lost the 
illusion of return that could have helped them in their exile. In this sense, “refugeeness” 
represents a state of being, because going home has become literally and physical impossible 
(Khosravi, 2011; Said, 2000). A friend of mine, who had a house there, mourned the loss of 
Yarmouk on his facebook page: 
Wind is what we are left with now … We stood in silence, watching in denial 
our massive loss. Our dreams are now lost … Our hearts are broken … Our 
childhood memories are scattered. Even in our worst nightmares, we could 
not imagine to see Yarmouk in rubbles [sic]. How lonely it was without its 
people. (facebook, 26 May 2018)  
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     These words capture the pain of loss, the sense of uprootedness, and the deep grievance I 
personally felt when I watched my own house in Yarmouk destroyed and looted. As the wife of a 
Palestinian refugee and a mother of two Palestinian children, and despite our Canadian 
citizenships, I now feel that we have been uprooted yet again. Our “multi-place” identity and our 
sense of belonging are more fragmented than at any time before, as we are Canadians with 
homes that have been lost in both Syria and Palestine. We are now the “Adam of two Edens,” as 
portrayed by Mahmoud Darwish, the popular Palestinian poet:  
I’m the Adam of two Edens lost to me twice. 
Expel me slowly. Kill me slowly. (Mahmoud Darwish, 2000) 
 
Conclusion 
     In this chapter I have discussed the emotional impact of the refugee journey on refugees’ own 
perceptions of themselves and others, and of life in general. I have explored some of the feelings 
that refugees often experience during their journeys in search of protection, including fear, 
exhaustion, anxiety, humiliation, and confusion. As in previous chapters, my work has drawn on 
the intimate expressions of individuals who have shared their stories with me. They have chosen 
to do so because they consider me a member of their own community who has also experienced 
a journey. In the second section of the chapter, I discussed the transformative impact of the 
journey on the positionality of refugees and examined the ambivalence of refugees’ roles within 
their families and communities. I examined these powerful elements at work in various phases of 
the journey and focused on refugees’ loss of role as protectors and providers. The experiences of 
professional and female refugees reflected vividly this emotional and life-altering impact of 
refugees’ journeys. Finally, I examined the reshaping of refugee identity and its impact on 
refugees’ re-formation of memory, perception of home, and sense of belonging. I focused on 
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Palestinian refugees from Yarmouk, who are reliving their statelessness during the current Syrian 
conflict.  
     The stories indicate that refugees’ decision to leave their home region for other places flows 
from their aim to move from invisibility, as victims of war and as marginalized, displaced 
persons, to social and political visibility, with protection, social acceptance, and better access to 
human rights. Many of the people with whom I spoke initially perceived the journey as such a 
passage, from rightlessness to a state of rights and protection. Yet, in the absence of legal and 
safe routes, and with restrictive border practices that deter refugees, their crossing may expose 
them to severe violence and precarity. They actually disappear again as illegal subjects who must 
avoid control, while experiencing intense fear, exhaustion, anxiety, confusion, and humiliation. 
The refugee journey thus becomes emotional, even shattering, and often traumatic. We see 
refugees arrive at their destinations with a heavy burden -- agonizing memories of loss and 
grievance as a result of the war they have fled. They also carry other forms of trauma from the 
journey itself. For this reason, and despite their moments of political agency en route, the often-
disastrous circumstances of their journeys radically unsettle their perceptions of role, identity, 
self, and life in general. These scars affect refugees’ ability to integrate within their new 
localities and mean that, for many, arrival there does not end their journey. Mountz (2017: 78) 
explains this long-lasting influence: “The trauma of displacement, migration, and detention 
travels well beyond the material infrastructure of detention, traversing space and time 
transcarcerally and transnationally in myriad ways.” Refugees’ journeys develop as intense 
emotional experiences that engender confusing alterations in positionality and identity, reflecting 
the appalling global crisis of protection and its high human cost. By examining the emotional toll 
and transformative impact of the refugee journey, I complete my analysis of this journey 
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according to the conceptual framework I proposed in chapter two. Informed by refugees’ stories 
and their real experiences during their search for protection, I showed how the refugee journey 
evolves as an act of survival and resistance that is messy and complex and has an intense 
emotional, even transformative impact on refugees’ lives and decisions.   
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Conclusion  
Research Overview 
     I began this dissertation by challenging the dominant official narrative in the global north  
about the events of 2015 in Europe. I proposed  that the arrival of more than one million refugees 
on the shores of Europe  reflected   not a “refugee crisis” or “migration crisis,” as some media 
outlets and  governments called it, but a global crisis of protection. This crisis of protection had 
been developing in the global south for years because  the international refugee regime have 
failed dramatically to  protect refugees and because many governments  in the global north have 
wilfully neglected, even renounced  their international commitments towards refugees. I argued 
strongly that this regime failure and countries’ reluctance to resettle refugees have forced many 
refugees, who are escaping war but not finding sufficient protection in their home regions, to 
think of journeying elsewhere to secure their safety and rights. Such decisions and actions, 
however, often take place under precarious conditions, because many governments in the global 
north have sought to contain refugees in their home regions and deter their entry to the global 
north. Such practices exponentially increase the human cost of border crossing, where many 
refugees’ journeys end sadly, even tragically.  
     Many survivors of the often-harrowing   journey reach their intended destinations bearing a 
weighty burden of painful, sometimes-traumatic memories and grievances that shatter their 
identities and deeply affect their lives in their new localities. To examine this crisis of protection 
further, I explored in this dissertation these three core questions:   
- Why is this a crisis of protection, not of migration? 
- How and why did this crisis develop in the shadow of the international refugee regime? 
- How does the refugee journey actually reflect and pay the human cost of this crisis?      
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     To answer these crucial and intertwined questions, I examined in chapter one the nature of the 
crisis and outlined many states’ perspectives on governing refugees. I showed how the 
limitations of the international refugee regime have allowed this crisis of protection to occur at 
such an intense scale. I illustrated the links between this crisis and the reluctance of many 
governments in the global north to honour their international commitments to refugees and hence 
to protecting refugees. I then examined how these states seek to contain and deter refugees from 
the global south. I showed how such practices have actually altered the norms and practices of 
protection, as outlined in the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees.  
     In chapters two to five, I shifted my approach and added further complexities to this study by 
showing how the regime of protection looks from the ground up -- from the perspectives of the 
people most affected:  refugees, specifically those from Syria. To do so, in chapters two to five,   
I positioned refugees as my prime source of knowledge, which flows from their decisions to 
leave their war-tron homeland and then their region, to journey to Europe in search of protection. 
My aim in so  doing  was to let refugees reveal, through their actual stories, how the failing 
protection regime and governments’ efforts to contain  and deter refugees scar  them en route to 
Europe where they hope, a better, safer life there. I hoped thereby to shift the focus from policy 
to real people, who are often invisible in international policy  making. I did so through the lens of 
the Syrian refugee crisis, especially through the refugees’ journeys to Sweden. I added the 
discussion of Palestinian refugees, whose families have lived in displacement in Syria since 
1948. Because they are stateless, these refugees experienced severe discrimination and 
vulnerability during their new displacement in neighbouring countries, especially Lebanon, 
Turkey, Jordan, and Egypt and during their later journeys towards Europe.  
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      This dissertation has explored the predicament of refugees from Syria and illustrated the 
impact of  regional and international responses to the Syrian crisis on their legal status and  
living conditions outside Syria. I situated their individual travails within the context of the global 
crisis of protection, as I showed how containment and deterrence by the global north dominated 
international responses to the crisis, rendering people in the global south more precarious as they 
travelled illegally in search of safety. Such policies included chronic shortfalls in international 
humanitarian aid and in official resettlement, which led to inadequate protection, dramatically 
worsening conditions of displacement within the region and forcing refugees to look for 
destinations elsewhere.  
     I examined these conditions through refugees’ stories of their escape from the war in Syria 
and their displacement in  neighbouring countries (both stages in chapter three)  and through 
their journeys beyond in search of protection (chapter four). By following the storylines of 
refugees, I examined their journeys on three main  routes to Europe: by sea from Egypt to Italy;  
by sea from Turkey to Greece, and on to  Sweden by air or via the western Balkan corridor; and  
by sea from Libya to Italy.  
     Through their stories, I showed how refugees’ journeys developed in response to this global 
crisis of protection, which none the less reveal their often-striking abilities to navigate and 
survive this crisis. Their decision to head out like this reveals their political agency as they push 
back against the harrowing conditions first of war and then of displacement. Their stories reveal 
the strong agency often required in such journeys, especially under such precarious conditions. 
The stories I have narrated make visible refugees’ agency as they create unexpected scripts and 
trajectories, often despite their wishes or intentions. Many refugees tried to avoid leaving their 
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homes in Syria:  Khaled, for instance, feared displacement like that of his parents, who lost their 
home in Palestine in 1948 and became stateless refugees in Syria. Khaled finally left his home in 
Daraa as security conditions in his area deteriorated, and particularly after security forces 
attacked him.  
     The stories also showed that many refugees attempted to establish new lives in their new 
localities in the region. They had no intention to travel to Europe, and only the tough conditions 
of displacement changed their minds. Wassim, for example, who escaped to Egypt with his wife, 
Rajaa, and their sons, established a new business there, but hostility against Palestinian refugees 
after 2013 led them to leave. Fares too did not want to leave Syria but finally did so, with his 
wife and son, to avoid another detention that might have resulted in his death. Fares tried to start 
a new life in Libya, but the intensified fighting and extreme insecurity there finally forced his 
hand, and they made a dangerous journey towards Europe and ended up in Sweden. 
     Stories such as these show how refugees exert agency despite the violence and constraints 
that shape their decisions and actions throughout the journey. The stories reflect the 
unpredictability and messiness of many journeys, with their  multiple moments of departure, 
stillness, and immobility (see chapter four). Many journeys unfolded as a set of chaotic loops and 
non-linear movements, but sometimes with tragic ends. Their stories showed how  such intense 
experiences might lead to fear, exhaustion, anxiety,  humiliation, and/or confusion,  which 
dramatically transform their notions of identity, self, and positionality, and hence  their 
perceptions of home, belonging, and life in general.  
     Informed by these stories and by my personal experience of exile and uprootedness, I 
developed a conceptual framework for the refugee journey (chapter two). My aim was to 
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contribute to scholarly debates about the crisis of protection and refugees’ predicament during 
their search for protection. My approach engaged meaningfully with refugees’ actual 
experiences, as I had proposed, and showed the journey itself to consist of three under-
researched elements. It proved to be   
- an act of resistance and survival that demonstrates refugees’  vulnerability, and  agency,  
in escape and displacement (chapter three) 
- a non-linear messy, complex, and precarious passage towards protection (chapter four) 
- an emotional and transformative  process that reshapes positionality and identity  (chapter 
five) 
     This framework articulates the journey through reconceptualised notions of the crisis, borders, 
protection, and refuge. It engages significantly with refugees’ stories and examines their 
decisions and actions, which reflect high degrees of agency intertwined with extreme precarity. It 
thereby challenges dominant narratives about refugees as powerless victims or as potential 
threats when they approach the global north. Instead, it represents refugees as real individuals 
who resist the inhumane conditions of war and displacement by undertaking complex and messy 
journeys towards foreign destinations. The framework examines particularly the emotional toll of 
such journeys and illustrates its shattering effects on refugees, many of whom reach  their 
destinations bearing  a heavy burden of fear, exhaustion, anxiety, humiliation, and confusion,  
which influences their sense of  belonging and  their  integration  into their new localities.  
Lessons Learned and the Way Forward 
     This understanding of refugees’ journeys is fundamental and crucial as the world’s attention 
shifts from refugees’ crises, including that of refugees from Syria, while the crisis of protection 
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still rages and haunts the lives of those who strive for safety and a better life. During 2017, 
arrivals in Europe via the eastern Mediterranean decreased by 92 per cent vis-à-vis 2016 
(UNHCR, 2018). This sharp drop took place while numbers of refugees from Syria increased by 
14 per cent during 2017, reaching a total of 6.3 million (ibid.), as the war continued. Moreover, 
Syrian refugees’ conditions remain highly vulnerable and precarious in neighbouring lands. 
Those who wish to travel to Europe face harsher deterrence and containment. According to the 
EU-Turkey deal of 2016, refugees who reach Greece from Turkey are now contained -- gathered 
in overcrowded reception centers on the Greek islands (UNHCR, 2018). Médecins sans 
frontières (MSF) reported multiple cases of self-harm and attempts at suicide among child 
refugees at Moria camp on  Lesvos, where more than 9,000 people  were trapped for months 
(and some even for years), living in terrible conditions, without any idea about their destiny 
(MSF, 2018b). The crisis continues on the central Mediterranean route as well. European Union 
(EU) governments such as Italy and Malta’s blocked humanitarian organizations at sea and 
accused rescue teams of trafficking in humans. In June 2018, the far-right Italian government 
withdrew from search-and-rescue operations and started refusing disembarkation to commercial 
and NGO vessels carrying rescued refugees (Amnesty International, 2018). According to MSF 
(2018a), such practices result in more drownings, as people are left stranded in unseaworthy 
boats in the international waters between Italy, Malta, and Libya.  Karline Kleijer, the MSF head 
of emergencies, described these decisions as “outrageous and unacceptable” and noted:  “The 
European political decisions that have been taken during the past weeks have had deadly 
consequences. There has been a cold-blooded decision to leave men, women and children to 
drown in the Mediterranean Sea” (MSF, 2018a).  UNHCR goodwill ambassador and prominent 
writer Khaled Hosseini (2018: 3) pleads, “Where is the outrage, one wonders? Are we growing 
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numb to the loss of human life? Or, maybe, numbers are to blame. Perhaps we are inspired to act 
by a single tragedy, while, paradoxically, larger-scale human suffering registers as abstraction.”  
Refugees’ stories, he insists, can challenge such indifference and numbness:  “Stories are the best 
antidote to the dehumanisation caused by numbers. They restore our empathy. Each story I hear 
from a refugee helps me feel, bone-deep, my immutable connection to its teller as a fellow 
human. I see myself, the people I would give my life for, in every tale I am told” (ibid.).  
     Hosseini’s call speaks to my argument about how refugees’ stories can generate useful 
insights and connect us with refugees as real people, who experience fear, pain, and loss. Just as 
Hosseini seeks to rehumanize refugees, my work encourages us to move beyond empathy to 
action. I hope that it may inspire us as scholars and policy-makers to re-animate refugees as real 
people rather than simply objects of policy and research analysis.   
      As I prepared this dissertation, the chronic absence of refugees as real individuals in 
scholarly literature and policy discourses haunted me. Academic research tends to treat refugees 
as objects or data that explain how such groups interact, engage, and respond to governing 
structures in their regions or in receiving states. Refugees’ human experiences during the 
journeys, the details of their daily struggles, and the emotional toll of such experiences are still 
largely missing and undertheorized in migration and refugee studies. This yawning void  limits 
our ability as scholars and policy-makers to grasp  refugees’ real predicaments and aspirations. 
They are missing too from  policy discourse, where they surface  as abstract numbers. They 
appear usually as faceless and nameless, with  “ungrievable” sufferings, or as illegals when they  
challenge  states’ borders in an “unauthorized” manner. Refugees are  “others,” whose pre-war  
lives and deeds are ignored, and whose hopes and dreams  are  questionable. Such an absence 
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reflects policy-makers’ reluctance to treat refugees as equal individuals worthy of  protection that 
offers the “independence and dignity which enable refugees themselves to decide how they wish 
to cope with their predicaments” (Hathaway, 2007: 364). 
      It is because of the absence of refugees that I have chosen not to conclude this dissertation 
with policy recommendations for refugee protection. I do not want to override their voices by 
focusing on policy frameworks again. I feel no need to reproduce what other research projects 
have already accomplished. As I noted above, since Europe’s summer of 2015, several research 
projects have documented and examined migrants and refugees’ journeys, especially via the 
Mediterranean (Amnesty International, 2018; Crawley et al., 2018; Squire et al., 2017; UNHCR, 
2018). Their final reports propose sweeping policy recommendations to facilitate safe and legal 
pathways for those in need of protection, rights-oriented border practices, and protecting human 
rights en route. For example, Amnesty International (2018) challenges practices that violate 
human rights at sea, with often-harrowing results. It urges EU states to deploy enough rescue 
vessels, create regional disembarking arrangements, allow NGOs to continue rescues at sea, de-
criminalize irregular entry, and stop outsourcing border control. It insists on reform of the Dublin 
Regulation system to reduce pressure on front-line EU members and ensure that all signatories 
protect asylum seekers. The UNHCR report Desperate Journeys (2018) recommends similar 
changes, especially re safe and legal pathways to international protection through resettlement 
for unaccompanied children. Squire et al. (2017) conclude Crossing the Mediterranean by Boat 
with calls for safe and legal pathways and improved reception centers. It urges states to replace 
deterrence with interventions that address why people undertake these journeys.  
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     I agree with most of these recommendations and hope that such interventions may challenge 
state efforts in the global north to decontextualize refugee crises in the global south by blaming 
refugees for their own hardships. A proxy war involving many local, regional, and international 
players has caused the Syrian refugee crisis, for example. Most of those players ignore their 
responsibilities towards the people of Syria, who are trapped between a brutal war and structures 
of protection and border controls that lock them in unbearable circumstances. Those who want 
better lives must consider “unauthorized” journeys as “illegal” figures who travel through 
precarious conditions and are portrayed as a threat to deter and securitize. Nevertheless, many of 
these recommendations seem to me unlikely to end the crisis. They fail to see refugees as real 
individuals who deserve to be treated as equal as other people in the global north. Only, I 
believe, by humanizing policies and research can we make a real difference. A radical shift of the 
analysis would circumvent refugees’ “otherness” and the binary of victims/criminals. This would 
require serious and meaningful engagement with refugees’ stories and narratives about their 
actual experiences during war, displacement, and search for protection. This gestalt shift would  
allow ‘us,’ as academics and policy-makers, to see and treat refugees as people who have  
diverse backgrounds, experiences, and  hopes and dreams, as we do, and who  deserve to live 
like us. I explore this form of engagement below.  
Future Research 
     Building on my findings in this dissertation and my argument for more humanized policies 
and academic research that disrupt the “otherness” of refugees and rather engage with them as 
equal humans, I propose three other areas of inquiry for future research informed more by 
refugees’ narratives and actual experiences:  
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- refugees’ integration  in countries of resettlement  
- the impact of  refugees’ differential  experience of their journeys  and its effect on their 
integration  
- the ethics of writing about refugees  
     Integration of refugees: My research opens up future inquiry into how the journey continues 
after arrival. As I noted above, my research has focused on refugees’ experiences before and 
during their actual journeys towards Europe, but I have not here been able to examine their 
experiences in their new localities – a notable, follow-through element of the journey. For many 
of the refugees I interviewed, arrival in Sweden started a new stage of their journey, with 
different kinds of challenges and changes. Many of them talked to me about missing their home, 
community, and life back in Syria. They spoke of the challenges of learning a new language, 
finding a job, or simply coping with new spaces and new norms of life. Hearing about this tells 
me that it is vital to examine refugees’ individual experiences in their new localities to 
understand the barriers and challenges they face as uprooted individuals with a heavy burden of 
emotional scars who are none the less willing to adapt. This inquiry will illuminate the journey 
of refugees as a whole and how it shapes their lives and trajectories. It would explore integration 
in terms of refugees’ individual and communal accomplishments and the barriers they often face.  
     To further humanize policies and research, this inquiry should look first at whether and how 
refugees reconstruct and reaffirm notions of identity, home, and belonging and at these notions’ 
influence on their relationship with their new localities and on their ability to integrate. In fact, 
refugees’ experiences of integration constitute a pressing topic for refugees and policy-makers as 
well. This is crucial, as European liberal values of acceptance and integration have been under 
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siege since the unprecedented events of 2015. The integration of refugees presents a major 
challenge for receiving governments, host communities, and above all for refugees themselves. I 
suggest, however, that a useful inquiry about integration starts not with institutional policies and 
systematic procedures of integration and social cohesion, but with refugees’ experiences and 
intimate notions of identity, home, and belonging. Future research could explore refugees’ 
relationship with their new localities and their integration from their own perspective. This 
presumes serious engagement with refugees’ stories as a prime source of knowledge. Examining 
their encounters with unfamiliar social, economic, and cultural structures may inspire new 
debates and scholarly work in anthropology, sociology, and political science that focus on 
insights from refugees’ actual experiences. This in turn may suggest new ways to think about 
protecting and accepting refugees that flow directly from and address the realities of their 
experiences, and may help humanize policies of protection and integration.  
     The impact of different journeys on refugees’ integration: Another area of inquiry that my 
research findings suggest concerns how the journey may affect refugees’ integration 
differentially. Comparing the experiences of asylum seekers from Syria with those of refugees 
from Syria being resettled by the UNHCR might be very revealing.  Sweden has received more 
than 50,000 Syrians and Palestinian refugees from Syria. As I showed above, the majority of 
these refugees arrived in Sweden “illegally” as asylum seekers during 2015. In response, the 
Aliens Act of July 2016 offered temporary residency to asylum seekers, reducing chances for 
them to reunite their families and creating barriers for refugees and asylum seekers to integrate in 
Sweden (Folkkampnj for Asyllratt, 2016). As a response to the same crisis, Canada received and 
officially resettled more than 40,000 refugees from Syria (Government of Canada, 2017). They 
received permanent residency on arrival, which gave them access to social services. As a 
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member of the Syrian community in Kitchener-Waterloo, Ontario, helping to sponsoring 
refugees and as a board member at Reception House of Waterloo Region, which assists  
government-sponsored refugees with resettlement in Waterloo region, I am keenly aware that 
resettled refugees face daunting  challenges of integration and self-accomplishment.  
     Studying the transformative impact of the refugee journey (see chapter five) may offer a 
starting point for this proposed inquiry. The journey affects various individuals’ positionalities 
and roles as protectors and providers in different ways. Such an inquiry might compare the 
experiences of refugees who resettle in Europe as asylum seekers after precarious journeys with 
those who have been resettled in Canada. Why are some – in both destinations -- still facing 
challenges of integration, such as learning the language, finding jobs, and coping with their new 
lives?  Refugees’ stories should offer prime knowledge for this sort of inquiry. Their own words 
may tell us about the journey’s impact on their ability to integrate, their sense of belonging, and 
their notion of locality while they perhaps try to reconstruct their identities in exile. This may 
lead to new frameworks for protecting refugees that may help them fulfil their needs and 
aspirations. 
     The ethics of writing about refugees: The absence of refugees as real individuals in 
academia and the latter’s tendency to treat them as objects raise questions about the ethics of 
working and writing about refugees and the need for new scholarly approaches that engage 
meaningfully with refugees’ stories and narratives. Scholars such as Clark-Kazak (2017), 
Johnson (2016), and Squire (2018) have entered this vital debate about the ethics of bringing the 
narratives of migrants and refugees into qualitative research. Yet we need more academic 
initiatives in migration and refugee studies to challenge the absence of refugees as real people 
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and to  communicate  with refugees’ communities, which may generate  new ways of thinking 
about  protecting  and accepting refugees.  
     During my journey as a researcher, I had to explore and write  about refugees’ actual 
experiences while having myself been uprooted and while also acquiring knowledge through  my 
communication with  family, friends, and community members, who shared their journey stories 
with me and trusted me to treat their intimate moments with respect and dignity. I came to this 
project from a policy background with a master’s degree in international public policy and long 
professional experience in diplomacy and international business. Thus I started this dissertation 
research  by analyzing the policy discourse of refugee protection and border practices. I 
struggled, however, with this approach, as it failed to capture the real scale and scope of the 
Syrian refugee crisis that I witnessed through my life in Syria and through the stories I heard. 
The policy discourse did not help me to – crucially -- delineate the devastating impact the crisis 
had on people’s lives. I found little space in this discourse for people’s voices and words.  
     This is why, during my research and as I was writing this dissertation, I found myself shifting 
towards other methods that allowed me to treat the stories I heard from refugees in an ethical and 
meaningful way. I ended up situating refugees at the center of my work and treating their stories 
as my prime source of knowledge about their journeys and aspirations and the crisis of protection 
in general. In the light of my experience as a researcher, I argue that research about refugees 
should be informed by their lived experiences and should aim to articulate, perhaps even help 
create new global frameworks of protection that hear, understand, and involve refugees as equal 
human beings.  
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     As I noted above in this Conclusion, research on refugees now tends more than before to 
adopt an ethical approach towards refugees’ experiences. I argue, however, that a breakthrough 
requires going beyond the ethics of research and entails avoiding the “otherness” of refugees. It 
starts by hearing, understanding, and treating refugees as real individuals. Their stories should 
serve not as abstract data that further the agenda and goals of academic researchers, but rather as 
an alternative and priceless source of knowledge about lived experiences and worthy aspirations. 
Genuine human research starts when we imagine ourselves in the position of refugees through 
their stories and words. It succeeds when we feel their tears, loss, fear, and their hopes and 
dreams. This becomes possible only when we perceive refugees as equal human beings, whose 
lives are worth living and whose sufferings and deaths deserve dignified acknowledgment and 
grief.   
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Interview Appendix  
Name Route  Date of 
Journey 
Family Destination 
Ammar 
 
Lebanon – Thailand – 
Turkey – Balkan 
route - Germany 
2013 -2015 -  Hanover - 
Germany 
Arrad Turkey - Canada 2012 - 2014 Wife and 2 
Children 
Kitchener - 
Canada 
Fares Egypt – Libya – Italy 
- Sweden 
2012- 2014 Wife and 1 
Child 
Stockholm - 
Sweden 
Hania Turkey – Greece – 
Balkan route - 
Sweden 
2015 6 children  Laxå - Sweden 
Issam and 
Qamar 
Egypt – Italy - 
Sweden 
2013 5 Children  Stockholm - 
Sweden 
Karam and 
Jenna 
Turkey – Greece – 
Italy - Sweden 
2014 3 Children  Hässleholm – 
Sweden  
Khaled Jordan – Syria – 
Turkey – Balkan 
route - Sweden 
2012- 2015 Sister and her 
family  
Berlin - 
Germany 
Mahmoud  Egypt – Italy – 
Sweden  
2013 Two sons (one 
stayed in 
Germany) 
Hässleholm - 
Sweden 
Rahma Turkey – Greece- 
Sweden  
2015 Son  Hässleholm - 
Sweden 
Rana  Irbil – Turkey – 
Greece - Sweden 
2014 Mother and one 
son  
Stockholm - 
Sweden 
Rasha  Turkey – Greece – 
Balkan route - 
Sweden 
2015 3 children  Laxå - Sweden 
Rawan 
 
Turkey – Malaysia – 
Germany - Sweden  
2014 -  Uppsala - 
Sweden 
Safieh  Turkey – Greece – 
Norway  
2014 Husband Norway 
Salam  Turkey – Greece - 
Sweden 
2013 -  Stockholm - 
Sweden 
Wassim  Egypt – Turkey – 
Greece – Sweden 
2013 - 2014 Wife and 2 
children 
(separate 
journeys) 
Stockholm – 
Sweden  
Rajaa Egypt – Turkey – 
Greece - Sweden 
2014 Wife of Wassim Stockholm - 
Sweden 
Rami  Egypt – Italy - 
Sweden 
2013 Son of Wassim  Stockholm - 
Sweden 
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Shadi  Egypt – Turkey – 
Greece – Balkan 
route - Sweden 
2014 Son of Wassim Stockholm - 
Sweden 
Yamen  Libya – Italy - 
Sweden 
2014 Daughter  Hässleholm – 
Sweden  
Youssef  Egypt – Libya – Italy 
– Sweden  
2012 -  Hässleholm – 
Sweden  
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Maps of Routs and Journeys 
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